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ABSTRACT
The terms 'sustainability' and 'sustainable development' have been
widely used in the context of environmental issues since the 1987
Brundtland Report, but there has been controversy about what they
mean, if anything. This thesis examines how a concept like sustainability
is used to attempt to change the world and how, conversely, its meaning
is changed by the political context in which it is used. Some people have
seen sustainable development as an attempt to co-opt environmentalist
concerns, rather than a genuine shift in approach.
This thesis examines the contemporary debate about sustainability and its
historical origins in wider concerns about Progress that have been present
since the beginning of the modern age at the end of the eighteenth
century, but were largely dormant from the middle of the nineteenth
century until the 1970s. Following a review of literature, many of the key
players in the debates of the last twenty years were personally
interviewed. Sustainability is shown to be a concept coined by
environmentalists in the 1970s to counter criticism that concern about
the environment was unimportant relative to social problems like
poverty. It also had the advantage that it placed opponents of
environmentalism on the rhetorical defensive.
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The thesis explores the sharp debates in recent years as environmentalists
and economists have struggled for control of the concept. It shows how
adoption of the concept of sustainability requires a rethinking of the
utilitarian philosophy that has been the ethical basis for economic theory
to date. It also shows that environmentalists have retreated from
simplistic neo-Malthusian thinking about economic growth.
The uptake of the idea of sustainability is seen as marking a loss of
confidence in the modern age's identification of Progress with crude
domination of nature. There is growing acceptance of the idea of physical
limits in view of the increasing evidence. Paradoxically, the concept of
sustainability is based on criticism of modernity's approach to nature but
retains modernity's optimism about the rational control of society. The
recent collapse of confidence in socialism has underlined scepticism
about that aspect of modernity just as much as the environmental crisis
has undermined its goal of the domination of nature.
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Stories about environmental issues now often appear in the media. In
the last few years it has become frequent for somebody to be quoted
commenting that the trend in question is 'unsustainable'. It may be said
about anything - ranging from emissions of carbon dioxide changing the
Earth's climate down to the environmental impact of disposable nappies.
In the 1990s, the idea that we should live 'sustainably' has become a
central slogan in environmental discussions. When the Norwegians
slaughter minke whales, they defend the activity on the grounds that it is
sustainable. Their environmentalist opponents are then forced to argue
that there are other criteria of judgement apart from sustainability.
Why has this idea of sustainability become so important recently? One
reason is because the idea of sustainability is much more powerful
rhetorically than an idea like being 'environmentally friendly'. But that
cannot be the entire explanation. After all, the term was hardly heard
until the late 1980s, twenty years after the contemporary environmental
movement got going.
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The idea of sustainability in something like its modern form was first
used by the World Council of Churches in 1974.1 It was proposed by
Western environmentalists in order to get round Third World objections
to worrying about the environment when human beings in many parts
of the world suffer from poverty and deprivation.
The idea only came to prominence in 1987, when the United Nations'
World Commission on Environment and Development, chaired by the
future Norwegian prime minister Gro Harlem Brundtland, published its
report Our Common Future.2 The central recommendation of this report,
usually known as the Brundtland report, was that the way to reconcile
the competing demands for environmental protection and for economic
development was through a new approach: Sustainable Development.
They defined it as development that "meets the needs of the present
without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their
needs."3
The slogan 'sustainable development' was quickly taken up by
governments and international agencies. At the UN Conference on
Environment and Development (UNCED), which took place in Rio de
Janeiro in 1992, the world's political leaders pledged their support for the
goal. However, the sight of such unanimous support from politicians has
encouraged the suspicion among some environmentalists that
sustainable development is a meaningless idea. Different people appear
to use the slogan in different ways, some emphasising development
through economic growth, and others emphasising sustainability
through environmental protection.
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Some environmentalist critics have claimed that the idea of sustainable
development is a contradiction in terms, and can be used merely as a
cover for continuing to destroy the natural world.4 On the other side of
the debate, some economists have argued that sustainable development
is too cautious about the future. It could lead to sacrifices of economic
growth for the sake of excessive concern about depletion of natural
resources. Defenders of the concept argue that disagreement about
sustainable development does not show that it is meaningless. Rather, it
is a 'contestable concept' like liberty or justice. Most people support these
goals but disagree about what exactly constitutes liberty or justice.5 It is
also sometimes argued by environmentalist supporters of the sustainable
development slogan that the compromises inherent in combining
'sustainable' with 'development' were a necessary price to pay to get the
idea of sustainability into the political mainstream at all.
However, the debate about sustainability is not simply about
'environment versus growth'. The idea of sustainable development was
originally used by the Brundtland Commission to try to get round that
polarised debate which had run from the early seventies. Although
sustainability is often presented as a matter of prudence, even of
common-sense - that you should not destroy the basis of your own
existence - it is really more a question of equity. People who engage in
unsustainable practices are not usually the ones who suffer the
consequences. Concern about sustainability must be based on moral
obligations towards future generations, not just personal self-interest. A
crucial sentence in the Brundtland report stated: "Even the narrow
notion of physical sustainability implies a concern for social equity
between generations, a concern that must logically be extended to equity
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within each generation."6 In this way, the Brundtland Commission's
conception of sustainable development brought together equity between
generations (intergenerational equity, in the jargon) and equity within
generations (intragenerational equity).
Bringing these two ideas together was a political masterstroke. From the
late sixties, when the present-day environmentalist movement was
starting, leftists and representatives of the Third World had frequently
accused environmentalists, with their concerns about 'the population
bomb' and 'the limits to growth', of being unconcerned about the plight of
the poor. They saw all this talk of 'limits' as a cover for traditional
conservative arguments that wealth was too scarce for everyone to share
in it - a thinly disguised justification for inequality.
The historical precedent for this view was Karl Marx's critique of the
argument put forward by Robert Malthus at the end of the eighteenth
century. Malthus had claimed that uncontrolled population growth
among the poor meant that wealth could not be distributed more equally,
as some supporters of the French Revolution wanted. The numbers of
poor would quickly grow to eat up any surplus and reduce everyone to a
state of bare subsistence.
Marx and his colleague Friedrich Engels argued that Malthus' argument
was false and was simply an excuse for inequality. The poor could learn
the same 'moral restraint' against large families that apparently had kept
the rich from breeding themselves into poverty. More importantly, they
argued that Malthus' concept of natural limits was oppressive and
conservative. It justified social injustice and ignored the potential for
scientific and technical progress.
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Ironically, today it is free market economists who most enthusiastically
echo Marx and Engels' faith in growth and progress. In the 1990s,
environmentalists have taken up Brundtland's idea of the connection
between intergenerational and intragenerational equity. Using the
concept of 'environmental space', Friends of the Earth now claims that
sustainability requires that people in the North reduce their consumption
of resources per head to a level that everyone in the world would be able
to live on indefinitely.
Environmental economists instead define sustainability in terms of non-
depletion of capital. It is argued that we are presently depleting the
'natural capital' of the Earth, as the green economist Herman Daly put it,
treating the world "as if it were a business in liquidation."7 However,
there is disagreement about to what extent advancing technology replaces
human-made capital for natural capital, and how far the idea of non-
depletion of natural capital should be taken. Oil is currently being
consumed at a million times the rate at which the reserves were laid
down. Should we immediately reduce our consumption a millionfold in
order to be sustainable?
Even radical Greens see the absurdity of that line of thinking. The debate
between 'strong' sustainability and 'weak' sustainability is about whether,
in general, the proceeds from running down natural capital like oil
reserves, that can be substituted for, should be invested directly in
substitutes for those resources - such as solar power technology, or can be
invested in other forms of capital - such as education. Another debate is
about whether there is such a thing as 'critical' natural capital that cannot
be substituted for by technology, and must be preserved absolutely.
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The dispute between environmentalists and economists over
sustainability is not just about the capacity of technological progress to
substitute for natural resources. In the absence of sufficient
understanding of the natural environment and of the capacities of future
science and technology to deal with any problems, it involves disputes
about how to deal with indeterminate risks. Economists tend to average
out such risks in their calculations, burying worst-case possibilities in the
average, so tending to advocate risky approaches to environmental
futures. Environmentalists instead highlight worst-case outcomes and
suggest that extra efforts should be taken to avoid them.
There are parallels between the risky approach that economists take with
the future and their lack of support for egalitarianism in the present.
Both are a result of the assumptions of the utilitarian philosophy
underlying mainstream economics. Most environmentalists are more
left-wing, and it turns out that there is a real philosophical parallel
between their interest in equity to future generations and equity within
generations. Drawing on the theories of the philosopher John Rawls, I
will suggest that there are very severe tensions between the utilitarian
basis of mainstream economics and sustainability's concern for equity
within and between generations. The difficulties of incorporating
sustainability concerns into mainstream economic thinking cast doubt on
the assumptions underlying economic approaches such as cost-benefit
analysis in environmental policy-making.
The concept of the links between concern for these two kinds of equity
has in the last few years led to a debate around the concept of
'environmental space' - the idea that the Earth's limited capacity to
support human use of the environment for economic purposes should
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be equally shared between the population of the world, rather than
predominantly for the benefit of the minority who live in industrialised
countries.
Is the idea of sustainability primarily about the economic prospects for
our descendants, or ultimately about the preservation of the natural
world for the sake of posterity? The debate between environmentalists
and economists about sustainability involves not just how we want to
treat the poor of today and our descendants, but also about how we value
the natural world. Do considerations of sustainability lead to the
protection of the natural world? Or is an ethical concern for nature for its
own sake necessary to bring about sustainability?
Richard Norgaard, an environmental economist at Berkeley, has argued
that the concept of sustainable development marks the beginning of the
dominant strand of Western culture's break with an idea it has been
firmly wedded to for the past two centuries - faith in Progress.8 When
people believed in Progress they did not worry about taking care of the
environment for the sake of their children and grandchildren. Progress
was seen in terms of the mastery of nature. People assumed that
advancing science and technology, by increasing human mastery of
nature, would decrease our dependence on it. In recent decades, faith in
human beings' capacity to successfully master nature or even to
collectively control our own destiny has been diminished. Too many
grand projects for improving the condition of humanity have ended in
social and environmental disasters.
The present debate about sustainability is part of a wider re-evaluation of
many of the values that have been passed down to us since the
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Enlightenment. It is the ideas of the Enlightenment that inspired
Western culture's optimism about science and progress. For a long time,
that optimism appeared to be amply borne out. Only in recent decades has
widespread doubt set in about the direction that our path of development
is taking us.
However, the environmental movement also shares many Western
post-Enlightenment values, while criticising others. It has an ambivalent
relationship to modernity itself. The commitment to equity that is crucial
to the idea of sustainability comes straight out of the values of the French
Revolution. The concept of sustainability is also an extension of the sort
of commitment to large-scale social reform that the Enlightenment
brought to the Western world. So sustainability combines much of the
social optimism of the Enlightenment with disillusion about the means
by which its goals were pursued.
What is more, the idea that we can achieve a condition of sustainability
implies that we will be able to consciously take control of our destiny and
redirect development in a different direction. The socialist movement
was about taking control of our historical destiny, and it ultimately failed
in its attempt to consciously transform the world to bring about a new
society. To try to achieve sustainability is to set ourselves a goal as
ambitious as any of the aims of the Enlightenment.
The thesis is structured in four parts. Part One provides an introduction
provides an introduction to the investigation and outlines the
methodology adopted for the research. Part Two deals with the historical
background to the emergence of the concept of sustainability, based on a
review of the literature. Part Three turns to consider the current debates,
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drawing heavily on interviews with key players in these debates. Finally,
Part Four returns to a more historical consideration of sustainability in
the context of a re-assessment of modernity.
^orld Council of Churches (1974) Report of Ecumenical Study
Conference on Science and Technology for Human Development,
Geneva: World Council of Churches
2World Commission on Environment and Development (1987) Our
Common Future, Oxford: Oxford University Press
3ibid, p. 8
4Tim O'Riordan (1988) 'The Politics of Sustainability' in Sustainable
Environmental Management: Principles and Practice, edited by R. Kerry
Turner, London: Belhaven
5Michael Jacobs (1991) The Green Economy, London: Pluto
6WCED (1987), p. 43
7Herman E. Daly (1992) Steady-State Economics, Second Edition, London:
Earthscan, p. 248




This section outlines how the project was conducted. It deals with the
research questions behind the project, the theoretical approach taken, and
the research design and implementation. A list of interviewees is
included at the end of the section.
Research questions
The thesis project was first conceived in early 1991 as a piece of research
examining the concept of sustainability. The terms sustainable
development and sustainability had already achieved considerable
popularity in discussions of environmental issues since the Brundtland
report. I was interested in considering claims on the one hand that
sustainable development marked a major advance in the environmental
debate, and on the other hand that the idea was self-contradictory or
meaningless. Did 'sustainable development' have a meaning?
During an extensive survey of the literature, a number of further issues
emerged. Some claimed that the intention of the Brundtland
Commission in adopting the term sustainable development had been to
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overcome the past controversy about economic growth and put the
environment on the agenda in a more positive way. Others put the
contrary view that the intention was to avoid the crucial issues by putting
forward a slogan that was in fact meaningless. So just what was the
intention behind the adoption of the term sustainable development?
The concept of sustainable development could be interpreted as an
attempt by environmentalists to force the mainstream to adopt the
environmental agenda in order to place them on the defensive. On the
other hand, it could be seen as an attempt by the mainstream to adopt
environmental rhetoric in order to co-opt environmentalist concern and
in that way neutralise it. Just who was co-opting whom?
The development of ideas about sustainability since the Brundtland
report had mostly taken place in the field of environmental economics. It
seemed that environmental economics was the meeting point for
environmentalists and economists to express their competing world-
views. Just what was going on between these two crucial groups?
Another question concerned the difference between sustainable
development and sustainability. The Brundtland report had used both
expressions. However, some environmentalists claimed that sustainable
development and sustainability were quite different ideas. Sustainable
development was primarily about continuing the growth agenda by other
means. Sustainability put the environmental agenda first. Was
'sustainable development' in fact different from 'sustainability'? What
was the significance of different interpretations of sustainability? Did it
mean that agreement was fundamentally impossible to achieve, or just
that consensus about such a new idea would take time to emerge?
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The continuation of the seventies growth debate in more recent
discussions of sustainable development leads to the question of whether
or not economic growth is compatible with achieving a state of
sustainability. The growth question also relates strongly to the issue of
equity within generations.
I was also interested in the philosophical basis of concern for
sustainability and in the relationship between concern for future
generations and concern for members of the present generation. Does a
concern for the welfare of future generations automatically require
concern for the welfare of the poor of the present day, as the Brundtland
Commission claimed? What is the philosophical basis of concern for the
welfare of members of future generations that do not actually exist?
The most fundamental question was whether it is possible to implement
the goal of sustainability at all. How would you set about achieving such a
major change in social and economic practice? Is sustainability a state to
be achieved, a goal to be aimed for but never attained, or just a slogan for
people to rally round?
The empirical research sought to explore these questions in more depth
and to clarify and carry forward the debates in the literature by talking to
those involved in these debates.
Theoretical approaches
My main interest in the research was in substantive issues rather than
social scientific theory itself. I did not attempt to follow a particular
epistemology, seeing theory only as a guide to the conduct of the research.
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I was looking at the debate in terms of attempts to use ideas to obtain
power and change the world, so my basic approach to the research project
was based on a 'Machiavellian' interpretation. In this century, a number
of authors have taken up Machiavelli's1 approach to political power to
explain social phenomena. I will outline the work of Foucault, Latour,
Callon and Gramsci which particularly strongly relates to these concerns.
Michel Foucault's 'genealogy' is a way of writing history that addresses
how ideas about the world appear and change the way the world is
organised.2 Foucault challenges conventionally accepted views - such as
that prison exists to reform criminals - showing that, although prisons
were intended to have that function, it has been known for well over a
century that they do not. Fie asks what social purpose prisons have served
after their original purpose has been lost. Foucault does not accept
functionalist explanations of social phenomena which explain them as
devices to maintain social stability. In Foucault's interpretation, ideas and
institutions are instead seen as historically contingent. Their power
resides not in themselves but in their relationships with the rest of the
world. He looks at the way that ideas that grant some people control over
others can be challenged.
Foucault's work addresses the organisation of the world primarily in
terms of the control of the human being, focusing on issues such as
prisons, mental institutions and the construction of sexuality. His post-
structuralist approach has been taken up quite widely in social science.
More recently, Bruno Latour and others have developed 'actor-network
theory'.3 It addresses the organisation of the social and natural world
together. Latour concentrates on how scientists and engineers turn their
theories or inventions from ideas into accepted social facts by forging
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alliances, not just with people, but with nature. Like Foucault, he looks at
the relationship between knowledge and power. Whereas Foucault
refused to define what power was, Latour explains power in terms of
number and strength of connections. By establishing connections
between things that were previously unconnected, an actor obtains power
over the elements connected. The more connections one can establish
with a particular element, the more power over that element one has.
Having a lot of connections enables one to act at a distance, and a
previously weak actor can become powerful. To have a lot of power, it is
necessary to tie together a lot of elements in a network.
Michel Callon, a colleague of Latour's at the Ecole des Mines in Paris, has
elaborated actor-network theory through the concept of 'translation'.4
Translation is the way in which elements are defined and thereby
constituted and positioned in relation to other subjects. Successful
translation leads to a situation where the elements work together towards
a desired goal - they are said to be convergent. In a convergent network,
because the elements are strongly tied together in mutual relationships,
they are difficult to break apart and re-problematise - the network is said
to be relatively irreversible. Callon uses a term also used by Foucault, that
of 'normalisation'. For Callon the normalisation of a network occurs as it
becomes convergent and irreversible. The relations between actors and
intermediaries become stable and routine. Foucault's conception of
normalisation is similar, but also emphasises the establishment of
disciplinary mechanisms to maintain the network.
A major criticism that can be made of Latour's and Callon's theories,
however, is that they operate only at a 'micro' level of direct interactions
between players, and ignore the broader social structures and other
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'macro' level phenomena.5 Another approach, also influenced by
Machiavelli's writings, but more able to deal with 'macro' level
phenomena is Antonio Gramsci's theory of hegemony.6 Gramsci's theory
examines how power is maintained in society through the establishment
of ideological 'hegemony' rather than domination by the use of force, and
by the formation of alliances around a coalition of interests and ideas.
There are also clear parallels with Foucault's work. Neither accepts the
functionalism that is a consequence of the rigidities of orthodox Marxist
and structuralist thought. Instead, they emphasise the way that power is
constructed and can be challenged. Gramsci, as a Marxist of sorts, gives
more emphasis to the material Realpolitik of a situation than the post-
structuralist Foucault does. However, unlike orthodox Marxists, he does
not see classes as simply pre-existing entities, rather as things that are
themselves constructed by a process of negotiation. But Gramsci grants
ideas less life of their own than Foucault does. His theory of power is
more materially based.
In my opinion, Marxism had an undue influence on Gramsci's thought,
and structuralism on Foucault's. Although Gramsci's Marxism is not
functionalist, it retains a key flaw in Marxist thought, the belief that it
alone stands outside the world and provides an Archimedean position
from which to view the world. Foucault's thought abandons the
structuralist belief that an understanding of linguistic relationships
provides a secure basis for knowledge, but retains the linguistic
philosophers' belief that language is the basis for knowledge. Both
Gramsci's and Foucault's theories of knowledge and power show
influences of systems of thought that they had partially, but not
completely, transcended.
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All these approaches examine how a stable set of relations, variously
called irreversibility, normalisation or hegemony, are achieved. They
approach the issue from different perspectives. Gramsci takes the
perspective of the subaltern class in its attempt to take the dominant
position in society. Latour takes the perspective of scientists and
engineers attempting to translate their ideas into networks of power.
Foucault looks at history from the perspective of the present, and
attempts to show how arbitrary and contingent the conceptions of truth
that have emerged are. The perspectives are different, both in orientation
and scale.
Gramsci's concept of 'hegemony' emphasises the extent to which in order
to gain and keep power it is necessary to have an ideological hold over
people, so that your interpretation of the world seems like 'common
sense' to them. Gramsci argued that any group which seeks to transform a
modern society must obtain ideological hegemony first. According to
Gramsci, a hegemonic group articulates its interests as being central to the
general interest. It forms alliances by showing how the interests of its
allies are linked to these central interests. A Gramscian interpretation of
sustainable development could be as a concept put forward in an attempt
to achieve the status of 'common sense' for environmental concerns,
placing opponents on the rhetorical defensive and attempting to
construct a broad coalition of interest in support of the phrase.
Foucault and Latour's approaches are more useful when looking at the
development of theories of sustainability in environmental economics.
In Foucauldian terms, environmental economics could be seen as the
discipline being created to academically embody the concept. Callon's
19
concept of translation can be used to consider attempts to incorporate
ideas from environmentalism into economics.
Both Callon's concept of translation and Gramsci's idea of hegemony
imply that enrolment is a double-edged sword. The dominant party must
in some ways, if only rhetorically, be seen to address the concerns of the
subordinate groups. In this process, both parties are to some extent
transformed. All three approaches see the normalisation of a new set of
social relations as an uncertain achievement that is potentially reversible.
They tell us something about the strategies for bringing about change, but
the outcomes of these processes are not predetermined - they depend on
the particular circumstances.
Research design
My aim in conducting the interview study was to speak to as many of the
key participants in the debate as possible. These were mainly academics
and diplomats. At that stage, I had identified the role of environmental
economists as crucial to the theoretical development of the concept of
sustainability. The United Nations process leading from Brundtland
through UNCED was the most important factor in the emergence of
sustainable development as an issue in international politics. My
intention was to conduct interviews with people who had played a
critical role in either the theoretical or political development of the
concept in order to get a more detailed understanding than was possible
just from the published literature and examine in more detail questions
arising from this. To do that, I tried to interview people who had written
books or papers that had been particularly important in the emergence of
the concepts of sustainability and sustainable development.
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Another interest I had was to look at attempts at implementing
sustainability. I conducted a number of interviews in the Netherlands
focusing on the national debate about sustainability, which is probably the
furthest advanced anywhere. Since the late eighties, and the publication
of the first National Environmental Protection Plan, the rhetoric of
sustainability has been central to Dutch environmental policy. Much of
the recent work on the 'environmental space' approach to sustainability
discussed in later chapters has been conducted in the Netherlands.
As well as conducting interviews, I directly observed international
negotiations at the 1994 meeting of the Commission on Sustainable
Development in New York, at the first Conference of the Parties to the
Framework Convention on Climate Change which took place in Berlin
in 1995, and attended some sessions at the 1994 World Bank/IMF General
Meeting in Madrid.
The original interview schedule was piloted with a test sample in the
Edinburgh area. The first stage of the fieldwork was a series of interviews
conducted in Britain in spring 1994. The next stage was a field trip to the
United States in summer 1994. I had not originally expected that it would
be possible to interview anyone from the Brundtland Commission or any
of the main UNCED negotiators. In the end, though, when attending the
CSD meeting in New York, I was able to interview Nitin Desai, who had
worked on the Brundtland report, and Ismail Razali, Malaysia's UN
ambassador, who had played an important role in UNCED. After the
CSD, I spent several weeks in the United States and interviewed a
number of figures. Between interviews, I spent time at the Library of
Congress in Washington to do further reading of the American literature.
After my trip to the United States, where it had proved difficult to
21
interview the World Bank employees I had planned to talk to, I managed
to interview Andrew Steer, the director of the World Bank environment
department, in Madrid. I also made a few trips to the Netherlands to
conduct interviews there with academics, environmentalists and civil
servants.
(a) Recruitment of Interviewees
The interviewees were chosen to represent participants in both the
theoretical and political debates about sustainability. In practice, many of
the leading theoreticians had also had some involvement in the politics.
Professor David Pearce and Professor Hans Opschoor, for example, had
both been advisers to their national governments. Some interviewees
proved much easier to gain access to than others. It proved impossible to
interview Maurice Strong, the former Secretary-General of UNCED, for
example. In some cases, persistence did pay off. For example, after several
unsuccessful attempts to arrange an interview, I did manage to get an
interview with David Pearce.
(b) Interviews
The interviews focused on the following areas:
• Professional life and work
• Understanding of the emergence of the debate.
• Drawing on their writings (if any), their own personal involvement in
the debates.
• Views on substantive issues related to economics and ecology.
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• How these substantive issues impinged on their own work and practice.
Initially, an interview schedule was drawn up. Early interviews in which
I tried to cover most of the schedule proved unsatisfactorily shallow,
however; and later an approach was adopted focusing on key questions
about issues the interviewee was directly involved in. Before each
interview, I attempted to read as much as possible that the interviewee
had written and work out which parts of the interview schedule and
which additional questions were particularly relevant.
Interviews usually lasted between 45-90 minutes.
(b) Transcription and Analysis
The interviews were transcribed afterwards, a task that took
approximately 6-12 hours of work per interview. Transcription and
preliminary analysis took place between groups of interviews, helping
with refinement of the interview technique.
(c) Table of Interviews
In addition to the interviews listed below, I was able to interview three
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Professor of Environmental Sciences, 15.3.94
University of East Anglia;
leading writer and commentator on
environmental issues
Political adviser to the 22.3.94
UK Environment Secretary
Research Fellow, 23.3.94
Centre for Social and Economic
Research on the Global Environment,
University College London;
important theorist of sustainability as
a concept in environmental
economics
Research Fellow, Green College, 20.4.94
Oxford
Warden of Green College, Oxford; 20.4.94
UK Prime Minister's adviser on
sustainable development;
former British Ambassador to the
United Nations
Director of UNED-UK; 26.5.94
environmental lobbyist at the Earth




leading figure in global NGO







author of Brundtland Commission's










Head of Secretariat, 2.6.94
Commission on Sustainable
Development
Assistant Professor of Biology, 6.6.94
Stanford University;
co-author (with Paul Ehrlich) of The
Population Bomb (1968)
retired Professor of Biology, 7.6.94
University of California,
Santa Barbara;
prominent environmentalist in the
late 1960s and early 1970s
retired Professor of Theology, 8.6.94
Claremont College, California;
co-author (with Herman Daly) of For
the Common Good (1989)
Associate Professor of 22.6.94
Political Science,
University of Maryland;
editor of The Sustainable Society
(1977), the first book about
sustainability




author of Steady-State Economics
(1977) and (with John Cobb)For the
Common Good (1989)
Professor of Environmental Studies, 23.6.94
Dartmouth College;
lead author of The Limits to Growth
(1972) and Beyond the Limits (1992)
Professor of Systems Dynamics, 24.6.94
University of New Hampshire;
co-author of The Limits to Growth










Research Fellow, Harvard University; 24.6.94
co-author of Blueprint for a Green
Economy (1989)
Malaysian Ambassador to the 5.7.94
United Nations;
former Chairman, Commission on
Sustainable Development
Associate Professor, School of Energy 21.7.94
and Natural Resources,
University of California, Berkeley;
author of Development Betrayed
(1994)
Senior Researcher, Friends of the 24.8.94
Earth Netherlands;
lead author of Sustainable
Netherlands Action Plan (1993), an
exploration of the environmental
space concept
Director of World Bank Environment 5.10.94
Department
Researcher, Friends of the Earth
Netherlands
Environmental Statistician,
Netherlands Central Bureau of
Statistics
Professor of Economics,
Free University of Amsterdam;
former Chairperson of Netherlands
Advisory Board on Research on
Nature and the Environment;






David Pearce Professor of Environmental 9.2.95
Economics, University College
London;
Chair of the Economics Working
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The debates around sustainability today - about limits to growth and
about the domination of nature - are not as new as they are sometimes
thought to be. There has been an intellectual debate around these issues
since the beginning of the modern age, two hundred years ago. In the
nineteenth century, the question of whether there were limits to growth
and the social consequences of such limits was the subject of fierce
controversy started by Malthus shortly after the French Revolution. His
most influential critics, Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, argued that
limits were not natural, but social.
In parallel to this debate, the Industrial Revolution led to an aesthetic
backlash to the domination of nature from the Romantic movement.
Mary Shelley's novel Frankenstein was the first expression of the modern
myth of scientific advance rebounding on humanity and its creator. The
Malthusian and the Romantic responses to modernity were both
influential among intellectuals in the early part of the nineteenth
century, but they became marginalised later in the century as scientific
and technological progress bounded forwards. These ideas, sceptical of
modernity's optimism about scientific progress, are intellectual forebears
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of the environmentalism that emerged as a much more powerful force in
the late twentieth century.
The late twentieth century environmental movement was sparked off by
increasing concern among scientists themselves about the
environmental impacts of modern technologies. In the early 1960s, there
was growing scientific concern about radioactive fallout from
atmospheric testing of nuclear weapons. This was soon followed, after the
publication of Rachel Carson's Silent Spring, by concern about the impact
on wildlife of large-scale use of pesticides. The environmentalism of the
1960s was first led by scientists drawing attention to existing
environmental problems. Later in the sixties, the idea of global
environmental limits began to emerge as a theme. Paul and Anne
Ehrlich's Population Bomb, in 1968, and the Club of Rome's The Limits to
Growth in 1972 were key examples of this trend. After The Limits to
Growth, environmentalists began to concentrate on the role of the
pursuit of economic growth in environmental destruction. Dissident
economists like Fritz Schumacher and Herman Daly became prominent
in the environmental movement.
The concept of sustainability emerged soon after the 1972 Stockholm UN
Conference on the Human Environment. The concept was an attempt to
bring together environmentalism with social justice in response to
accusations of neo-Malthusianism that had been made about the new
environmentalism by representatives of the Third World at Stockholm.
It took until 1987, though, for this attempt to reconcile environment and
equity to develop real political force with the publication of the
Brundtland report. The slogan of sustainable development soon proved
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irresistible for governments and was endorsed by the world's political
leaders at the UN Conference on Environment and Development in
1992. Facing up to the implications of sustainable development has
proved to be much more difficult, though.
Chapter 2.2, 'Historical Origins of the Debate', deals with the debate about
progress until the end of the nineteenth century. Chapter 2.3, 'The
Emergence of Environmentalism', describes the development of the
modern environmental movement from the late nineteenth century.
Chapter 2.4, 'Sustainability Emerging', describes developments from the
1972 UN Conference on the Human Environment in Stockholm until
the 1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in
Rio. It concentrates particularly on the Brundtland Report. Chapter 2.5,






It was the development of Western science that allowed human beings to
break free of the technological limits which had constrained earlier
civilisations, leading to the emergence of belief in Progress.1 The
rediscovery of Greek science from the Arabs and information gleaned
from the Arabs themselves launched European science at the end of the
Middle Ages. The invention of the printing press enabled ideas to spread
quickly. In the seventeenth century, European scientists began to make
dramatic new breakthroughs. The invention of the telescope and
Galileo's discovery of moons orbiting Jupiter led to the overthrow of the
old Earth-centred view of the universe. The discrediting of the authority
of the Catholic Church's teachings about astronomy precipitated the
development of rationalism as an ideology for scientists. The power of
reason was demonstrated by Isaac Newton when he developed his laws of
motion to explain the movement of the heavenly bodies in mechanical
terms.
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Francis Bacon was a particularly important ideologist of science. In his
Utopian novel The New Atlantis, published in 1627, he introduced the
idea that science would enable the domination of nature.2 It had
previously been believed that man had permanently lost his dominion
after the expulsion from the Garden of Eden. Bacon proposed that it could
be regained through a scientific understanding of nature's workings. His
startling idea was that scientific men could gain powers that had been
believed to belong to God. His imagery was striking: "I am come in very
truth leading to you Nature with all her children to bind her to your
service and make her your slave."3
Another important early ideologist was Rene Descartes. In A Discourse
on Method, he put forward the idea that nature could be understood by
the use of Reason.4 He firmly separated man, who possessed rationality,
from the rest of the natural world, which did not and could be regarded as
a machine. Even animals, which appeared to be conscious, were in fact
mere automata. There were no longer any ethical restraints on what
could be done to other living things or the Earth. The first great success of
Descartes' vision of scientific progress through the analogy of Nature as a
machine was Newton's discovery of the laws of motion. It was followed
in the late seventeenth and the eighteenth century by rapid advances in
many fields of science.
In the eighteenth century, the Enlightenment and the idea of the Age of
Reason looked for the rationality being applied so successfully in science
to be turned to other fields. In England, the philosopher John Locke
outlined a political theory based on a deduction of the rights to life, liberty
and property.5 Locke inspired Thomas Jefferson's American Declaration
of Independence. The idea of a rational political order took an even more
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powerful hold in the French Revolution, inspired by philosophes like
Voltaire and Rousseau.
In Britain, rationality was applied in the field of economics. Early
capitalism began to break down the semi-feudal order and the factory
system was created. Intellectual support for capitalism and the market
came from the Scottish political economist Adam Smith, as exemplified
in his description of the division of labour in a pin factory.6 He showed
how a complex and difficult task had been rationally broken down into a
series of tasks, which could be completed much more quickly when
divided up in this way. Smith also reasoned counter-intuitively that
efficient economic coordination could be achieved through competition
in markets. If each individual acted to maximise their own economic self-
interest, "the invisible hand" of the market would bring about the most
efficient distribution of resources.
Unlike Locke, Smith and the English tradition of liberalism, who based
their theories on the idea that self-interest was natural, but could be
harnessed for the general good, Rousseau argued that man was born
good, but was corrupted by society.7 Adam Smith welcomed the creation
of new desires that followed from economic development. Rousseau
thought that human desires beyond the need for food and shelter
contributed to unhappiness. Possessions are not essential for happiness,
Rousseau wrote, and the desire for them arises out of comparison with
others, and sense of vanity, which Rousseau called amour-propre. The
result is that people are unhappy in civilised societies, not because they
are unable to fulfil their basic needs, but because they cannot fulfil socially
created desires. Economic development continually creates a gap between
new wants and their fulfilment. Rousseau held that the route to
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happiness lay in abandoning society and returning to life as a natural
being in a natural world. His ideas inspired the Romantic movement in
the early nineteenth century, and are echoed today by the Green
movement.8
It was Smith, rather than Rousseau, who captured the spirit of the future.
At the end of the eighteenth century, the application of the steam engine,
starting in England but soon spreading across Europe and America, led to
a sudden explosion of manufacturing activity that Engels later named
"the Industrial Revolution". Within two generations it had led to the
most profound changes in the nature of people's lives since the
invention of agriculture several millennia earlier. The technology and
social organisation that flowed out of the Industrial Revolution gave
human beings a degree of control over nature unparalleled in previous
history.
Malthus and Population
Just as the Industrial Revolution was starting to expand the limits of
material progress, Reverend T. R. Malthus published his Essay on
Population in 1798. He argued that the tendency of population towards
geometric growth meant that it would always outstrip the growth in food
supply. The population was controlled by 'misery' (rising mortality rates
due to food shortages) and 'vice' (prostitution and contraception). The
standard of living of the labouring classes always hovered around the
minimum necessary for subsistence. This tendency towards population
increase meant that any improvement in the conditions of the labouring
classes could be only temporary and would soon be eaten up by
population growth. The poor laws, which provided relief for
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unemployed labourers, only encouraged them to have more children
than they could support. Those laws should be abolished. The 'iron law of
population' would also prevent any permanent improvement in the lot
of the masses, making futile any attempt at a more just and egalitarian
society, as proposed by Godwin and Condorcet after the French
Revolution. Malthus claimed to have come to this view reluctantly: "I
have read some of the speculations on the perfectibility of man and
society with great pleasure. I have been warmed and delighted with the
enchanting picture which they hold forth. I ardently wish for such
improvements, but I see great, and, to my understanding, unconquerable
difficulties in the way to them."9
William Godwin had proposed a Utopian anarchist society where
property and self-interest had disappeared. People would instead act
rationally in the interests of the whole. One of Malthus' first critics was
Godwin himself. In 1801, he responded to Malthus and pointed out that if
the birth rate could be reduced through 'moral restraint' (delayed
marriage) then 'misery' and 'vice' could be avoided.10 Godwin pointed
out that such restraint must exist among the rich, or else they would
have bred to the point of poverty themselves, so it could be acquired by
the poor. Malthus accepted this point in the second edition of the essay,
published in 1803. This marked something of a retreat from the position
in the first edition that any improvement in the condition of the masses
would automatically be eliminated by increases in population. He came
to the view that the condition of the poor could be gradually improved by
education about the benefits of delayed marriage. Combined with
economic growth, it would gradually raise their living standards. But he
continued to argue that redistribution of wealth could not work. It would
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only mean that the misery and poverty of the masses would be made
general.
Condorcet had died in the Jacobin Terror of 1794. He had been a liberal
Frenchman who believed in sexual freedom and advocated contraception
as the means to curb population growth. Malthus, like nearly all his
English contemporaries, considered contraception to be 'vice'. Malthus
argued that contraception discouraged prudence and took away the
pressure to support a family that encouraged people to work. Malthus
was not, as is often imagined, against population growth. He thought that
it was a good thing. What he thought was a bad thing was that the
population grew faster than the means to support it. Malthus was not the
extreme conservative he is often remembered as having been, either. He
was a moderate Whig. He supported civil rights for the lower classes, and
even the eventual extension of the vote to them once they had become
educated.
Not surprisingly, Socialists in particular hated what Malthus said. There
were very few socialists in Britain at that time, but there were a number
of socialist thinkers in France. They generally agreed that there was a
danger of overpopulation, but they tended to see the solution in
improved social and economic organisation, more advanced technology
and a consequent rise in the standard of living. They believed that as
more varied pleasures became available, people would turn away from
unbridled sexuality. They rarely saw value in contraception. The
exception was Fourier, who regarded even abortion as legitimate in order
for people to enjoy a good sex life.
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Fourier believed that a socialist regime would result in a rapid increase of
wealth to four times the level it was then. Nonetheless, he was worried
about the physical limits of resources. He said the world was finite, and in
two centuries would probably have a population of 5.5 billion. Even
though the deserts might be reclaimed, the human species would become
overcrowded and suffocate through excessive numbers. But he hoped
that new conditions of life in a socialist society would humanely limit the
population.11
What actually happened was that the population of Britain rose from
around ten million to around fifty million in the following hundred
years. But thanks to the mechanisation of agriculture and food imports
from the outside world, particularly the Empire, food shortages grew less
rather than more. A similar pattern was repeated in the rest of Europe.
Even so, the population eventually grew to a point that locally available
fertiliser was no longer sufficient and it had to be supplemented to
maintain the rise in yields, first with guano from Chile, later with
artificial fertiliser manufactured from fossil fuels. Britain remains a net
importer of food today. As living standards rose and urbanisation
continued, the size of families gradually became smaller. Population
growth levelled off in Europe in the twentieth century. In the past decade,
the average fertility rate in most European and other industrialised
countries has fallen well below two children per woman. However,
population growth began to increase in the non-industrialised countries
of the world as death rates began to fall in the middle of the twentieth
century, and by 1992 the world had a population of 5.5 billion, rising at
1.7% a year.
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Marx's critique of Malthus
Malthus had been dead for ten years before his fiercest and ultimately
most influential critics began their attacks on his ideas. Karl Marx and
Friedrich Engels did not deny the phenomenon that Malthus was
describing, of the wages of agricultural labourers falling to subsistence
levels, but they explained it as a 'reserve army of labour' necessary for
capitalist accumulation. The law referred to an excessive number of
labourers relative to the means of employment, not subsistence.
Their argument had two parts; firstly, that Malthus' "law" of population
was not universal or necessary, and, secondly, that relative surplus
population was not an inevitable effect of the human condition, but of
the dynamics of capital accumulation. Their intention was to show that
the cause of the prevailing poverty and misery in society was not
overpopulation, but oppressive economic and political structures. Marx
and Engels' view of Malthus was connected to their perceptions of the
political consequences of his theories. Marx wrote in 'Critique of the
Gotha Program':
But if this theory is correct, then again I cannot abolish the law
even if I abolish wage labour a hundred times over, because the
law then governs not only the system of wage labour but every
social system. Basing themselves directly on this, the economists
have been proving for fifty years and more that socialism cannot
abolish poverty, which has its basis in nature, but can only make it
general, distribute it simultaneously over the whole surface of
society!12
Engels repeated many familiar arguments against Malthus. He gave
Godwin's about the role of sexual restraint in response to Malthus'
warnings:
We derive from it the most powerful economic arguments for a
social transformation. For even if Malthus were completely right
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this transformation would have to be undertaken straight away;
for only this transformation, only the education of the masses
which it provides, makes possible that moral restraint of the
propagative instinct which Malthus himself presents as the most
effective and easiest remedy for over-population.13
Engels went on to say that it was absurd to talk of overpopulation when
only a third of the Earth's land surface was cultivated and the application
of agricultural improvements already known could raise the production
of this third sixfold. Moreover, he added, the geometrical rise in
population was matched by a geometrical increase in science and its
application: "And what is impossible to science?"14. That phrase was a
denial of any problem with natural limits - because human scientific
ingenuity was such that essentially nothing is impossible. In reference to
Malthus' theory, Engels says: "our attention has been drawn to the
productive power of the earth and mankind; and after overcoming this
economic despair we have been made for ever secure against the fear of
over-population."15
The apparent limits to the fertility of land had led the early economists to
conclude that there were limits to the growth of the economy. As science
and technology began to make possible many things previously
unimagined, and mechanisation enormously increased agricultural
productivity, the idea put forwards by Marx and Engels, that this kind of
growth could continue for ever and that any apparent natural limits were
not real, began to take hold. Their criticism of Malthusian natural limits
was influential well beyond those who accepted their views generally,
and today, paradoxically, is held at least as forcefully by mainstream
economists as by the few surviving orthodox Marxists.
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Ted Benton16 has recently analysed Marx and Engels' rebuttal of Malthus'
natural limits conservatism. He argues that their 'social constructivist'
response that the limits are purely social goes beyond what is necessary to
rebut Malthus and, ironically, goes against the materialist spirit of their
philosophy. He distinguishes between 'utopian' and 'realist'
emancipatory perspectives. 'Utopian' perspectives seek to deny the
existence of limits to human emancipation. 'Realist' perspectives accept
that there may be limits to what is possible, and seek to achieve
transformation within those boundaries.
He goes on to criticise their characterisation of production in terms of
material transformation from raw material to product. He points out that
many aspects of production, such as farming, are not really examples of
such transformation. By such a characterisation, Marx overlooks the
extent to which human existence is dependent on the operation of
natural ecological cycles, and he overstates both the transformative aspect
of praxis and the extent to which praxis is based on domination of nature.
Benton argues that each form of social life does indeed have its own
specific material constraints and limits. However, it is possible to adopt
social and technical strategies to deal with these limits. For example,
recycling is a means of effectively transcending natural limits to the
availability of non-renewable resources. The emphasis is instead on
adaptive technologies rather than directly transformative ones.
Benton points to some evidence that Marx and Engels in fact
acknowledged the trans-historical necessity of human dependence upon
naturally given conditions and limits to social activity. There are two
famous passages representing the 'ecological Marx' that he quotes. One is
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Marx's discussion of the deleterious effects of capitalist agriculture on soil
fertility:
By this action it destroys at the same time the health of the town
labourer and the intellectual life of the rural labourer. But while
upsetting the naturally grown conditions for the maintenance of
that circulation of matter, it imperiously calls for its restoration as a
system, as a regulating law of social production, and under a form
appropriate to the full development of the human race.17
The other is from Engels:
Thus at every step we are reminded that we by no means rule over
nature like a conqueror over foreign people, like someone
standing outside nature - but that we, with flesh, blood and brain,
belong to nature and exist in its midst, and that all our mastering
of it consists in the fact that we have the advantage over all other
beings of being able to know and correctly apply its laws.18
As Benton has pointed out, Marxism does contain within its materialism
the possibility of accepting limits to human power. Its reluctance in
practice to do so can be seen as ironically reflective of the dominant
western ideology since the Industrial Revolution. This ideology,
originated by Bacon and identified with the scientific enterprise, sees man
as entirely separate and perfectly capable of ruling over nature like a
conqueror over foreign people. It is an ideology that sits uneasily with
acceptance of modern science, and particularly with the theory of
evolution.
Mary Shelley and the Frankenstein Myth
Even in the nineteenth century, the goal of human domination of nature
was not universally shared among political radicals. The Romantics were
an important intellectual movement at the beginning of the Industrial
Revolution. They reacted against what they saw as the increasing
estrangement of human beings from nature as the Industrial Revolution
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took place. They were opposed to the prevalent mechanistic approach to
science, to the humanist separation of human beings from nature, and to
the Christian separation of God from nature. It was a Romantic, Mary
Shelley, who reworked the old Biblical myth of the danger of eating from
the tree of knowledge in a modern secular form which underlies many
present-day fears about out-of-control technology - the Frankenstein
myth.
In Shelley's novel, the eponymous Dr Frankenstein created a being that
destroyed all his family and friends and ultimately himself as well.19 In
the novel the monster was a consequence not just of Frankenstein's
egotistical single-mindedness, but also Frankenstein's masculine desire to
father a creature entirely his own with no female aid (clearly a severe case
of uterus envy). Shelley presents his search in sexual terms reminiscent
of Bacon's language: "They [scientists] penetrate into the recesses of
nature, and shows how she works in her hiding places," Frankenstein
says. Later, "With unrelaxed and breathless eagerness, I pursued nature to
her hiding places... a resistless, and almost frantic impulse, urged me
forward; I seemed to have lost all soul or sensation but for this one
pursuit".20 Frankenstein's science is shown as an obsessive quest for
power over nature and for public glory - an example of hubris with
ultimately tragic results.
Frankenstein is one of the most famous books ever written, but it is
much less well known that Mary Shelley later wrote The Last Man, the
first book warning of global environmental catastrophe.21 The arrogant
male scientists of the twenty-second century believe that they now
understand Nature and can control it. They are proved disastrously
wrong when there is a sudden and inexplicable climatic change, leading
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to famine and then a plague that wipes out the human race. Mary
Shelley's bizarre imaginings about the dangers of technological and
scientific hubris were not taken seriously for over a century, but her ideas
were re-invented in the late twentieth century.
John StuartMill's Stationary State
John Stuart Mill, who was widely regarded as the greatest English
philosopher of his time, was also concerned about the human
domination of nature. In his epic Principles of Political Economy, Mill
devoted a short chapter to the idea of a 'stationary state economy', one
which in today's language was not growing. He noted that according to
classical political economy, profits and economic growth would
ultimately decline over time. Classical political economists, following
Adam Smith, had believed that population growth was unavoidable, so
therefore an end to economic growth would lead to increasing hardship
for the population. Mill pointed out that population growth must be
restrained anyway and went on:
I cannot, therefore, regard the stationary state of capital and wealth
with the unaffected aversion so generally manifested towards it by
political economists of the old school. I am inclined to believe that
it would be, on the whole, a very considerable improvement on
our present condition. I confess I am not charmed with the ideal of
life held out by those who think that the normal state of human
beings is that of struggling to get on; that the trampling, crushing,
elbowing, and treading on each other's heels, which form the
existing type of social life, are the most desirable lot of human
kind, or anything but the disagreeable symptoms of one of the
phases of industrial progress-
There is room in the world, no doubt, and even in old countries,
for a great increase in population, supposing the arts of life to go on
improving, and capital to increase. But even if innocuous, I confess
I see very little reason for desiring it... It is not good for man to be
kept perforce in the presence of his species. A world from which
solitude is extirpated, is a very poor ideal... Nor is there much
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satisfaction in contemplating the world with nothing left to the
spontaneous activity of nature; with every rod of land brought into
cultivation, which is capable of growing food for human beings;
every flowery waste or natural pasture ploughed up, all
quadrupeds or birds which are not domesticated for man's use
exterminated as his rivals for food, every hedgerow or superfluous
tree rooted out, and scarcely a place left where a wild shrub or
flower could grow without being eradicated as a weed in the name
of improved agriculture. If the earth must lose that great portion of
its pleasantness which it owes to things that the unlimited increase
of wealth and population would extirpate from it, for the mere
purpose of enabling it to support a larger, but not a better or a
happier population, I sincerely hope, for the sake of posterity, that
they will be content to be stationary, long before necessity compels
them to it.22
Conclusions
Many of the themes that are debated today around the issue of the
environment would be recognisable to a Victorian intellectual. The
concern about limits to growth in today's environmentalism would
remind them of Malthus. The discussion today about the dangers of
technology and the limits to scientific certainty would remind them of
Mary Shelley. The present-day Green agenda would strike them with its
similarity to John Stuart Mill's concerns about the destruction of nature
in pursuit of economic growth.
But they would find some aspects of the present debate rather different.
The argument that natural limits could always be overcome by science
and progress that was made by Marx and Engels comes today more from
the right than the left. A Victorian would also be struck by the extent to
which we, who live in a world that has seen so much progress in the last
century or so, have lost faith in the ideal of a better world in the future.
Unlike Victorians, who generally looked to the future optimistically, we
tend to look to the future with the feeling that optimism is passe. The
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slogan 'sustainable development' is an attempt to sound optimistic which
reveals a degree of doubt about the future that most Victorians did not
share. Our intellectual mood would strike them as very similar to
Romanticism. They would wonder quite why that has happened.
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This chapter addresses the emergence of the environmental movement
over the past century. It shows how contemporary environmental
concerns have roots in the environmental movements that appeared at
the end of the nineteenth century in the United States. Until the 1960s,
though, environmentalism was a marginal concern. The contemporary
environmental movement emerged after the publication of Rachel
Carson's Silent Spring in 1962. The environmentalism of the 1960s and
early 70s was led by scientists raising the alarm about unsustainable
trends. This wave of environmentalism culminated in The Limits to
Growth study, published in 1972.
John Muir and the Sierra Club
The organised environmental movement was started by John Muir, a
Scottish emigrant to America. In 1864, as a young man of twenty-six
fleeing Civil War conscription, he disappeared into the Great Lakes
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wilderness. There, he discovered an awe for nature similar to that of the
Romantics before. Muir later walked across much of North America,
eventually going to California, where he settled and focused his energy
on preserving the Sierras.
Muir's first book, The Mountains of California, describes the natural
wonder of the state, and also the loss of biological diversity in California
already apparent due to the pressure of development:
But of late years plows and sheep have made sad havoc in these
glorious pastures, destroying tens of thousands of the flowery acres
like a fire, and banishing many species of the best honey-plants to
rocky-cliffs and fence-corners, while, on the other hand,
cultivation thus far has given no adequate compensation, at least
in kind; only acres of alfalfa for miles of the richest wild pasture,
ornamental roses and honeysuckles around cottage doors for
cascades of wild roses in the dells, and small, square orchards and
orange-groves for broad mountain-belts of chaparral.1
Muir's greatest personal achievement against the forces of development
was the establishment of Yosemite as a National Park in 1890. Within
two years development pressures were so severe that a group of
Californians led by Muir founded the Sierra Club to defend the park. The
final years of Muir's life were dominated by the unsuccessful 1908-13
campaign to prevent the building of a dam in Hetch Hetchy Valley, the
next valley north of Yosemite.
Gifford Pinchot's Conservation
A very different tradition of conservation also appeared in the United
States at the turn of the century, personified by Gifford Pinchot, the first
director of the US Forest Service. The idea of natural capital was adopted
by Gifford Pinchot. Pinchot was the most prominent advocate of
'sustained yield' forestry, in contrast to the rapacious practices of the
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'robber barons'. The Conservationist approach he put forward was
implemented under the presidency of Teddy Roosevelt in the first decade
of the twentieth century. Pinchot was appointed the first director of the
US Forest Service. His Conservationism sought to conserve natural
resources as it saw the destruction of resources such as forests as wasteful.
The justification for conservation was that the resources could be more
economically efficiently exploited. Pinchot said that the aim of
conservation, echoing Jeremy Bentham's formulation of utilitarianism,
was "the greatest good for the greatest number for the longest time." The
Conservationist position was known as 'wise use' and became the
cornerstone of official thinking about the environment in the United
States. It was criticised even from the start by more radical thinkers, often
called Preservationists, led by John Muir. The Conservationists believed
that not utilising natural resources was wasteful. When it was suggested
that hydroelectric development of Niagara would spoil the river's beauty,
Conservationists responded that it would be crime to let so much energy
go to waste.2 The two groups fought over the Hetch Hetchy dam,
intended to provide water for the rapidly growing city of San Francisco. It
was a battle that eventually the Preservationists lost. The
Conservationists had supported the dam, claiming it was a wise use of
nature for human ends. The Preservationists argued against its
construction as it would destroy one of the most beautiful valleys in the
world. John Muir personally believed that the crime in building the dam
was the destruction of nature more than the loss of aesthetic value. At
that time, though, the use of this non-anthropocentric argument was not
politically viable.
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The Conservationists invented the profession of forestry, which they saw
as tree farming. They created America's National Forests, areas of public
land set aside primarily to provide for the need for timber. To obtain the
maximum 'sustained yield' of timber, foresters grow only one species of
tree in neat rows to make for easier harvesting and operate a system of
rotation every few decades. The result lacks all the biological diversity of
natural forests.
The practical problems with Conservationism lay in its lack of
understanding of ecology. The Conservationists brought about the
adoption by the US government of the policy of exterminating all
predators. It became apparent to some people that this was not necessarily
a good idea when it led to the population of deer in the Kaibab Forest
near the Grand Canyon exploding, then crashing after they destroyed
their food supply in the 1920s.3 One response to these problems was the
development of ecology as a science.
Aldo Leopold's Land Ethic
Aldo Leopold decided that the problem lay deeper than insufficient
scientific knowledge. Leopold had been trained by Conservationists in the
Yale Forestry School, and for the early part of his professional life he
accepted Conservationist teaching. Gradually, however, he became
disillusioned. The issue that precipitated this change of heart was
predator control.4 In his book A Sand County Almanac, Leopold called
for a 'land ethic'.5 Leopold's intuition was that the earth was an
indivisible living being, each species playing its part in an indivisible
whole, and human beings were just one part of that community. The
land ethic stated that "a thing is right when it tends to preserve the
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integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community. It is wrong when
it tends otherwise."6 He said that the land ethic "changes the role of
Homo sapiens from conqueror of the land-community to plain member
and citizen of it."7
Yet Leopold justified the land ethic in anthropocentric terms - essentially
that the long-term human interest was best served by a healthy
ecosystem, even if the short-term interest was best served by purely
economic criteria. That is the argument given for adopting criteria of
"sustainability" in decision-making today. Leopold argued that it was not
sensible from our point of view to remove a species from an ecosystem
without knowing what the long-term consequences would be: "To keep
every cog and wheel is the first precaution of intelligent tinkering."8 That
is another argument that is familiar today, in the form of the
precautionary principle.
Rachel Carson's Silent Spring
The new environmental movement that emerged in the 1960s was
sparked off by Rachel Carson and her book Silent Spring.9 Carson was a
respected writer and scientist who wrote Silent Spring to draw attention
to the destruction of wildlife by the use of the pesticide DDT. What was
new about Carson's book was that it criticised a technology intended to
better the condition of the human race, rather than a specific
development, and that it revealed unintended and unpredicted
consequences of this technology.
Carson revealed that our actions could lead to seriously damaging
environmental consequences when we interfered with natural systems
we did not fully understand. She criticised the unthinking use of the
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technological "quick fix" of employing synthetic chemicals to control
insects. She warned that these chemicals contained the prospect of a dying
world in which springtime would no longer bring forth new life, only
silence. Carson concluded that "the 'control of nature' is a phrase
conceived in arrogance, born of the Neanderthal age of biology and
philosophy, when it was supposed that nature exists for the convenience
of man."10 Carson's challenge to pesticides was implicitly a challenge to
science and the idea of technological progress.
The environmentalism of the late twentieth century has two key
concerns: the limits to control that were emphasised by Leopold and
Carson, and also the idea of a global environmental crisis - limits of scale
on a small planet. Atmospheric nuclear testing was banned in 1963 after
the discovery of strontium-90 from nuclear fallout in mother's milk and
in the fat of Antarctic penguins. Not long afterwards, traces of DDT were
also found in Antarctic penguins. The notion that the world was not
large, but relatively small began to gain currency.
Spaceship Earth
The metaphor of the earth as a spaceship was coined by the American
presidential candidate Adlai Stevenson in a campaign speech as far back
as 1952.11 It was taken up by the British journalist Barbara Ward in her
1966 book Spaceship Earth.12 The concept was developed simultaneously
by the economist Kenneth Boulding. In his essay 'The Economics of the
Coming Spaceship Earth'13 Boulding put forward the idea that previous
human history had taken place against a background where the scale of
human activities was tiny compared to the environment. In this
situation, there was always somewhere 'out there' to expand to or put
your wastes. He called this a 'cowboy' economy because the idea of an
endless frontier was embodied by the American cowboy. What was now
happening was that human activity was growing to a size where there
was no 'out there' left. In this situation it was no longer possible to try to
put problems somewhere else. They would always return to you. He
wrote that it would require a 'spaceman' economy because frontiers had
shrunk to zero, there was nowhere to expand to, nothing could be simply
thrown away and all waste would have to be recycled. Boulding's essay
was influential, but the metaphor did not catch on immediately.
In the 1960s there was a growing sense that Western technology had
reached every corner of the earth and that with improved
communication the world was growing smaller and closer together. This
was the time of Marshall McLuhan's 'global village'.14 It was also the time
where a global nuclear holocaust seemed a real possibility. What really
brought the metaphor alive was the photographs of the Earth that the
Apollo astronauts took from the Moon at the end of the 1960s. The
pictures were of a small and beautiful blue-white planet with oceans and
clouds, against the blackness of space and the grey of another, lifeless,
world. The photograph perfectly visualised the metaphor 'Spaceship
Earth' and the environmental movement seized on it Within a few years
the metaphor had become a tiresome cliche, but while it lasted it was
extremely powerful. In 1970 the first Earth Day was held. In 1972, at the
first UN Conference on the Environment, the official slogan of the
conference was 'Only One Earth'.
The metaphor has two different connotations. One is of limits to human
activities. The other is of the need for human management of the
environment. The two meanings are not entirely incompatible, but there
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is clearly a tension between them. One implies that we are overcrowding
passengers. The other implies that we are the new commander about to
bravely go where no species has gone before, presumably replacing God.
Paul Ehrlich's Population Bomb
The era of 'Spaceship Earth' was the time when fear of global
environmental limits began to emerge. Environmentalism came
together with a renewed Malthusianism. Concern about exponential
population growth, this time in the Third World, came to the fore with
the publication of Paul Ehrlich's The Population Bomb.15 Paul and Anne
Ehrlich (who co-wrote the book but was denied credit by the publisher)
were animal population biologists who had developed these opinions
after personally witnessing the hunger and overcrowding in India. The
Ehrlichs argued that population growth would lead to massive famines
in Asia and Africa in the 1970s. Most controversially, they proposed that
some countries, such as India, were such hopeless cases that resources
should not be wasted on helping them. This ruthless position was very
reminiscent of Malthus himself, the first person to suggest that
exponential growth would lead to an imminent collision with natural
limits.
The Ehrlichs' terrible predictions of famine and imminent ecological
collapse failed to come true. Famines had occurred quite often in India
until the 1970s, but have not happened since. The large famines of the
1970s and 1980s in Africa took place mostly in war-torn countries. It
seems, though, that at the time the self-proclaimed alarmism of The
Population Bomb was very influential in raising concern. The theologian
and environmentalist John Cobb told me that it was The Population
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Bomb's alarmism that motivated him to become an environmental
activist. Cobb said that although the book had been wrong in its
predictions and contained "gross exaggerations", he wanted to
acknowledge that it was The Population Bomb that shook him into
action. The environmental economist John Pezzey was also scared into
environmentalism by The Population Bomb and other alarmist books of
the late sixties. He told me that he now feels cheated by the alarms that
were raised about problems that did not turn out so bad as he was led to
believe then. This kind of alarmism was an easy target for John Maddox,
the editor of the journal Nature in his anti-environmentalist polemic
The Doomsday Syndrome.16 Today, his optimism appears as wide of the
mark as the Ehrlichs' pessimism. Maddox did not believe that there were
ecological limits. For example, he argued that there was no shortage of
land for cultivation in the world and pointed to the Amazon and Congo
basins as large areas suitable for agricultural development.
Costs of Economic Growth
The prominent economist Edward Mishan shook up the economics
profession with the publication of The Costs of Economic Growth.17 He
argued that calculations of Gross National Product were seriously
misleading as a measure of human welfare because they included the
costs of defensive measures such as anti-pollution expenditure and failed
to count negative effects of affluence like aircraft noise against growth. A
decade earlier, John Kenneth Galbraith had made fairly similar
arguments against GNP as a measure of welfare, but without the
emphasis on environmental externalities.18 Mishan's argument was
sound, but embarrassing to economists. Another of my interviewees,
Hans Opschoor, now a professor of economics, was inspired to specialise
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in the then non-existent discipline of environmental economics by
reading The Costs of Economic Growth.
The Limits to Growth
The crystallisation of the concerns of the first wave of environmentalism
that ran from around 1966 to 1972 was The Limits to Growth.19 A report
by a group of young MIT scientists, it immediately took the world by
storm, gaining enormous media coverage. It was translated into 28
languages and sold 9 million copies. The Limits To Growth was based on
computer models that appeared to show that if the current trends of
exponential growth in population and demand for non-renewable
resources continued, the world would face severe shortages of food and
non-renewable resources by the middle of the twenty-first century. The
modellers concluded that "the limits to growth on this planet will be
reached some time in the next hundred years."20
The model assumed that there are finite amounts of fossil fuels and
minerals available on the Earth. It did not simply assume that you use a
certain amount and then run out, but modelled the price behaviour of an
increasingly scarce and difficult to obtain resource. The estimates of
availability given could be challenged but, the MIT team argued, because
of the nature of exponential growth, even if resources were several times
larger than the current estimates, they would still become extremely
scarce and expensive only a few decades later. According to the model,
population growth was happening too fast for demographic transition
before collapse unless population control measures were introduced. The
authors admitted they had no idea of the capacity of the pollution
absorption capacity of the environment, but they felt that with
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exponential growth in pollutants it would be reached relatively quickly.
They modelled pollution as a single long-lived chemical that in high
concentrations would shorten human life and interfere with food
production.
The authors explicitly stated that their model was not a definite
prediction of what would happen - it was an exploration of the
consequences of current trends. They ran versions of the model which
assumed various changes, such as enormous potential increases in
agricultural productivity, the availability of cheap nuclear power,
extensive mineral recycling and very strict pollution control standards.
Even with all these running in the model, exponential growth still
caused an overshoot of what could be sustainably supported by the planet
and a collapse of civilization before the end of the twenty-first century.
When they modelled a future with zero population growth and zero
capital growth, and assuming a fourfold increase in the technological
efficiency of production, and investment in agriculture to end
malnutrition, the model gave an ultimately stable state at a European
average standard of living: "It is possible to alter these growth trends and
to establish a condition of ecological and economic stability that is
sustainable far into the future."21
Criticism of The Limits to Growth
Critics pointed out that the output of the computer model was
determined by the assumptions the programmers had made. The project
had been funded by the Club of Rome, an international grouping of
prominent scientists, business people and civil servants concerned about
environmental problems. They were of an essentially Malthusian
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persuasion. Donella Meadows has stated that she and her husband were
Malthusians when they started the project. In fact, they started work on
the project two weeks after returning from a year in Asia. Donella
Meadows told me about the conclusions of the model:
We had kind of intuited it in India, but it was just a feeling to go
from one of the world's richest places to one of the world's poorest
and to see the soil erosion and to see the children and to see the
burgeoning cities and the disappearing forests. You just somehow
knew all of this was inconsistent, was offensive, was morally
intolerable and furthermore was physically impossible to continue
doing things this way. We knew that, but we couldn't put a case for
it. It was something any intelligent observer knows anywhere they
go in the world. So the computer model helped us to put numbers,
to put time frames, to get a much neater mental model of the
problem and the possible solutions. (Donella Meadows, Dartmouth
College, New Hampshire, 23.6.94)
It can be argued that they already knew what they were expecting to find
and wrote the model in that way. There is perhaps truth in that. Because
of the status computers had at that time, there was a tendency for the
public to believe any computer model was correct. The reality was that it
all depended on the validity of the assumptions.
The best developed critique of The Limits to Growth came from a team at
Sussex University's Science Policy Research Unit.22 They pointed out that
the computer model was no less subjective or ideological than the mental
models on which it was based. They criticised several aspects of the
model, but concentrated on the Malthusian pessimism of the
assumptions underlying it. The Sussex team examined the model and
argued that the assumptions about the rate of technological progress and
the availability of physical resources were too pessimistic. They accepted
that physical growth cannot continue indefinitely on a finite planet, but
held that any physical limits were much more distant. The Sussex team
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more generally criticised the determinism of the model as it did not
include the feedbacks that would allow for resource substitution, new
inventions and changing ways of life. They accused The Limits to Growth
of discounting the potential for adaptation in human society and putting
forward a counsel of despair in proposing an immediate end to growth.
The Sussex team claimed that the concentration on disaster in a century
distracted from what could be done to solve urgent existing problems,
such as the distribution of the world's wealth.
Herman Daly's Steady-state Economy
The ideas in The Limits to Growth did not go away, though. They were
instead taken up and elaborated. Herman Daly used the law of entropy to
attempt to demonstrate that the scale of the economy was limited.23
Economic activity is about the creation of order (low entropy) in one
place. The entropy law demands that a larger amount of entropy is
created elsewhere. Daly's former professor Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen
had already used that argument.24 He had concentrated on the
irreversibility of the use of non-renewable fossil fuels as a source of
energy. Daly made the point that economic activity (or rather energy and
material throughput) necessarily creates pollution and wastes. More
activity means more pollution and waste. There is a limit to how much
the biosphere can absorb. Daly concluded that the entropy law set a limit
to the scale of the economy. His claim that entropy sets a limit to the
physical scale of the economy is now widely accepted, but his conclusion




Ideas about limits to growth even influenced the 1977-81 Carter
administration in the United States. President Carter was concerned
about the 'energy crisis' and promoted research into renewable energy
sources. He commissioned a report on the state of the global
environment up to 2000. The report's conclusion was:
If present trends continue, the world in 2000 will be more crowded,
more polluted, less stable ecologically and more vulnerable to
disruption. Serious stresses involving population, resources, and
environment are clearly visible ahead. Despite greater material
output, the world's people will be poorer in many ways than they
are today.
For hundreds of millions of the desperately poor, the outlook for
food and other necessities of life will be no better. For many it will
be worse. Barring revolutionary advances in technology, life for
most people on earth will be more precarious in 2000 than it is
now - unless the nations of the world act decisively to alter current
trends.25
The finding from the Global 2000 study which came as a surprise was a
calculation that habitat destruction was likely to lead to the extinction of
500,000 to 2 million species, mostly in tropical forests. Concern about loss
of biodiversity quickly moved up to become a major environmental
concern. This was despite the fact that it was and remains impossible to
accurately quantify the scale of species extinction.
At the end of 1980, Carter lost power to Ronald Reagan, who was a
determined anti-environmentalist. As a consequence, environmental
leadership passed from the United States to Europe in the 1980s. The
environmental movement had already spread in the early 1970s, first to
Scandinavia, then to the rest of western Europe, and particularly to
Germany. European environmentalism was less concerned with the
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wilderness issues that have always remained crucial to North American
environmentalism, and was more concerned with the problems of
industrialism.
In the 1970s, though, environmentalism was a Western idea of little
interest to the Third World. The next chapter describes how
environmentalists invented the concept of sustainability in an attempt to
overcome Third World hostility to their concerns.
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UN Conference on the Human Environment - Stockholm, 1972
The poverty of the Third World was a key issue at the UN Conference on
the Human Environment, held in Stockholm in 1972. The Swedish
government had been concerned about the damage that pollution from
other European countries was doing to their lakes. Initially, Third World
governments regarded environmental concern as a luxury for the rich,
and argued that the environments of Third World people were blighted
by poverty. They regarded it as hypocritical of Western countries to warn
them about pollution. Indira Gandhi, prime minister of India, was the
only head of state to attend the conference apart from the Swedish prime
minister. She told the conference: "Poverty is the worst pollution." The
same kind of polarisation and misunderstanding between the West and
the Third World was evident two years later in Bucharest at the first
World Population Conference.
However, the idea that was the environment was a critical development
issue was accepted to some extent and was included in the Stockholm
Declaration on Human Environment that was agreed at the conference.
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The Stockholm Conference did succeed in placing environmental
problems on the international agenda for the first time. It led to the
establishment of the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP).
It was based in Nairobi and had as its first Secretary-General Maurice
Strong, the Canadian who had chaired the Stockholm Conference. Strong
coined the term 'ecodevelopment' as a way of verbally reconciling the
desire for development and environmental protection. UNEP succeeded
in establishing itself as a global environmental conscience, encouraging
countries to develop environmental policies and agencies. But based in
Nairobi, far from the centres of power in the UN system, UNEP has
always been short of funds and one of the weakest agencies in terms of
institutional power.
'Small is Beautiful'
In the seventies, the idea of ecodevelopment was often combined with
the idea of 'appropriate technology'. The guru of the appropriate
technology movement was the dissident economist Fritz Schumacher. In
his bestseller Small is Beautiful he linked concern about pollution and
depletion of natural resources to Third World issues.1 Schumacher
claimed that conventional development strategies promoted islands of
Western modernity in the cities, while doing nothing for the vast
majority in the countryside. These development projects were dependent
on imported technology and experts. Schumacher's solution was rural
development that would be on a 'human scale', and based on 'appropriate
technology'. Appropriate technology would be small-scale technology that
could be understood and controlled by ordinary people, rather than
dependent on experts. In the end the downfall of ecodevelopment was its
association with Schumacherian views. Rural ecodevelopment did not
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allow Third World countries to develop modern economies. The urban
elites, who actually controlled the governments of Third World
countries, were not content to accept the idea that they could not follow
the path to Western modernity.
The Sustainable Society
The seeds of the approach the Brundtland Commission was to
successfully take in the 1980s were laid as early as 1974. The concept of a
'sustainable society' emerged at an ecumenical study conference on
Science and Technology for Human Development that was convened by
the World Council of Churches. They defined it as follows:
First, social stability cannot be obtained without an equitable
distribution of what is in scarce supply or without common
opportunity to participate in social decisions. Second, a robust
global society will not be sustainable unless the need for food is at
any time well below the global capacity to supply it and unless the
emission of pollutants are well below the capacity of the
ecosystems to absorb them. Third, the new social organisation will
be sustainable only as long as the use of non-renewable resources
does not out-run the increase in resources made available through
technological innovation. Finally, a sustainable society requires a
level of human activities which is not adversely influenced by the
never-ending large and frequent natural variations in global
climate.2
The 'sustainable society' concept is notable because it starts with the
principle of equitable distribution, which was to be a cornerstone of the
Brundtland Report's approach. Still more remarkably, it involves the
concept of democratic participation, which became important at the Earth
Summit nearly twenty years later. The second and third conditions of the
definition are similar to the definitions of physical sustainability used
today. What is most interesting is that the original definition started, not
with environmental conditions, but with social conditions for
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sustainability: the need for equity and for democracy. You could define
the debate about sustainability as the ideas that emerge when concern for
the global environment and concern for global social justice meet.
John Cobb told me that the idea of the sustainable society emerged in the
World Council of Churches in the aftermath of the Stockholm
Conference. Like the United Nations, the World Council of Churches was
very much influenced by the Third World. Many Third World clergymen
thought that the environment was a distraction from justice and
development. They saw environmentalism as a 'bourgeois' concern. The
idea of a sustainable society - one that would not self-destruct - sounded
more serious and also an idea that had less tension with the concern for
justice. The environmentalists, led by the anthropologist Margaret Mead,
managed to get the World Council of Churches to adopt the phrase "a
just, participatory and sustainable society" as an official slogan in 1975.
Very few people were aware of the work in the World Council of
Churches. Even Dennis Pirages, who edited The Sustainable Society3 in
1977, had not heard of it. Among some academic environmentalists,
though, the idea of sustainability was beginning to catch on. The
Sustainable Society explored the issue of how to reconcile limits to
growth with concern for social justice. The book concluded that less
growth would make equality more difficult. In a period of growth, it is
much easier to direct more of the benefits to those at the bottom. Without
growth, improving the lot of the poor would require bringing down the
rich, which is politically very difficult.
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Sustainable Development
The term 'sustainable development' emerged in the World Conservation
Strategy of 1980, published by the International Union for the
Conservation of Nature. Sustainable development was defined as "the
integration of conservation and development to ensure that
modifications to the planet do indeed secure the survival and well-being
of all people."4 Development was defined as "the modification of the
biosphere and the application of human, financial, living and non-living
resources to satisfy human needs and improve the quality of human
life."5 Development could, however, be a threat unless resources were
effectively conserved. Development had to be combined with
conservation, which was defined as "the management of human use of
the biosphere so that it may yield the greatest sustainable benefit to
present generations while maintaining its potential to meet the needs
and aspirations of future generations."6 The definition of conservation
included elements of Gifford Pinchot's old definition as "the greatest
good for the greatest number over the longest time" and the new
definition of sustainable development that was to emerge out of the
Brundtland Report.
The World Conservation Strategy foreshadowed many of the ideas
associated with Brundtland. It emphasised the importance of
incorporating conservation into development planning at the beginning.
It identified the main causes of habitat destruction as poverty, population
pressure, social inequity and terms of trade that worked against poorer
countries. It called for a new international development strategy that
would redress inequity, stimulate economic growth and counter the
worst poverty.
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The problem the World Conservation Strategy had was that it was
written by a group identified as being Northern environmentalists. Its
concern for habitat conservation was ultimately based on a moral
framework that was not universal. The emphasis on the environment in
the document did not go down well with development agencies. Worse,
the World Conservation Strategy did not discuss political and economic
changes that would be needed to bring about the goal of sustainable
development, so it lacked practical credibility as well. The task of making
the idea of sustainable development politically acceptable fell to the
Brundtland Commission.
The Brundtland Report
In 1983, the United Nations General Assembly set up the World
Commission on the Environment and Development with the
Norwegian Labour Party leader and future prime minister Gro Harlem
Brundtland as the chairperson. The outcome of their efforts, Our
Common Future,7 was published in 1987. They came to focus on one
central theme:
many present development trends leave increasing numbers of
people poor and vulnerable, while at the same time degrading the
environment. How can such development serve next century's
world of twice as many people relying on the same environment?
This realization broadened our view of development. We came to
see it not in its restricted context of economic growth in developing
countries. We came to see that a new development path was
required, one that sustained human progress not just in a few
places for a few years, but for the entire planet into the distant
future.8
They called this new path 'sustainable development', and defined it as
"development which meets the needs of the present without
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own
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needs."9 That phrase has been repeated, misquoted and re-written
countless times since. Its strength is that it is both simple and vague. That
is also its weakness. However, the Brundtland Commission's own
conception of what sustainable development would be was more
complicated than simply that one-sentence definition. They went on to
say:
The concept of sustainable development does imply limits - not
absolute limits but limitations imposed by the present state of
technology and social organization on environmental resources
and by the ability of the biosphere to absorb the effects of human
activities. But technology and social organization can be both
managed and improved to make way for a new era of economic
growth. The Commission believes that widespread poverty is no
longer inevitable. Poverty is not only an evil in itself, but
sustainable development requires meeting the basic needs of all
and extending to all the opportunity to fulfil their aspirations for a
better life. A world in which poverty is endemic will always be
prone to ecological and other catastrophes.
Meeting essential needs requires not only a new era of economic
growth for nations in which the majority are poor, but an
assurance that those poor get their fair share of the resources
required to sustain that growth. Such equity would be aided by
political systems that secure effective citizen participation in
decision making and by greater democracy in international
decision making.
Sustainable global development requires that those who are more
affluent adopt life-styles within the planet's ecological means - in
their use of energy, for example. Further, rapidly growing
populations can increase the pressure on resources and slow any
rise in living standards; thus sustainable development can only be
pursued if population size and growth are in harmony with the
changing productive potential of the ecosystem.
Yet in the end, sustainable development is not a fixed state of
harmony, but rather a process of change in which the exploitation
of resources, the direction of investments, the orientation of
technological development, and institutional change are made
consistent with future as well as present needs. We do not pretend
that the process is easy or straightforward. Painful choices have to
be made. Thus, in the final analysis, sustainable development
must rest on political will.10
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I have quoted at some length because that passage, immediately following
the single sentence so often quoted, summarises well much of what the
Brundtland Commission meant by 'sustainable development'.
The Brundtland report set much of the subsequent agenda for both
academic debate about sustainability and international political debate
about environment and development. Why was the Brundtland report
so influential? Many people have claimed that what it said was not very
intellectually innovative. It was, after all, the unanimous report of a
group of establishment politicians and diplomats from all over the world.
But for such a body, the Brundtland report was remarkably innovative
politically.
The basic political problem the Brundtland Commission was faced with
was how to reconcile concern for environmental protection with the
desire for economic development in the South and economic growth in
the North. Environmental protection had been seen as a threat to
development and growth. Fifteen years earlier, at the UN Conference on
the Human Environment in Stockholm, many Third World countries
had argued that environmental protection was a luxury for the rich. The
Brundtland report drew on thinking in environmental economics and
argued that there was a mutual interlinkage between the economy and
the environment. A healthy economy required a healthy environment:
We have in the past been concerned about the impacts of economic
growth upon the environment. We are now forced to concern
ourselves with the impacts of ecological stress - degradation of
soils, water regimes, atmosphere, and forests - upon our economic
prospects. We have in the more recent past been forced to face up
to a sharp increase in economic interdependence among nations.
We are now forced to accustom ourselves to an accelerating
ecological interdependence among nations. Ecology and economy
are becoming ever more interwoven - locally, regionally,
nationally, and globally - into a seamless net of causes and effects.11
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Environmental resources were often under-valued and over-exploited.
The Brundtland Commission stressed the importance of the integration
of environmental decisions into central economic decision making. They
gave the example of the way that industry ministries would be
responsible for promoting production targets, while the resulting
pollution would be the responsibility of the environment ministry. The
consequence was that environmental costs were often ignored in
economic planning. These costs were later paid by society.
At the same time, they argued, a healthy environment was not possible
in a world marked by the existence of extreme poverty. Environmental
degradation often affected the poorest groups in society most severely, as
they were unable to protect themselves from the environmentally
destructive activities of richer and more powerful people. The
Brundtland Commission also argued that extreme poverty often forced
people to practice environmentally destructive activities as a desperate
means of ensuring short-term survival:
Environmental stress has often been seen as the result of the
growing demand on scarce resources and the pollution generated
by the rising living standards of the relatively affluent. But poverty
itself pollutes the environment, creating environmental stress in a
different way. Those who are poor and hungry will often destroy
their immediate environment in order to survive: They will cut
down forests; their livestock will overgraze grasslands; they will
overuse marginal land; and in growing numbers they will crowd
into congested cities. The cumulative effect of these changes is so
far-reaching as to make poverty itself a major global scourge.
On the other hand, where economic growth has led to
improvements in living standards, it has sometimes been
achieved in ways which are globally damaging in the longer term.
Much of the improvement in the past has been based on the use of
increasing amounts of raw materials, energy, chemicals and
synthetics and on the creation of pollution which is not adequately
accounted for in figuring the costs of production processes. These
trends have unforeseen effects on the environment. Thus today's
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environmental challenges arise both from the lack of development
and from the unintended consequences of some forms of
economic growth.12
As indicated earlier, development that is sustainable has to address
the problem of the large number of people who live in absolute
poverty - that is, who are unable to satisfy even the most basic of
their needs. Poverty reduces people's capacity to use resources in a
sustainable manner; it intensifies pressure on the environment...
A necessary but not sufficient condition for the elimination of
absolute poverty is a relatively rapid rise in per capita incomes in
the Third World. It is therefore essential that the stagnant or
declining growth trends of this decade be reversed.13
The Brundtland Commission emphasised that sustainable development
was a matter of equity both between and within generations, saying
"Even the narrow notion of physical sustainability implies a concern for
social equity between generations, a concern that must logically be
extended to equity within each generation."14 However, the Brundtland
Commission trod very carefully when discussing what sustainable
development would mean for the North:
Meeting essential needs depends in part on achieving full growth
potential, and sustainable development clearly requires economic
growth in places where such needs are not being met. Elsewhere, it
can be consistent with economic growth, provided the content of
growth reflects the broad principles of sustainability and non-
exploitation of others... Hence sustainable development requires
that societies meet human needs both by increasing productive
potential and by ensuring equitable opportunities for all.15
So the Brundtland Commission broadly supported economic growth,
although with the proviso that there are indeed limits to physical growth:
Growth has no set limits in terms of population or resource use
beyond which lies ecological disaster. Different limits hold for the
use of energy, materials, water, land. Many of these will manifest
themselves in the form of rising costs and diminishing returns,
rather than in the form of any sudden loss of a resource base. The
accumulation of knowledge and the development of technology
can enhance the carrying capacity of the resource base. But ultimate
limits there are, and sustainability requires that long before these
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are reached, the world must ensure equitable access to the
constrained resource and reorient technological efforts to relieve
the pressure.16
The Brundtland report is not always a consistent document. For example,
it is critical of the way that income as currently measured fails to take
account of the depletion of natural capital, but otherwise uses current
measures of GNP growth as real measures of increasing income. At one
point it says that raising living standards in the South requires growth in
GNP per capita of at least 3%. It then goes on to say that for enough capital
to be available, the economies of the North (which have only very slowly
growing populations) must grow at a minimum of 3-4% a year. This
would seem to give little possibility for increasing equity between North
and South. With such a rate of economic growth in the North, it would
take very much higher rates of per capita growth in the South to catch up
in any reasonable time. Even if there was no growth in the industrialised
North, the income gap the Commission reports between the
industrialised market economies and the low income economies is so
great that at 3% a year it would take about 150 years to bridge the gap.
The report points out that bringing living standards in the South up to
current levels in the North would involve expanding the world
economy by a factor of 5-10. It goes on to state that an expansion of energy
consumption on that scale with current technologies would be an
ecological impossibility. With current energy mixes, even a doubling
would probably be impossible. So the need is for increased efficiency.
However, elsewhere the Commission points out that the earlier stages of
industrialisation that many Southern countries are going through tend to
involve the development of industries that are particularly energy-
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intensive. This is a problem that they mention in passing, but do not go
on to address.
There are also many signs within the report of disagreements among
Commission members. On the issue of nuclear power, the report actually
admits to these disagreements, although in tone the report is
predominantly anti-nuclear. On other issues there is more of an attempt
to paper over the divisions, for example on consumption patterns. Nitin
Desai, now UN Undersecretary-General for Policy Coordination and
Sustainable Development, was the member of the Brundtland
Commission secretariat largely responsible for the drafting of the first
section of the report. When I interviewed him, he said: "The Brundtland
report, I admit, is a little careful in its formulations on the issue of
consumption." (Nitin Desai, New York, 30.5.94)
The significance of the Brundtland report for environmentalists was that
it reflected many of their concerns, even if it did not put forward
proposals as radical as they would have liked. And, in particular, the
Brundtland report accepted the idea of environmental limits. On the
other side, governments and industry could accept the idea of
environmental limits because these limits were not seen in the report as
a brake on economic development or growth. The report cleverly
balanced environmental and economic considerations. Or as the
environmental economist John Pezzey put it to me less kindly "It's a very
attractive message. You can have your cake and eat it, there's not a
conflict. And it's a funny message when you think about it... What I
would say is, it depends... But it's a very tricky message because I think it
was jumped on by all sorts of politicians who didn't like confronting
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people with choices, trade-offs, wanted to pretend they could have
everything." (John Pezzey, University College London, 23.3.94)
It is this seeming desire of the Brundtland Commission to tell people
they could have everything they wanted and that nobody would have to
make sacrifices that explains both its political popularity for squaring a
circle and the suspicion it is viewed with by the more sceptical.
Another cause of the attention paid to the Brundtland report was
probably that it was in the right place at the right time. The Commission
was formed by the United Nations in 1983, a time when the profile of
environmental issues was quite low. The reception of the Brundtland
report should be judged against the background of increasing concern
about environmental issues in the late eighties as the Cold War drew to
an end and environmental problems became seen as a new global threat
to survival. The discovery in 1985 of a large hole in the ozone layer over
Antarctica had come as a complete surprise. Evidence was rapidly found
supporting the theory that chlorofluorocarbons, chemicals used in
refrigeration and aerosols, were responsible. The drama of the Chernobyl
nuclear accident in 1986, which spread radioactive fallout across Europe,
drew the attention of the entire world. Over the next few years, the
environment moved to near the top of the agenda of journalists and
politicians. Unlike the first wave of environmental concern in the late
sixties, which was confined to Western countries, the environmental
wave of the late eighties and early nineties was felt almost everywhere in
the world.
The Brundtland report had an important legitimising role, particularly
among Southern governments. After Brundtland, few governments
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continued to dismiss environmental concern as merely a Western or
'bourgeois' luxury. By emphasising the connections between the
environment and more traditional concerns with economic
development, the Brundtland report forced governments and
international agencies such as the World Bank to start to begin to think
and talk about the issues. Real action, however, tended to be much less
forthcoming.
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Hopes for the Earth Summit
The most obvious direct consequence of the Brundtland Commission's
work was that in 1992 the United Nations Conference on Environment
and Development (UNCED), often called the Earth Summit, took place in
Rio de Janeiro. Such a conference had been one of the concrete proposals
made in the Brundtland report. UNCED was the largest international
conference ever held, including over a hundred heads of state. The
intention of UNCED's organisers was to provide a focus for global
concern about the environmental and development crises. It was also
hoped that the end of the ideological divisions of the Cold War and the
demands that it had made upon Western budgets would yield a large
'peace dividend'. Maurice Strong, who was Secretary-General of the
conference, had a plan for what he wanted to achieve:
•Conventions on climate, biodiversity and forests
•An Earth Charter
•Agenda 21, a global action plan outlining the sustainable
development priorities for the twenty-first century
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•An agreement on new financial resources to implement Agenda
21, and progress on agreements to transfer environmentally sound
technologies from North to South
•A strengthening of UN institutions, including an Earth Council
Strong had some success with all these, except for a forest convention,
which did not emerge at all. However, the content of the agreements
reached was rather less impressive.
The Framework Convention on Climate Change
The main impetus for the Climate Convention came from the 1990
report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), a body
of leading scientists advising the United Nations.1 They had predicted
that, if carbon dioxide emissions continued to rise, a global average
temperature rise of 1.5 to 4.5°C could be expected over the next century.
The global average temperature now is only 3°C higher than in the
depths of the last Ice Age. According to the IPCC, a 60% reduction in
carbon dioxide emissions from present levels would be needed to stabilise
the climate. They proposed that a 60% reduction should take place by 2040
to avoid dangerously rapid climate change.
In the climate negotiations, it became clear that the best that could be
broadly agreed was that the governments of industrialised countries
would set a target to return carbon dioxide emissions to 1990 levels by
2000. The United States, which emits more carbon dioxide than any other
country, refused to accept a target for even stabilising carbon dioxide
emissions, saying that it would be economically damaging. The
Framework Convention on Climate Change signed at Rio reflected this.
The convention did accept that climate change was a serious problem and
that action could not wait for resolution of scientific uncertainties. It also
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accepted that industrialised countries should take the lead. As a result of
American pressure, it had no binding targets or dates, although it
indicated that a first step would be for industrialised countries to stabilise
carbon dioxide emissions at 1990 levels by 2000. The framework
convention also included arrangements for the future negotiation of a
binding convention.
The Convention on Biological Diversity
In the biodiversity negotiations, the US administration of President Bush
took an even more obstructive line and eventually refused to sign the
Convention on Biological Diversity. This was despite the fact that the
biodiversity convention dealt more with ensuring access to biodiversity
(predominantly in the South) for countries with biotechnology
(predominantly in the North) than with actually protecting biodiversity.
President Bush regarded the framework for access to biodiversity as a
threat to the American biotechnology industry.
The convention affirmed that countries have 'sovereign rights' over
biological resources in their territory, which should be shared
internationally on mutually agreed terms. These terms included
recognition of indigenous knowledge as intellectual property due
royalties. Countries which signed the convention must develop plans to
protect biodiversity and submit information on them. However, there
was no requirement for new plans, no standards for the plans to meet
and no international action plan for the preservation of biodiversity.
Environmentalists were disappointed, and even Jacques Delors, the
president of the European Commission, (not normally noted for his
environmentalism) called it 'too timid.'2
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The Statement on Forest Principles
The Statement on Forest Principles emerged after negotiations on a
forests convention collapsed. Pressure for a forests convention had come
from Western countries concerned about tropical deforestation.
Countries with tropical forests, particularly Brazil, regarded the idea of
international intervention in their use of forests as intolerable. The
document emphasised the right of national sovereignty over forests.
The Rio Declaration
The Rio Declaration on Environment and Development was the
substitute for Maurice Strong's 'Earth Charter'. The name was changed at
the insistence of Southern countries which objected to the
environmental emphasis in the proposed name. Strong had intended a
brief and inspiring statement of a new global environmental ethic. What
actually emerged was a lengthy and uninspiring piece of diplomatic
jargon. A sign of the lack of a new environmental ethic is the first four
principles of the 27 in the declaration. The first principle stated that
"Human beings are at the centre of concerns for sustainable
development. They are entitled to a healthy and productive life in
harmony with nature."3 The second principle of the Rio Declaration
affirmed the sovereign right of states to exploit resources according to
their own environmental and development policies. The third principle
asserts the 'right to development'. The fourth principle makes
environmental protection 'an integral part of the development process'.
The important environmental principles that the Rio Declaration
included which were absent from the Stockholm Declaration are the
precautionary principle (Principle 15) and the 'polluter pays' principle
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(Principle 16). However, both principles were heavily qualified. In
general, the Rio Declaration was a step backward from the Stockholm
Declaration. The Rio Declaration is mostly about development, while the
Stockholm Declaration had been mostly about the environment and was
also much more internationalist in tone.
Agenda 21
Agenda 21 was intended to be a framework of action for achieving
sustainable development. Over 500 pages long, it is a document of mind-
boggling complexity. There are some important recurring themes.
Perhaps the most important is the 'bottom-up' approach, emphasising the
role of citizens (particularly women), communities and NGOs.
Development, for perhaps the first time in an international agreement, is
seen as something built by people, rather than from the top down
through large state projects. The entire tone of Agenda 21 is about
participation and open government. UNCED had an unprecedented
degree of NGO involvement, and this was institutionalised in the
document. Agenda 21 also emphasises the role of the market, trade and
business in bringing about sustainable development. Both these features
of Agenda 21 can partly be attributed to the demise of state socialism and
the general disillusionment with bureaucratic approaches to problems.
However, the emphasis on participation is also the result of intensive
lobbying from NGOs. Even regimes which clearly do not believe in
democratic participation did not feel strong enough to oppose the
principle, although they have not carried it out.
Agenda 21 emphasises the importance of adequate knowledge and
institutions, known in UN jargon as 'capacity building'. Almost every
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chapter includes references to education and the development of 'human
resources'. Agenda 21 is also full of references to the importance of
integrated approaches to environment and development. It calls for
institutions that transcend traditional sectoral divisions and attempt to
deal with the linkages underlying specific problems.
Missing from Agenda 21 was adequate discussion of several important,
but controversial, issues known as 'black holes'. These include
consumption patterns, population, international debt and militarism.
Chapter 4 of Agenda 21 is devoted to consumption patterns, and does
include a reference to 'unsustainable patterns of production and
consumption', particularly in industrialised countries as a matter of grave
concern. The chapter also calls for national strategies and policies to
encourage 'sustainable consumption patterns'. The chapter is extremely
weak on specifics, though. Industrialised countries, especially the United
States, resisted the entire theme and had the text toned down
considerably.
Chapter 5, dealing with population growth, had to be called 'Demographic
Dynamics and Sustainability'. All references to contraception were also
removed at the insistence of the Vatican and the Philippines. However,
the chapter did support the right of women and men to decide on the
number and spacing of their children. It also included the following
statement: "The growth of world population and production combined
with unsustainable consumption patterns places increasingly severe
stress on the life-supporting capacities of our planet".
Militarism and international debt proved to be issues that were just too
controversial, and were not mentioned at all, despite the obvious fact that
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both were major problems. They were later tackled at the UN Social
Summit in Copenhagen in March 1995. The other area of extreme
difficulty in the negotiations for Agenda 21 was finance. Maurice Strong's
UNCED Secretariat produced an estimate that funding the programmes
in Agenda 21 would cost $600 billion a year, of which about $125 billion a
year should be aid from industrialised countries. That $125 billion was
(coincidentally?) equivalent to the unmet UN target for official
development aid of 0.7% of GNP.4 Western countries were simply not
prepared to put forward that kind of money, particularly in a recession,
although all of them except the United States had agreed to the aid target
in principle. They eventually came up with $2 billion over three years,
directed through the World Bank-controlled Global Environmental
Facility (GEF) - about 0.5% of the sum asked for.
The Commission on Sustainable Development
The implementation of Agenda 21 was to be overseen by the
Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD), a watered-down
version of Strong's Earth Council. The CSD meets annually for three
weeks in New York and has a small secretariat. The CSD is officially just
one of many sub-committees that report to the UN Committee on
Economic and Social Affairs (ECOSOC), notoriously a bureaucratic
graveyard. In practice, the CSD is rather more influential than its lowly
place in the UN system would suggest. That is because national
environment ministers lead the delegations of some important
countries. They have far more power in the real world than ECOSOC
does.
82
The South at UNCED
The CSD is not going to succeed in implementing anything like Agenda
21, though, if for no other reason than that the funds to do it are not
being released. For Southern governments, UNCED was ultimately a
failure because the funds and technology transfer they had hoped for
from Agenda 21 have not materialised. The thinking behind the South's
strategy in the UNCED negotiations was outlined in a policy document
from the South Centre, a think tank funded by the G77 group of Southern
states:
Two strategic considerations should guide the South's negotiating
position... (a) ensuring that the South has adequate
'environmental space' for its future development, and (b)
restructuring global economic relations in such a way that the
South obtains the required resources, technology, and access to
markets...
In the UNCED negotiations proper, the South should... insist on
tilting the balance towards development and considerations of
global economic reform, in order that the South may be offered
some hope of being able to follow a path of sustainable
development. Issues on which the South should receive firm
commitment from the North are: (i) debt relief; (ii) increased ODA
[official development aid], (iii).. access to international liquidity;
(iv) stabilisation and raising of commodity prices; and (v) access to
markets in the North.5
The restructuring of global economic relations had been one of the
recommendations of the Brundtland report, reflecting Southern
concerns. In the 1980s, nearly all countries in the South became trapped
in a cycle of debt after the interest rate on apparently cheap loans they had
taken out in the 1970s rose dramatically. As a consequence, these
countries had to call on the Western-controlled International Monetary
Fund (IMF) to avoid complete bankruptcy. The 'structural adjustment'
conditions attached to IMF loans were tough. They involved cutting
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public expenditure (including health and education budgets),
privatisation of industries, opening markets to imports and increasing
exports. Because most Southern countries were dependent on the export
of a small number of commodities each, and over a hundred countries
were increasing their exports in line with IMF instructions, the
consequence was that the price of commodities fell on the world market
and the Southern countries were no better off. The debt crisis meant that
for several years the South was making larger debt repayments that it was
receiving in aid and loans. The poorest countries of the world were
subsidising the rich. The cuts in education and health meant that for the
people of the South, the eighties were a Tost decade' for development.
Finally, the pressure for exports to pay the debt encouraged the
unsustainable exploitation of the environment.
The crisis that the South had faced for the past decade was at the top of
their agenda. They hoped that with the idea of 'environmental space', the
limited carrying capacity of the Earth, they had finally found a bargaining
chip to get a better deal. Ismail Razali, Malaysia's UN ambassador and the
first chairman of the CSD, was one of the most important negotiators for
the South at UNCED. Two years later, he told me in frank terms about
the strategy pursued:
We thought here was a chance that we could also blackmail the
North into accepting this proposition that the only way you could
solve these problems with global environment was to do
something in the South in a very prominent fashion. If the
millions of the poor in the South have no chance towards
development, then worse environment will result from that. At
the end of the day, whether you're a big frog or a small frog, you
will drown in the same pond because the pond is contaminated.
(Ismail Razali, New York, 5.7.94)
The idea was that the North would provide a lot of aid and technology:
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So for a while the industrialised countries were frightened by this
prospect. That environmental pollution was transboundary.
Would go to Europe, to the United States. And they would pay
money to make sure this doesn't happen. But after Rio.... very little
adjustment was being made in the industrialised world. The onus
of change was being placed on the shoulders of the countries of the
South. And the promised means of implementation to help phase
in sustainable development in the Third World, the poor
countries, was not there. Because governments of the North
became bankrupt or were not in a position to do it. And more
important, because their own citizens didn't want them to make
that sacrifice. Here in the United States, it is easier to talk in terms
of helping the Russians because if the Russians fall, we are back
possibly to a Cold War situation. Can you talk in terms of the
Americans paying money to help the people in the developing
world? So that's a disappointment of Rio. We have in the last two
years seen a situation where the industrialised countries have not
been able to make available the means of implementation, either
through financial transfers or technology. But at the same time,
many developing countries feel that if the means are not there
they are not obliged to continue with efforts towards helping the
environment. Some major countries may decide to go the
unsustainable route. (Ismail Razali, New York, 5.7.94)
The problem that 'greenmaiT has is that essentially Third World
countries have to threaten to destroy their own environments with
unsustainable development. They will obviously suffer much more from
doing this than people in the North, so the threat is not very credible.
Razali now seems to recognise that attempting blackmail over
environmental space was not a successful strategy.
The North at UNCED
Northern governments were negotiating from a much stronger position.
They had most of the money and most of the power. The money that
they did in the end put up for GEF is to fund projects in Southern
countries on climate change and biodiversity. It was specifically tied to
issues of the global environment. It is also worth noting that the three
conventions negotiated at UNCED were all dealing with issues that the
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North was more concerned about than the South. African countries
wanted a convention on desertification, but the North was not interested.
A Convention on Desertification emerged only in 1994.
However, the UNCED did mark a change in Western attitudes to some
extent. The fact that consumption was dealt with at all is really quite
remarkable. The non-binding commitment to stabilise carbon dioxide
emissions suggested that the West, twenty years after The Limits to
Growth, was beginning to think seriously about limits to physical growth.
The Significance of UNCED
Just before UNCED, the three leading members of the original Limits to
Growth team published a sequel, Beyond the Limits, in which they
argued that it was now clear that some important environmental limits
had already been passed.6 They claimed that the hole in the ozone layer
had been the first definitive sign that a global limit had been reached.
They also pointed to collapsing fisheries around the world and
indications of global warming as evidence that further global limits had
been passed. On the other hand, they quietly admitted that their earlier
predictions about fossil fuel and mineral reserves had been too
pessimistic. They also accepted that energy and materials efficiency had
increased more than they had expected twenty years earlier. The
conclusion they emphasised, though, was that global environmental
limits were now in sight in the early 1990s, when in the original
computer model they had been expected in the late twenty-first century.
The Northern interest in the UNCED process was dominated by concern
about global environmental issues. Although the Rio Declaration does
not reflect it, the feature of UNCED which is most significant was the
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emergence of global environment as a major issue in international
politics. Rio was a major political event in a way in which Stockholm had
not been. Twenty years before, the environment, let alone the global
environment, was not seen as a central political problem. The question
which UNCED was unable to settle was how to handle limits to the
Earth's environmental space. That is the issue which post-UNCED
debates on sustainability centre on, as will be explored in later chapters.
NGOs at UNCED
Despite unprecedented access to the negotiations, NGOs did not have a
major influence on the agreements negotiated by the governments at
UNCED. Pratap Chatterjee and Matthias Finger, in an overwhelmingly
negative account of the UNCED process from a radical Green perspective,
argue that NGOs failed at Rio.7 However, they do admit that mutual
learning between North and South took place. Andrew Steer, director of
the World Bank Environment Department, told me that he thought that
UNCED had made Northern environmentalists think differently about
development. Martin Khor, president of the Third World Network,
wrote:
The UNCED process forged new and stronger links between
Northern and Southern groups, between development and
environmental activists. It would now be difficult for
environmentalists to stick to wildlife issues or population, without
simultaneously addressing international equity and global power
structures.8
Business for Sustainable Development?
At the time, another important outcome of UNCED was widely seen as
the formation of the Business Council for Sustainable Development
(BCSD). It was founded at the initiative of Stephen Schmidheiny, the
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Swatch billionaire, who had been appointed as special adviser to Maurice
Strong. Schmidheiny persuaded forty-eight other international business
leaders to join his group. Schmidheiny published a book, Changing
Course, as the BCSD's manifesto.9 Schmidheiny drew on the theory of
Total Quality Management (TQM) to argue for a revisioning of the
business approach to the environment. TQM focuses on the customer
and the idea of looking at the overall production process from a product's
conception until it ends up at the customer. The TQM approach holds
that low quality is a sign of organisational inefficiency. Schmidheiny
argued that pollution, like low quality, is a sign of inefficiency and waste.
Environmental efficiency, like quality, should be built into the
production process from the start.
Schmidheiny accepted that the environment cannot complain in the
same way as a dissatisfied customer. Preferably, business should regulate
itself to avoid government intervention which would ultimately be
more rigid and less efficient. When governments got involved,
Schmidheiny favoured economic instruments, like ecotaxes, over more
rigid regulation. In urgent cases, Schmidheiny thought regulation might
be justified.
At UNCED, the BCSD worked quite well with the traditional business
lobbyist, the International Chamber of Commerce. Later, however, a split
emerged between Schmidheiny and the less environmentalist ICC. Since
UNCED, little has been heard from the BCSD, and the ICC has reasserted
itself.
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After Rio: Environment off the agenda
In the day-to-day world of global politics, the environment and
sustainable development have generally sunk down the international
agenda since UNCED. The South had some success in controlling the
agenda for the UN Conference on Social Development held in
Copenhagen in March 1995, called the Social Summit. It dealt with the
issues of poverty, unemployment and social exclusion. The South used
the Summit as a sounding board for its concerns about the debt burden
and unfair trade relations. Without much interest from Northern
governments, however, the Social Summit was doomed to be ineffective
at bringing about change.
After their failure to get what they wanted at UNCED, many Southern
governments were pleasantly surprised to get anything. The long-
running GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) negotiations
finally led in 1994 to an agreement by Western countries to lower some of
their barriers to Southern imports, in exchange for a lowering of barriers
to imported goods in Southern countries. This development was
considered good news for many countries in Asia and Latin America, but
it was bad news for the poorest countries, mostly in Africa, which had
received protected access to Northern markets under the Lome
Convention.
The negotiations also led to the creation of an important new
international body, the World Trade Organisation (WTO), a younger
sister to the World Bank and the IMF. For many environmentalists,
however, the creation of the WTO and the move towards free trade was
extremely worrying. The more radical Green wing of the environmental
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movement is opposed to free trade on the fundamental grounds of belief
in local self-sufficiency and maximum decentralisation. Among
environmentalists generally, though, there is a fear that international
free trade tends to encourage a lowering of environmental standards for
short-term competitive advantage. Proponents of free trade counter-
argue that protected industries are often very bad environmentally.
What worries environmentalists most is the fact that there will be a
WTO Panel to decide if regulations are acting as barriers to trade. It
succeeds the GATT Panel which ruled that US sanctions against tuna
caught without following safeguards to protect dolphins was an unfair
barrier to trade. The strong fear is that the WTO Panel, with much more
sweeping powers than the GATT Panel, will be biased towards putting
trade before the environment.
The American influence
Another problem for the environmental agenda has been the Republican
Congress elected in the United States at the end of 1994. After the election
of the presidential ticket of Bill Clinton and A1 Gore in 1992,
environmentalists had high hopes. A1 Gore, the new vice-president, had
strongly criticised former President Bush's attitude at UNCED and even
published a widely-praised book supporting action to protect the global
environment.10 President Clinton signed the Biodiversity Convention
soon after he took office.
At the 1994 World Population Conference in Cairo, the US
administration pledged to put in its share towards a fund for women's
health and access to contraception. The World Population Conference
itself was a considerable success. The idea that access to contraception is a
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human right proved capable of uniting all states except the Vatican,
Sudan, Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Nicaragua. At the 1984 World Population
Conference in Mexico, the Vatican had been powerfully supported by the
United States, then under the influence of right-wing Christian
fundamentalists. Meanwhile, since 1984, disputes about whether
population growth needed to be stopped had been sidestepped. A large
body of research suggested that women across the world wanted fewer
children and better access to contraception. The line many Southern
countries had taken in 1974 and 1984 - that smaller families would have
to wait for development - was discredited.
A month after the Cairo conference, the right-wing Christian
fundamentalists returned to the stage when the Republicans won control
of the US Congress. Suddenly, the more constructive line the Clinton
administration had taken came to an end. With the Republicans trying to
abolish most of America's environmental legislation, the administration
was unwilling to sign up to commitments it could not hope to get past its
Congress at the first Conference of the Parties to the Framework
Convention on Climate Change (COP-1), held in Berlin in April 1995.
The Americans continued to block any binding targets or timetables.
Climate Summit
The conference discussed a draft protocol proposed by the Alliance of
Small Island States (AOSIS), calling for a 20% reduction in carbon dioxide
emissions from industrialised countries by 2005. This target had been
endorsed by the IPCC scientists as a first step towards a 60% reduction by
2040. The AOSIS Protocol was opposed not just by the United States, but
by all the Western countries. Enthusiasm for cutting carbon dioxide
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emissions was actually much less in Berlin than it had been in Rio. In
1992, several Western countries had committed themselves to ambitious
targets of up to 20% reduction in carbon dioxide emissions. However,
estimates by the Climate Secretariat in 1995 showed that only two
Western countries were not still increasing their emissions. Britain had
cut its emissions by closing much of its coal industry and replacing coal
with natural gas for electricity generation. This policy had not been
pursued for the sake of the climate however, but was an unexpected side-
effect of the rules for the privatisation of the electricity generation
industry. Germany was reducing its emissions by counting the old East
and West together. Falls in the former East, as inefficient old industry
closed, were more than compensating for increases in the former West.
Emissions from the other parts of the former Eastern bloc were falling as
well for the same reason. In 1992, it had been thought that stabilising
emissions by 2000 would not require much effort. Despite the
commitments, little was done and now the target is not being met.
The 1995 Second Assessment Report of the IPCC that came out at the end
of the year states that the balance of evidence is that global warming is
already taking place.11 At the second Climate Conference, held in Geneva
in July 1996, the Clinton administration suddenly changed position and
accepted the principle of binding targets, leaving Australia isolated in
oppposition. Another important development was that the fossil fuel
lobby was balanced by the insurance industry. Insurers lobbied for action
to reduce carbon dioxide emissions, concerned by a pattern of increasing
storm damage widely regarded as an early sign of climate change. There is
now much more optimism that the third Climate Conference, to be held
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in Kyoto at the end of 1997 will finally lead to a binding convention and
the start of international action on the issue.
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A number of points emerge from a review of the history of the debate.
The concept of limits to growth was used by Malthus as an argument for
the maintenance of inequality and against the idea of human
perfectibility. His critics initially used two counter-arguments. The first
was that the limits to food production, which he claimed were
immediate, in fact lay in the distant future. Their second counter¬
argument was that even if the limits were immediate, the correct
response would be to improve the condition of the poor so that they
could lower their birth rate, rather than to just accept their starvation as
inevitable.
Later, Marx and Engels argued that Malthus had been seeking to use the
concept of natural limits as an apparently immutable justification for
unequal social relations. Engels even appeared to claim that the advance
of science meant that there never could be natural limits to social
progress. This faith in the power of science was to become a crucial
feature of modernity.
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Although from the Romantics onwards there was some opposition to the
idea that it was desirable to use science for the domination of nature, the
success of economic and technological progress in transforming the lives
of people in the West led to the marginalisation of this viewpoint for a
long time. It was only from the 1960s that this opposition emerged as a
major force in Western societies. In the late twentieth century, when the
debate about limits to growth returned, similarly Malthusian conclusions
were initially drawn. Critics of the new environmentalism initially
argued that the environmentalists were conservatives opposed to
progress for the poor. It was in response to this criticism that the slogan of
sustainability was invented by environmentalists in the World Council
of Churches. The Brundtland Commission's formulation of sustainable
development emphasised the importance of equity. By the time of
UNCED, the idea of global environmental limits was used as an
argument for a more equal sharing of the environmental space available.
Although that attempt failed, the concept of equitably sharing the Earth's
environmental space has become increasingly important in recent
thinking about sustainability that will be described in Part Three.
Modern environmentalism owes its origins to scientists like Rachel
Carson, Paul and Anne Ehrlich, and Donella and Dennis Meadows. By
the end of the eighties, the general scientific community took concerns
about threats to the global environment very seriously. The mainstream
of the economics profession, however, has not done the same. Although
the 'limits to growth' debate of the seventies has become less significant,
there is still fundamental disagreement between environmentalists and
economists. It will be apparent in Part Three that the conceptual
development of the concept of sustainability since the Brundtland report
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has been largely under the influence of a relatively small group of
economists concerned about environmental issues. Other economists
have remained critical of the entire idea. The difficulty that economists
have had with sustainability will be shown to be related to the
philosophical basis of mainstream economic theory in a particular
version of utilitarianism.
Sustainability was originally invented as a political concept by
environmentalists in the 1970s responding, not to economists on the
right, but to Marxist-inspired critics on the left. These leftist critics
claimed that concern about environmental limits was Malthusian
disregard for the poor, or 'bourgeois' sentimentality. The intention was to
create a term that was difficult rhetorically to oppose. The very first
World Council of Churches definition of a 'sustainable society' also
brought together the idea of physical sustainability within environmental
and resource limits with the idea of social sustainability in terms of
equitable distribution and political participation. The Brundtland
Commission drew the parallel between equity to future generations and
equity for the people of the present. By tying these two kinds of equity
together, the Brundtland Commission tried to create a common platform
for environmentalist concerns about the future and Third World
concerns about development. They also hoped to be able to get round the
debate about limits to growth by accepting the environmentalist case of
limits to physical growth, while rejecting their claim of absolute limits to
economic growth. Although this compromise position carries a lot of
weight intellectually, it is more difficult to put the idea into practice.
Brundtland's conception of sustainable development was an attempt to
steer a middle ground between environmentalist criticism of industrial
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society and the orthodoxy of growth and development. The political
genius of the idea was that it had a little bit to offer everybody. Observers
were divided on whether it was genuinely an attempt at reform or an
attempt to have your cake and eat it. Was the vagueness of Brundtland's
definition of sustainable development a politically necessary compromise
or an invitation to duplicity, allowing everyone to claim to be a friend of
the environment?
The difficulty of turning sustainable development from a slogan into real
change became increasingly apparent after UNCED. It was very apparent
that despite everything the North and the South were still at cross-
purposes. Northern governments were interested in the idea of
environmental limits as a threat from the South. Southern governments
were interested in environmental limits as an argument for a more
equitable distribution of wealth internationally. At UNCED, it was among
NGOs that North and South, environmentalists and development
activists, began to come to terms with each other. Bringing together the
physical and the social aspects of sustainability proved to be a unifying
goal for them.
The debate about the implications and the implementation of sustainable
development has not gone away after nearly a decade. The definition is
still a subject of controversy, as is the question of growth. New debates
about the sustainability of 'natural capital', environmental space and
ecological tax reform have emerged. In the last few years, the tension
between the goal of sustainability itself and the assumptions of






The intellectual debate about sustainability and sustainable development
since Brundtland has been conducted mainly on the terrain of the new
discipline of environmental economics. It is not a unified discipline,
though. One group of environmental economists apply ideas from the
neoclassical mainstream of the economics profession. Other
environmental economists are critical of economic orthodoxies and often
support the political agenda of the Green movement.
It is interesting to note that many of the 'green economists' I interviewed
came to economics after having developed an interest in environmental
issues. Herman Daly is an exception as he chose economics for
intellectual reasons in the 1950s. It was his experiences in Brazil in the
1960s that turned him into an environmentalist. Hans Opschoor was
interested in the natural world and wanted to study geology, but was
forced to study economics by his father in the 1960s. John Pezzey was a
young environmentalist in the 1970s who studied mathematics and
worked as a meteorologist before deciding to go back to university and
become an economist. Paul Ekins was an engineer who retrained as an
economist in the 1980s after having become an environmental activist.
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The last two consciously chose economics as they had come to the
conclusion that economics was central to environmental reform.
Richard Norgaard originally studied mathematics. He worked as a river
guide in his vacations, and became interested in environmental
problems after the Glen Canyon was flooded for a dam project. He
decided to switch to economics after concluding that economics was
crucial for an understanding of environmental issues. At that time, in
the early sixties, 'it was a perverse thing to do'. Only in the 1980s did it
become more common for people interested in environmental issues to
train as economists.
The fact that most of these people were not originally economists, but
environmentalists, may explain why they found it so easy to challenge
the conventional economic paradigm - some of them entered the
profession with the intention of doing just that. This is in line with
Thomas Kuhn's observations about paradigm-challenging scientists
usually being new entrants to their discipline.1 What it also reveals is
that the challenges to economic thinking from an environmental
perspective have very largely come from environmentalists-turned-
economists, rather than ordinary economists.
The paradigm dispute between environmentalists and economists runs
through the entire debate about sustainability. The most obvious
disagreement between these groups historically has been about the issue
of economic growth. Much of the debate about the meaning of
sustainable development has been about the role of economic growth,
carrying on the argument that has been going on since the 1970s.
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In more technical economic terms, a debate has been conducted about
definitions of sustainability in terms of capital. GNP as a measure of
income does not take account of the running down of 'natural capital',
such as forests and oil reserves. Sustainability has been given an
economic definition as 'non-declining capital'. The idea is that the
running down of capital should not be counted as income. There is
disagreement about to what extent increases in human-made capital can
compensate for the loss of natural capital.
Some economists have cast doubt on the need for any sustainability rules
and the pursuit even of sustainable development. They argue that the
traditional economic approach of optimal development is able to cope
with the future perfectly well. All that the goal of sustainability does is
introduce extra unnecessary constraints on the path of development.
This argument depends on a very high level of confidence in the capacity
of technical progress to overcome any problems that may emerge in the
future. More interestingly, the path of optimal development turns out to
be one that is not risk-averse, or even disaster-averse. The difference
between optimal development and sustainable development is in the
approach taken to large-scale risks. Sustainability emerges out of the
principle that it is worth lowering the average expectation of income in
order to minimise the risk of the worst-case outcome - rather like taking
out insurance.
The 'maximin' approach that sustainability takes to equity between
generations is rather similar to the maximin approach to equity within
generations familiar to political theory from the work of the philosopher
John Rawls. It appears that the risk-indifferent approach to the future that
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economists frequently adopt has strong parallels with their inegalitarian
approach to the distribution of wealth in the present. Both are a
consequence of the classical utilitarian basis of mainstream economic
theory.
This section of the thesis looks in detail at key parts of the current debate
about sustainability, drawing on the interviews I conducted with key
players. It is divided into four chapters. Chapter 3.2, 'The Meaning of
Sustainability', concentrates on the definition of the term sustainable
development and whether it means something different from
sustainability. What does the word 'development' add exactly? Is it just a
euphemism for economic growth? Chapter 3.3, 'Taking Sustainability
Into Economics', looks at attempts to incorporate the concept of
sustainability into economics and the problems that have been
encountered. Chapter 3.4, 'Putting a Price on the Planet', looks at one of
the key differences about values between economists and
environmentalists that underlies many of these disputes. Finally,
Chapter 3.5, 'Moral Philosophy and Sustainability', looks more generally
at the philosophical disputes around the concept of sustainability.
1Thomas Kuhn (1970) The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Chicago:






The starting point for the concept of sustainable development was the
aim to integrate environmental considerations into economic policy. In
that way, the concept became a meeting point for environmentalists and
economists. More profoundly, it was conceived as an attempt to bring
environmentalist ideas into the central area of policy, which in the
modern world is economics. It was to be the ground on which the
mainstream was to consider the environmentalist case.
The concept of sustainable development carefully balanced
environmental concern with endorsement of economic growth, at least
in the South. It was deliberately conceived as being something more
palatable than the hardline environmentalist message. Rather than
challenge the idea of growth directly, it sought to modify the kind of
growth strategies that were pursued.
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The result of this aim for balance between environmental and economic
concerns was a consensus on a definition that was at the very least rather
vague. Some have seen the vagueness as meaninglessness: you can claim
anything as part of sustainable development. Another view is that
although there is much disagreement at present, with time the meaning
will become clearer as people learn a new environmental language.
Others have argued that sustainability is like other important political
ideas, such as liberty and justice, which are 'contestable concepts'. Because
people do not agree on the exact meaning does not mean that there is no
meaning at all. They argue that sustainable development is a concept that
has succeeded in moving the debate forward and towards the
environmentalist position.
Defining Sustainable Development
'Sustainable development' is a meeting point for environmentalists and
developers. The environmental scientist Tim O'Riordan argued in his
1988 essay 'The Politics of Sustainability' that the reason for the popularity
of the term sustainable development lay in the way that it could be used
both by environmentalists, emphasising the sustainable part, and by
developers, emphasising the development part.1 The definition of
sustainable development given by the Brundtland Commission,
'development which meets the needs of the present without sacrificing
the ability of future generations to meet their needs', is often criticised as
hopelessly vague or, in the language of experts, non-operationalisable. In
his 1988 essay, O'Riordan expressed the concern that the vagueness of the
definition would allow people to claim almost anything as part of
'sustainable development', reducing the term to meaninglessness.
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In 1994, Dennis Meadows spoke for many radical environmentalists
when he told me he thought that sustainable development was a
meaningless term:
Meadows: I consider that the term sustainable development as it is
currently used is an oxymoron. People, if you probe beneath the
surface, what they really want, what they really mean when they
say that term, is sustainable growth. And growth is not sustainable.
Certainly not physical growth. So I see that the term sustainable
development has so quickly passed into common usage that it
really has no meaning. Or it has fifty different meanings. So you go
to a conference where people are talking about sustainable
development and they're just talking past each other, because
they're all interested in something different. For the Third World
sustainable development means redistributing the wealth from the
rich to the poor. For the rich countries, sustainable development
means that the poor countries quit having so many kids. So it's not
been a very useful term for structuring any kind of collaboration or
even moving ahead. And I don't know if it will be. It may be too
late to save that term. I use the term 'survivable development'.
Which means unfolding in a way which can survive
discontinuities and a crash.
SD: Yes. That's kind of like Pezzey. He has the two different terms.
What about sustainability? I mean when people talk about things
like sustainable cities, or just trying to achieve sustainability. How
do you feel about that. Do you think that still has some hope, or is
it too late?
Meadows: It's a rallying call like freedom or liberty. People will
come round and wave their flags when you say that word. So it has
some political influence, but as a basis for any kind of detailed or
feasible planning, I just don't see it. Cities are inherently
unsustainable. By their very nature. So I just don't see it as a very
useful term. Even the Brundtland Commission used the term
sustainable development to mean really sustainable growth.
(Dennis Meadows, University of New Hampshire, 24.6.94)
Criticism of the vagueness of Brundtland's definition is accepted to some
extent by the author of the definition himself, Nitin Desai, an economist
and former staff member of the Commission, who is now UN Under¬
secretary General for Policy Coordination and Sustainable Development.
When I asked how he would define sustainable development, he said:
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Having been guilty of many, including the ones you see in the
Brundtland Report, I hesitate to add yet another. And I would urge
at this point, the issue is not of defining sustainable development,
as of understanding it. Take the word 'development' itself. The
value of any definition of development is simply the clue that it
gives to the moral premises of the person who's giving the
definition. So one person will describe development in terms of
improving prospects for human beings, human resource
development. Someone else will describe it in terms of growth.
They are not really very valuable as operational definitions. It's not
as if someone decides "I want development. Now let me find out
what it is". That's never the way things work. You don't need
definitions for definitions. Definitions are useful only for the clue
that they give you for the premises on which somebody works. If
you can't define development adequately, how can you define
sustainable development in a simple formulation? (Nitin Desai,
New York, 30.5.94)
Desai makes an important point. The problem in agreeing on the
meaning of sustainable development is not fundamentally about
agreeing upon a precise definition, but about agreeing upon the values
that would underlie any such definition.
Sustainability or Sustainable Development?
The degree of difference about values becomes apparent when you
consider another question: are sustainability and sustainable
development the same thing or different? This is a strange question to
have to ask. It seems obvious that they must be different because
otherwise the word 'development' would be entirely superfluous, but it is
politically important for many people to avoid making a distinction.
Making a distinction drives a wedge into the consensus that formed the
basis of the Brundtland Report and now Agenda 21 around the mutual
need for environmental protection and Third World development.
'Sustainable development' is the cornerstone of that consensus. In
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Agenda 21 the terms 'sustainability' and 'sustainable development' are
used interchangeably.
For environmentalists like Dennis Meadows, on the other hand, the
mention of the word 'development' makes them see red. Tim O'Riordan
drew a distinction in 1988 between sustainability and sustainable
development.2 He saw sustainable development as a term that ultimately
gave priority to development, while the idea of sustainability was
primarily about the environment. His analysis is rather borne out by
Nitin Desai:
What I'm going to focus on is the political acceptance of sustainable
development in the international sphere. And I'm going to start
really with the Brundtland Commission. I was part of the staff and
in fact was the person who was principally responsible for the front
end of the report which dealt with the review of development and
the basic conceptual chapter on sustainable development. How did
it come in the Brundtland Commission? Remember the
Brundtland Commission was called the World Commission on
Environment and Development. And maybe I could give you an
insight as to how this appeared in the Brundtland Report. Because
that's where much of the politics of sustainability started. Basically
the Brundtland Commission was a broad based commission which
included people both from industrial countries as well as
developing countries. And around the time I was brought in there
was a feeling that the issue of development was not receiving
sufficient attention, that environmental management would stop
the very necessary growth which was required in developing
countries in order to meet some very basic needs. So the feeling
was that the issue of development had to be injected into this
agenda in some ways. That's one of the reasons incidentally why I
was brought in. I was essentially a development man, working on
the development side in India. The notion of sustainable
development entered the Brundtland Commission basically as an
attempt to find the meeting ground from a perception which saw
environmental matters essentially as matters which controlled
towards a perception which saw the issue more in terms of re¬
directing growth. If you look carefully at that chapter of Brundtland
which talks about sustainable development, and look also at the
fine print in it, not just the famous definition which everybody
comes up with, but the rest. What were the components of
sustainable development which were spoken of there? And you
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will see that it is an attempt essentially at talking in terms of
redirecting development and growth, rather than stopping it.
Because it recognises very clearly that you must meet people's
needs. That's the way in which the process itself started. I believe
that the impact of the Brundtland Report was very great because
there was a widespread perception in many circles that
environmental policy as we have traditionally understood it was
not effective. It was end of the pipe. So quite apart from the very
real concern of developing countries to inject their need for
development into any global thinking and resource management,
there was also the feeling in industrial countries that if you really
wanted to tackle environmental problems you'd have to move
upstream. Not end of pipe solutions, but you have to move into
the factors which shape decisions, into economics. From ecology to
economics. So both of these came together in the notion of
sustainable development. And that's why the report had such a
strong impact. Because it wasn't just a plea reaffirming what was
already agreed in 1972 in Stockholm. It was basically seen as a new
political approach which sought to inject the issue of resource
management, environmental management into the very heart of
economic policy making and development policy. And it therefore
responded to the concerns which many people had. That's how the
whole business of sustainable development started. (Nitin Desai,
New York, 30.5.94)
I asked Nitin Desai whether he though there was a difference between
sustainability and sustainable development:
Desai: I would treat sustainability purely as an attribute of
sustainable development. The difference to me is purely verbal. I
don't see a conceptual difference as such. And certainly that's not
there in any of the texts which we are involved in, where more or
less they're used interchangeably. It's purely grammatical, the
difference.
SD: Yes, in Agenda 21 they're used so interchangeably it's almost
like they are one. Some people have argued they're quite distinct.
But some people have argued, like you're saying, that one of them
is an attribute of the other. But in Agenda 21, it's not even used
like that, is it?
Desai: It's used interchangeably. Purely where grammatical style or
stylistic elegance requires. But there's no deep sense in which
Agenda 21 requires any distinction to be made between sustainable
development and sustainability of development.
SD: So is that the view you have? Or do you think -
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Desai: I would say that's the view I have. Because I think that
would really be hair-splitting. If we were to try to draw a very fine
line between sustainable development and the sustainability of
development. As far as I can see, the two things should mean the
same thing. (Nitin Desai, New York, 30.5.94)
Desai is playing with words. The distinction between 'sustainable
development' and the 'sustainability of development' is indeed a very
fine one. The real significance of the issue of the difference between
sustainability and sustainable development is not so much about the
meaning of sustainability as the meaning of development. Is
development about economic growth or about human development?
The term 'sustainable development' has become associated with support
for economic growth. A preference for 'sustainability' is associated with
an anti-growth agenda.
Sustainable Development through Economic Growth?
Development through economic growth lies at the heart of the UN's
interpretation of sustainable development. The question of whether
sustainability is compatible with economic growth will be discussed
further in the next chapter. But when I talked to Joke Waller-Hunter, the
head of the Commission on Sustainable Development secretariat, she
made clear that vagueness about the implications of sustainable
development for growth was vital to the current consensus:
Waller-Hunter: It's easy to reach consensus on a term like
sustainable development. But of course then the problem is while
it's easy to reach consensus on the term, more work should be
done on the definition. Although I wouldn't promote a very
specific defining of the terms, because the consensus that is now
achievable on sustainable development would most likely
disappear.
SD: Why do you think it's easy to achieve consensus on that term?
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Waller-Hunter: Because in the view of the Brundtland
Commission, the mother and father of the term more or less as it
is used now, it includes the possibility of growth, economic growth,
in developing countries, and it doesn't exclude economic growth
in industrialised countries. While at the same time the message is
that quality of the economic growth should be such that the
negative impacts on poverty, on the environment and the on the
use of natural resources will be limited. (Joke Waller-Hunter,
2.6.94)
The identification of sustainable development with the growth agenda
has made radical environmentalists deeply suspicious of it. The
acceptance of the concept of 'sustainable development' by governments
and other institutions seen as representing the status quo has fuelled the
belief among radical environmentalists (such as Nicholas Hildyard,3
editor of The Ecologist) that the whole idea is being used as a
smokescreen. The statement in the Maastricht Treaty that one aim of the
new European Union would be sustainable development is an example
of the problem. In that case, matters were further complicated when the
first English translation of the treaty used the term 'sustainable growth',
which is a term that has been used in economics since the 1940s to
describe something quite different - a rate of economic growth that will
not lead to inflationary overheating.
Linguistic confusion
The present situation is one of linguistic confusion. Does that mean that
sustainability is meaningless? Donella Meadows said:
I think we're struggling for the language now for a whole set of
concepts that are urgent in our conversation that hadn't been
while the world was unfull as Herman [Daly] would say. We didn't
need all this language about limits and sustainability and we didn't
develop it and our language is now very much lacking. And
sustainable development is it seems to me used in a million
different ways, mainly for political purposes. I was reading a great
article about the mouthing of sustainability over and over again
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not going to bring us to sustainability. Sustainability is my word for
the moment to talk about what I do. Not sustainable development,
and lord knows not sustainable growth. And I mean Herman
Daly's very clear, very strict definition. You have stable population.
You have stable throughput. And you have that stable throughput
for each source and sink below its limits. To me that's sustainable
society. That's a physical definition. That's the envelope within
which everything else has to take place. Then we have social
sustainability. Then we have the question of decent human lives,
justice. To me it was clear from the model 25 years ago.
Sustainability means meeting those physical requirements; and
beyond that, meeting those social requirements that have to be met
so that the system doesn't blow itself apart socially.
And I'm very aware that not everybody uses the word in those
ways. I think that's what happens. The Eskimos with all their
supposed words for snow needed them and pointed to this kind of
snow - you used this word, and that kind of snow - you used that
word. Often enough that everyone had a shared experience of
snow x and snow y and snow z. And then they didn't have to go
through all the rigmarole, but for a while they had to. And that's
where we are right now. We have to develop whole mindsets
about sustainability and we may someday, we're beginning to do
this, have deep sustainability, you know like deep ecology. Strict
sustainability and not-so-strict sustainability and sustainable
growth for the people who are just catching on and really don't get
it yet. We'll have to have words like that. We'll have to say "I
mean sustainability with regard to pollution sinks."
SD: Yes. There's terms like very strong, strong, weak and very weak
sustainability.
Meadows: Yes. People say because we're in this linguistic confusion
that therefore we shouldn't do anything, we shouldn't go
anywhere, we don't know what we're talking about. And to an
extent we don't know what we're talking about. And talking about
it is the first step towards a shared social experience that will get us
to move to do the things that we need to do. It's a mess. But social
transformations are messy. (Donella Meadows, Dartmouth College,
New Hampshire, 23.6.94)
That last sentence of Donella Meadows' is particularly worth bearing in




Another view is Michael Jacobs' in his book The Green Economy.4 He
argues that sustainable development is a 'contestable concept': one that
affords a variety of competing interpretations or conceptions: 'Many
political objectives are of this kind: liberty, social justice and democracy,
for example. These concepts have basic meanings and almost everyone is
in favour of them, but deep conflicts remain about how they should be
understood and what they imply for policy.'5
Because something is a contestable concept does not mean that it has no
meaning at all. Words have meanings when there is a consensus among
a language community about what they mean. You cannot be like
Humpty-Dumpty in Alice Through the Looking-Glass: "'When I use a
word,' said Humpty-Dumpty in a scornful tone, 'it means what I want it
to mean, neither more nor less.'"6 People do try to distort the use of
words for political ends, but there are limits to how far it is possible to
succeed in that. Very few people believed that the German Democratic
Republic was a democracy.
What kind of definition?
How tightly is it possible to define legitimate use of the term
sustainability? Herman Daly is quite strict:
SD: How do you feel about the term or concept of sustainability? Or
perhaps they're slightly different, the term and the concept?
Daly: I think it makes sense to talk about sustainable development.
It does not make sense to talk about sustainable growth. Growth
being defined as physical expansion. Development as qualitative
improvement. Though I would say sustainable development
ought to be thought of as development without growth, that is
without growth beyond the physical carrying capacity of the
ecosystem, the regenerative and absorptive capacities. So in that
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sense I think the Brundtland Commission did us a great service by
putting the idea of sustainable development on the agenda,
although for them it's practically the same as sustainable growth.
They think the economy has to grow by a factor of between five
and ten, which I think is not reasonable. Nevertheless, in spite of
all the contradictions, they probably had to accept the
contradictions in order to get the consensus, to get the term out.
That forced people in places like the World Bank to deal with the
words. You start thinking about the words, and you're forced to
write something. And that's what happens to bureaucrats. All
throughout the UN system, once the Brundtland Commission said
sustainable development, everyone had to start thinking about it
and writing about it, or even writing about it without thinking
about it. Whenever bureaucrats have to write about things, they
start thinking a little, or at least they start looking around for
somebody who has already thought around enough to have
written something, and stimulates thought and discussion. There's
a lot of nonsense written. But not everything's nonsense.
Hopefully it'll begin to filter through. So I think on balance it's
been a very helpful and beneficial thing. We're in danger now,
though, of losing the impetus through mush. The term just
becoming a catch-all for everything that's good. People want to talk
about moral sustainability and political sustainability and
psychological sustainability. I think all that is just way off the mark.
All these other things may be good, but I think the term
sustainability, or sustainable development, ought to be really kept
within its environmental context, its ecological sustainability. So if
something is not socially sustainable, well, maybe it's socially good
or bad, but I don't think it helps to stretch the sustainability idea
too far beyond its real meaning or its basic meaning, which I think
is the non-consumption of capital. Of natural capital in this case.
You can say there is such a thing as moral capital or social capital
and if you run that down, it's not sustainable. OK, I'll accept that.
But that's sort of a metaphorical extension. I wouldn't want to halt
action on environmental sustainability until such time as we had
agreement on what is moral sustainability. (Herman Daly,
University of Maryland, 22.6.94)
Daly emphasised the physical aspect of sustainability. Tim O'Riordan,
Professor of Environmental Sciences at the University of East Anglia,
emphasised the social aspects:
SD: How would you define sustainability?
O'Riordan: Well basically I think it's a social question. Therefore
one should see it in terms of social well-being, institutions, civil
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rights, the minimisation of armaments, the control of deprivation
of the very poor, the provision of a minimum standard of living
and access to a decent quality of environment, also education and
employment for all peoples. So I see sustainability as primarily a
social and political issue with a strong ethical undertone. And the
so-called physical dimension fits within that, but it isn't
predominant. That's the reverse of what most people see.
SD: Why do you see it that way?
O'Riordan: Because I think that's what Brundtland was trying to
get at, never properly understood. And I think that you cannot
have sustainability in an unequal society. An unequal society will
produce non-sustainability by definition. An equal society at least
has the chance of producing sustainability, but that's not
guaranteed.
SD: Why will an unequal society be unsustainable?
O'Riordan: Because an unequal society will create poverty and a
desire for acquisition and create protectiveness and a whole host of
property right issues which allow dominant groups to acquire and
control at the expense of sub-dominant groups. Just by definition
that means sub-dominant groups will suffer inadequate access to
resources and they will therefore abuse the little resource access
they've got in order just to survive. This has been seen time and
time again in the modern age.
SD: You've criticised the Brundtland Commission's definition.
You said you didn't think it meant anything. Would you like to say
why?
O'Riordan: It's like the wonderful phrase by Gifford Pinchot that
conservation is the greatest good for the greatest number for the
longest time. It doesn't mean anything until its operationalised.
What does it mean in terms of forestry management, like the
spotted owl in the Pacific Northwest? It's the same with
Brundtland. It talks about providing needs for today and providing
needs for tomorrow. So the diminishment of the needs for
tomorrow is not achieved as a result of trying to meet the needs of
today. All that does is provide you with a basic concept. But if you
look at anything we're doing wrong now in terms of resource
extraction or pollution discharges or international management of
the commons, there's not an inkling of evidence that we're
seriously addressing the needs of tomorrow by actually deliberately
sacrificing some of the needs of today. Despite that Brundtland
rhetoric, it's not been put into effect. Now it's not just a function of
inadequate guidance, it's largely a function of inadequate
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understanding of what's involved with that particular definition.
So for my money, though it's a neat definition, it tells you nothing
about the operationality of a given problem. (Tim O'Riordan,
University of East Anglia, 15.3.94)
Dimensions of Sustainable Development
There appears to be a substantial difference in how Daly and O'Riordan
conceive of sustainable development. Should priority be granted to
physical or social criteria? Let me quote the sentences immediately after
the Brundtland Commission's famous definition:
Sustainable development is development that meets the needs of
the present without compromising the ability of future generations
to meet their own needs. It contains within it two key concepts:
• the concept of 'needs', in particular the essential needs of the
world's poor, to which overriding priority should be given; and
• the idea of limitations imposed by the state of technology and
social organization on the environment's ability to meet present
and future needs.
Thus the goals of economic and social development must be
defined in terms of sustainability in all countries - developed or
developing, market-oriented or centrally planned. Interpretations
will vary, but must share certain general features and must flow
from a consensus on the basic concept of sustainable development
and on a broad strategic framework for achieving it.
Development involves a progressive transformation of economy
and society. A development path that is sustainable in a physical
sense could theoretically be pursued even in a rigid social and
political setting. But physical sustainability cannot be secured
unless development policies pay attention to such considerations
as changes in access to resources and the distribution of costs and
benefits. Even the narrow notion of physical sustainability implies
a concern for social equity between generations, a concern that
must logically be extended to equity within each generation.7
In this crucial passage, Brundtland seems to be identifying the crucial
elements of sustainable development as meeting basic needs, recognising
environmental limits, and the principles of intergenerational and
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intragenerational equity. Its emphasis on social aspects is indeed similar
to O'Riordan's, although he is much more radical in his egalitarianism.
Nitin Desai mentioned two important aspects of thinking in the
Brundtland Commission: 'that you must meet people's needs' and 'to
inject the issue of resource management, environmental management
into the very heart of economic policy making and development policy'.
You will remember that when I asked him for his definition of
sustainability or sustainable development, he did not give one, saying: "at
this point the issue is not of defining sustainable development, as of
understanding it". He went on to say:
If you can't define development adequately, how can you define
sustainable development in a simple formulation? It is better to
say a series of sentences which give you a clue. Brushstrokes if you
like, which define the outlines of the idea, rather than a neat
outline. I told you one dimension: asset management. Another
dimension: A key feature of sustainable development. What is the
qualification that sustainability brings to whatever is a normal
understanding of development? One, asset management. Two, one
of the features of development quite often is that it reduces options
for others. I develop my land area in a manner which reduces
options for my neighbours. Or it may reduce options for my
children. If I cut down the forests my children will find it very
difficult to recreate those forests. The second dimension I would
give is trying to minimise the reduction of options for others. So
think consciously "Are we, through this activity, enhancing
options for people? Options in terms of choices available to them
for living reasonably. Or are we reducing them? This dimension is
necessary to get a better understanding of issues like biodiversity,
species loss and so on. A real concern is that by doing that we're
reducing options for the future. The third brushstroke is
responsibility. That sustainable development is responsible
development. That if my acts of production and consumption
have some consequences on you, then I accept responsibility for
those consequences. Either responsibility which is reflected in
rearranging my consumption so as to reduce that, or my
compensating you for the harmful effects. If you like, 'polluter pays
principle'. Something which alters the way we think about
development in the normal sense. The final element I would give
here. The fourth element is equity. That any pattern of
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development which widens options for me and reduces options
for you, which involves an unrequited passing on of costs from me
to you. Which gives me one level of living, and you a completely
different level of living, to me is not acceptable. So the fourth
brushstroke is in terms of equity. So equity, responsibility,
widening of options, asset management. These don't constitute a
definition, they constitute, if you like, the brushstrokes which give
you some indication of the direction of development. I believe this
is what to be looking for. That sustainable development is really
about the direction of development. (Nitin Desai, New York,
30.5.94)
In this passage Desai identified a number of rather overlapping ideas. His
brushstrokes are suggestive, but vulnerable again to the accusation of
vagueness.
When I asked Joke Waller-Hunter about the Brundtland Report, she said:
I think the major message is the shift of responsibilities in
decision-making. For me the very important message is that it
should be the economic sectors that should be a hundred percent
accountable for the impact of what their activities on the
environment. Second one is the Brundtland Report highlighted
the unbalance between the use of resources between the North and
the South. And the message for sustainable development means
equity. Sharing of natural resources between North and South - I
think that's the second very important message. And of course the
third one being that poverty alleviation is the major priority if you
would ever try to achieve sustainable development. These three
messages for me are major. And in industrialised countries more
focus was given to the first message, that there should be a shift in
decision-making. And that thinking permeated rather slowly. But I
think that's what sustainable development is about. (Joke Waller-
Hunter, New York, 2.6.94)
Michael Jacobs identified three core elements of sustainable
development: entrenchment of environmental considerations in
economic policy-making; a commitment to equity both within and
between generations; and development being used as a notion of
economic welfare which acknowledges non-financial components.8
116
Waller-Hunter and Jacobs identify two out of three similar elements at
the core of sustainable development. The ideas of integrating the
environment into economic policy and of the importance of North-
South equity are crucial features of Brundtland's concept of sustainable
development. In that sense, sustainable development is not such a vague
idea as it is sometimes accused of being. The problem of actually
operationalising sustainable development remains, however.
Joke Waller-Hunter claims that Agenda 21 is an operationalisation of
sustainable development by giving concrete policy directions. But that is
not a widely held view. Most people I spoke to were dismissive of
Agenda 21, which was commonly criticised as a shopping list. Waller-
Hunter admitted that a weakness was that 'the level of concreteness in
Agenda 21 isn't such that it can be readily implemented.' Tim O'Riordan
wanted to give Agenda 21 five years before making judgement as to its
usefulness; but he also told me that Agenda 21 was not really about
sustainability, but basic environmental protection measures in Southern
countries.
The difficulty in giving an operational definition of sustainable
development, or even in reaching agreement on what are the key
elements of the idea, lies in the fusion of two concerns that pull in
somewhat different directions: the environmental and the social.
The notion of needs leads to Brundtland's concern for intragenerational
equity. The notion of limits underlies Brundtland's concern for
intergenerational equity. Gandhi is supposed to have said "The world has
enough for everyone's need, but not enough for everyone's greed." As
David Pearce has pointed out, the biggest fundamental obstacle for any
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attempt to operationalise Brundtland's definition of sustainable
development is the seeming impossibility of determining what exactly
are 'needs'.9
Since sustainable development as presently defined seems to be non-
operationalisable, is it of any value? In 1993, Tim O'Riordan wrote a new
essay called 'The Politics of Sustainability' where he admitted that "the
phrase has stuck... Like it or not, 'sustainable development' is with us for
all time."10 I spoke to one initial critic who had been won round to the
usefulness of the idea of sustainable development. I asked Hans
Opschoor, a professor of economics at the Free University of Amsterdam
and then chairman of the Dutch government's Advisory Committee on
Environmental Policy, his opinion on sustainable development:
Opschoor: There's a nice story by which I can illustrate what I
think. At the time the Brundtland Commission was writing, I was
directing the Institute for Environmental Studies downstairs here,
and I was very much at a distance, though monitoring what
happened in the commission. As a consequence of that I think we
were the first to have a symposium on the report after it came out.
At that time we had people from the Brundtland Commission
making presentations. I was to be one of the speakers and I had a
very critical presentation on how you couldn't operationalise the
concept of sustainable development, and how vague a notion it
was. A kind of notion that could cover up for all sorts of nasty
things from any perspective, etcetera. It so happened that the now
minister of development cooperation, Jan Pronk, who then was a
Member of Parliament, sat next to me behind the table waiting for
his turn to give his presentation. He glanced through my notes and
he kicked me under the table and said "You're not going to say
that. If you say that you're assisting in torpedoeing a concept which
might have an international policy impact." So I thought a lot
about that. And in fact I changed my presentation. I did maintain it
was hard to make operational, etcetera, but I wasn't prepared to
throw the concept away yet. Almost eight years after the fact, I
think I'm happy I made that decision. I'm not saying that the
concept is a very precise one. It is very imprecise. It is much easier
to say what is unsustainable than to indicate where sustainability
begins. There are all kinds of grey areas. You have strong and weak
sustainability and what have you. But nevertheless, it turned out
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to be one way of getting close to two hundred countries together,
and I don't see any other way would have been as effective. Now
the Conference on Sustainable Development [UNCED] wasn't all
that successful, but you have commissions on sustainable
development in the UN system. You have the EU sort of adopting
the notion of sustainable development, even though they call it
sustainable growth. Of course all these things are pains in the neck,
but at least nobody can bypass the issue any longer. It's very
undone to not say "Yes I'm in favour of sustainable development."
It's politically incorrect to be against it, I would say. And as long as
we haven't got a better concept or set of concepts, I'm prepared to
go by it and see how much further we can come.
SD: Why do you think it became so popular?
Opschoor: Because it has in it anything anybody might want to
have. If you're an environmentalist it has sustainable, and if you
are not saying precisely what you mean by that term it sounds very
ecological. Of course if you hear the subsequent debate about
sustainable development, people like David Pearce and Solow and
Carl Mayo have developed it - weak sustainability to a certain
degree being acceptable under the notion of sustainability, then it
becomes much more of a tricky subject. Anyhow, the ecologists or
the environmentalists could at least say that the environment was
there. Economists saw development. I found out recently that if
you go back to the very ancient IMF/World Bank documents and
the discussions surrounding the original charters, even in the
forties they were talking about sustainable growth, and what they
meant was on-going growth. There was nothing environmental
yet. Growth had to carry on and not be stopped in any way. So
maybe the old guys still remembered that and it sounded nice in
their ears. So it has something for everybody, I think. And if you're
not paying too much attention, you're fairly happy with what
comes out of it. So it is a kind of vague, undefined something. But
still, it gives an opportunity to address people with totally different
paradigms and say "OK, if you're in favour of sustainable
development, what about the sustainability of this or that?" That
sort of notion lends itself to carrying on a debate, even though as a
policy objective it has to be specified to make any sense at all. (Hans
Opschoor, Free University of Amsterdam, 19.12.94)
Conclusion
The findings in this chapter suggest that the vagueness of the concept of
sustainable development seems to have turned out to be more useful for
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environmentalists than some early critics thought it would. Although
the concept of sustainable development has not led to radical changes in
practice, it has set the terms of debate in a terrain more favourable to
environmentalism. It seems that the tactic has been to keep the concept of
sustainable development vague in order to maintain the consensus. The
strategy fits in very much with the interpretation that sustainable
development is being used as a concept of enrolment. By gaining the
assent of other groups to a concept which puts the debate on ground
chosen by environmentalists, they are able to try to slowly push forward,
using the rhetorical advantage of 'common sense' that the term gives
them. It is a strategy that could have been directly modelled on the one
advocated by Gramsci11 for a group challenging the dominant ideology.
The next stage of the environmentalists' strategy has been to translate the
concept of sustainability from politics into economics.
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This chapter explores in some detail the debates about how to modify the
economic system in order to implement sustainability. What follows is a
brief outline of the issues to be covered.
One of the most telling criticisms of conventional economics which
environmentalists have been making since the time of The Limits to
Growth is that in calculating GNP statistics economists treat the
consumption of the Earth's capital as if it were income.
The first part of this chapter discusses economic definitions of
'sustainability' starting from this point. The idea has been that a state of
sustainability would be achieved if capital was non-declining. It is not
that simple, though. There is controversy about whether to consider
human-made capital and natural capital together (weak sustainability) or
separately (strong sustainability). If they are counted together then
increases in human-made capital can compensate for running down
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natural capital. Is that legitimate? Are the two kinds of capital
substitutable in that way?
The question turns largely on the issue of the extent to which technology
can compensate for the loss of natural resources. Weak sustainability
assumes almost infinite substitutability by technology, an assumption
which environmentalists regard with scepticism. Strong sustainability
also assumes some substitutability, however. The difficulty is that any
assumption about substitutability is ultimately rather arbitrary.
However, there is a more fundamental problem with attempts to define
sustainability in terms of capital. How do you compare the value of
different kinds of capital? Strong sustainability assumes that decreases in
one aspect of natural capital can be compensated for by increases in
another kind of natural capital. To what extent is that idea legitimate
either? How can you compare oil reserves and endangered species?
Mainstream economists can use this argument to cast doubt on the whole
notion of sustainability. To them, it seems better simply to include the
economic value of natural capital in the national income accounts. This
approach amounts to the same as calculations of 'optimality' that are
made conventionally in economics. Sustainability in terms of natural
capital raises problems for environmentalists too. If different kinds of
natural capital are to be allowed to compensate for each other, then they
must be reduced to some common unit of measurement.
The second part of the chapter turns to a different approach to
sustainability that has become popular in the last few years. The concept
of 'environmental space' attempts to make sustainability more concrete
by dealing with the physical components separately. The idea is to look at
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each component and consider what would be a level of activity that could
be supported by ecosystems without irreversible damage. The total
amount of activity that could be supported in such a way is referred to as
the 'environmental space'.
The environmental space concept is closely linked to the issue of
distribution. Starting from the position of a more of less fixed amount of
environmental space, the current situation (where it is
disproportionately exploited by the industrialised countries) seems
unjust. The environmental space concept has been used to argue for a
much more equal level of consumption across the world. It is these
egalitarian implications that seem to have made it a particularly
controversial idea.
In contrast to the natural capital concept, the environmental space
concept starts from a more environmental approach to sustainability. It
leads quickly to concrete questions about what sort of consumption
patterns would be sustainable with present or plausible future
technologies and about what sort of lifestyle changes might be needed.
The environmental space concept can be seen as a way of making the goal
of sustainability more concrete, but it does not itself imply particular
policy mechanisms for implementing the goal. The Dutch government's
National Environmental Policy Plans in recent years have attempted to
implement aspects of the environmental space concept to bring about
'sustainability' in the Netherlands. The attempt to dramatically increase
the environmental efficiency of their economy through voluntary
agreements and limited regulation has not been as successful as was
originally hoped.
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The third part of the chapter discusses ecological tax reform, a mechanism
that has been proposed for the implementation of the environmental
space concept. Ecological tax reform goes beyond the common idea of
environmental taxes by aiming to redirect the entire taxation policy away
from taxes on labour towards taxes on the use of energy and natural
resources. Ecological tax reform would make energy more expensive, but
make labour cheaper. The hope is that the consequence would be to
reduce both pollution and unemployment. Ecological tax reform would
ultimately involve restructuring the entire economy and is currently
regarded with caution by politicians.
Although the environmental space concept is not directly about limiting
economic growth, it tends to suggest that, in order to release enough
environmental space for Southern countries to increase their material
standard of living, Western consumption patterns should be cut back in
some ways. In that way, it leads us back to the debate about limits to
economic growth. The final part of the chapter revisits the economic
growth debate.
Even though both sides in the old seventies debate now accept that Gross
National Product is not really a measure of either human welfare or
environmental destruction, to a remarkable extent they continue the
debate as though it were. The debate has become a lightning rod for their
real point of difference: whether it is economic or environmental values
that should reign supreme.
Sustainability in terms of capital
The idea of sustainability originally emerged out of 'limits to growth'
thinking. The 'sustainable' part of Brundtland's 'sustainable
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development' is based on 'the idea of limitations imposed by the state of
technology and social organization on the environment's ability to meet
present and future needs.'
In Blueprint for a Green Economy, David Pearce and colleagues defined
sustainability in economic terms as 'non-declining capital.'1 They took
capital to mean not just monetary and human capital, as economists
conventionally consider capital to be, but 'natural capital', the value to
human beings of the Earth itself. The idea of natural capital had already
been used in the Brundtland Report. Over the next few pages I will
outline the debates both about how to assess sustainability in terms of
capital and whether the entire approach is a useful one.
Very simply, the non-declining capital rule can be refined into either
'strong sustainability' or 'weak sustainability.' The strong sustainability
rule is 'non-declining natural capital.' The weak sustainability rule is
'non-declining total capital.' Weak sustainability allows human-made
capital to substitute for natural capital.2 Strong sustainability does not.
Just how much 'substitutability' of capital is there?
The concepts of weak sustainability and strong sustainability can be
refined further. 'Very strong sustainability' assumes no substitutability
and would not allow any element of natural capital to be depleted. For
example, it would not allow oil to be taken out of the ground. I do not
know of anyone who actually belongs to this school of thought. Moderate
'strong sustainability' only allows natural capital to be depleted when it is
compensated for in another way. For example, oil can only be taken out
of the ground if the revenue is used for the development of solar energy
technology. This school of thought includes Herman Daly. 'Very weak
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sustainability' assumes infinite substitutability and adheres simply to the
total capital rule. Solow founded this school of thought. Moderate 'weak
sustainability' conserves 'critical natural capital'. Blueprint for a Green
Economy explained:
There are many environmental assets for which there are no
substitutes. No one has yet found a way of (feasibly) recreating the
ozone layer, for example. The climate-regulating functions of
ocean phytoplankton, the watershed protection functions of
tropical forests, and the pollution-cleaning and nutrient-trap
functions of wetlands are all services provided by natural assets
and for which there are no ready substitutes. If man-made and
natural capital are not so easily substituted, then we have a basic
reason for protecting the natural assets we have.
Technological advances could of course one day advance the
degree of substitution between the two types of capital. Perhaps,
one day, we will not need the oceans for food or climate regulation,
or the nutrient values of the world's coastal margins, but that
raises the issue of how to behave if we cannot be certain that such
substitution will take place. If we do not know an outcome it is
hardly consistent with rational behaviour to act as if the outcome
was a good one. Most of society is "risk-averse": we act so as [to]
avoid bad consequences. If environmental risks have the potential
for large negative payoffs then risk-aversion dictates that we
protect natural environments, at the very least until our
understanding of how they function in terms of life-support
grows.3
Some economists have criticised the entire notion of sustainability. They
argue that the aim must be to maintain income, rather than capital. The
conventional economic goal of 'optimality' already does that, they say.
Why not 'optimality'?
The most forthright attack on the theoretical basis of sustainability has
come from Wilfred Beckerman, a former economics professor at Oxford,
in his anti-environmentalist polemic Small Is Stupid.4 He draws a simple
distinction between 'strong sustainability' and 'weak sustainability'. He
claims that environmental economists originally favoured 'strong
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sustainability', but then they realised it would mean no oil, so they
switched to weak sustainability. He then goes on to claim that 'weak
sustainability' is in practice exactly the same as optimality.
Beckerman does not appear to understand the concept he is criticising. He
seems unaware that even very weak sustainability counts the
consumption of natural capital against income. Conventional measures
of optimality fail to do this, and count such consumption as income.
Secondly, Beckerman assumes total substitutability of human-made
capital for all forms of natural capital, without any apparent awareness
that this is in any way a problem. John Pezzey said to me about
Beckerman: "I suspect he's a pure economist who doesn't have really
much education about science."
A much more sophisticated critique of the theory of sustainability than
Beckerman's comes from the Cambridge economics professor Partha
Dasgupta. At the World Bank's International Conference on
Environmentally Sustainable Development held in Washington DC in
1993, he attacked the definition of sustainability in terms of non-declining
capital, provoking an illuminating dispute with Andrew Steer, director of
the World Bank's Environment Department.
Dasgupta5 attacked the definition of sustainability as non-declining
capital as being far too loose to be of any use. No net accumulation of the
overall capital base is recommended. He condemns this as "foolishly
conservative". If an economy happens to be poor in its resource base
today, the formulation condemns it to poverty in perpetuity. Instead, he
recommends the theory of 'optimal development'. Dasgupta goes on to
say:
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Much attention has been given in recent years to defining
sustainable development. One early thought - that whatever else it
may imply, it must imply non-negative changes in the stock of
natural resources (such as soil and soil quality, ground and surface
water and their quality, land biomass, water biomass, and the
waste-assimilation capacity of the receiving environments) - is a
non-starter - not because it is an undesirable goal, but because it is
an impossible goal. However, leaving this aside, there is the
weakness that the requirement is imposed as a matter of definition
on the determinants of well-being (the means of production of
well-being), not on well-being itself. Presumably, the focus of
concern should be present and future well-being, and methods of
determining how well-being is affected by policy. History,
introspection, and experience with analytical models since the
early 1960s tell us that reasonable development paths would
involve patterns of resource substitution over time, and also of
substitutions among resources and various types of capital stocks,
including knowledge and skills.6
He goes on to ask the question "What should be sustained?" He says that
sustaining current well-being is not a coherent answer because current
well-being is not a given. Many authors have recognised that the starting
point should be to consider a just distribution of well-being over time.
Dasgupta attacks the idea that this requires the constraint of non-
declining natural capital stocks. He accepts that some natural capital
would have to be conserved for a minimum level of welfare for the
future to be guaranteed. But why introduce it as an additional constraint
to the maintenance of a minimum level of welfare for future
generations? Preservation of an index of natural capital ought to be
derived from considering the path of optimal development.
Dasgupta goes on to criticise the lack of ethical argument in formulations
of sustainable development. He thinks a better approach would be to look
at the total well-being of future generations over different paths of
development. Dasgupta uses an approach from Tjalling Koopmans' work
on the problem of intergenerational justice. It is to conduct a number of
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thought-experiments about the intergenerational implications of
alternative sets of ethical assumptions in plausible worlds. The premise is
that no single ethical judgement should be taken as decisive.
Dasgupta uses this approach to show that there is a difference between the
consumption discount rates used in cost-benefit analysis and discounting
of the well-being of future generations. The consumption discount rate
turns out to reflect the assumed rate of productivity of capital. This is a
point which he says is often misunderstood in much of the
environmental literature that is critical of social cost-benefit analysis. On
the other hand, the work of economists on global warming assumes that
incomes will grow regardless and discounts its costs to negligible
amounts.
Dasgupta sees a problem of market failure in the environment needing
the construction of shadow prices to reflect the value of environmental
goods. He adds that risk and irreversibility must also be taken into
account, so the option value of conserving environmental goods must
also be included in calculations.
In the discussion after Dasgupta delivered his paper, Andrew Steer
summarised Partha Dasgupta's view as being that while the concept of
'sustainable' development is useful in motivating enthusiasm for the
environment, it has no useful meaning in theory - and hence,
presumably, none in practice. Dasgupta was taking the economist's stance:
if you do the intertemporal optimisation right, and use the correct
shadow prices, the correct policies will simply fall out of the analysis. This
approach was put forward as being much better than assigning
'sustainability' rules, which inevitably will be arbitrary.
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Steer commented that when Herman Daly read Dasgupta's paper he was
very troubled because he saw a threat to real world policy-making from
theoretical economics. In the real world, it is not possible to do the careful
intertemporal optimisation calculations using shadow prices.
Steer said that to be on the safe side, we can choose to make a
requirement that the value of natural capital does not decline below
today's levels. This would provide a broad assurance that welfare
accruing to tomorrow's generations from the natural capital stock will
not be less than to today's generation. Dasgupta would argue that such a
constraint is quite arbitrary and might lead to sub-optimal
intergenerational welfare. Steer asked if Dasgupta agreed that in the real
world we need some arbitrary rules of thumb to give some assurance that
future citizens can lead a good life.
Steer went on to say that economists like himself need to know their
limits. There are some things you cannot put a money value on. Often,
values imputed to the environment by human beings stem from deeply
held spiritual and cultural roots. For many environmental assets, these
non-measurable values may be the most important of all. The job of the
economist is to do as good a job as possible in estimating those values
that can be measured, which should be respected as an important input to
the decision-making process, but not the only one. Decisions need to be
informed not only by such calculations but also by the views people
express in open discussion and the political process - so sound
environmental policy-making can operate only in an atmosphere of
participation and democracy. In practice, economists tend to condescend
to policy-makers when decisions are made on 'non-economic' grounds,
and environmentalists tend to harshly criticise economists whose
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valuation exercises suggest that, on economic grounds, the costs of
protection outweigh the benefits. Steer gave the example of debates over
global warming: "The real reason we should do something about global
warming is not that it is going to affect the economics of our lives 200
years from now. Rather, it relates to the much deeper spiritual and moral
reasons associated with the fact that you and I do not want to hand on to
our children's children a world that is very different from the one we
inherited."7
Partha Dasgupta was unimpressed. He said he did not think the notion of
sustainability helped to understand matters. Taking as an example the
idea that some index of capital ought to be preserved to sustain
consumption, he argued that some types of capital, like coal stocks, would
probably be reduced, while others, like water quality, might improve. So
there would be a changing mix of capital stocks along the chosen
sustainable path. "Thus, to create the index of capital that, by implication,
must be preserved, we will need shadow prices, or some surrogate of
shadow prices. Where will we get these shadow prices? Plainly, we will
need a valuation criterion to obtain them. Thus, we are back to the
notion of optimal policies, and the prior question of the distribution of
well-being across generations."8
The difference between Steer and Dasgupta is partly over how much
weight to place on calculations of shadow prices, and partly over how
much weight should be given to the principle of precaution. Their
exchange brings out the fact that what underlies the definition of
sustainability in terms of capital is a desire to guarantee the welfare of
future generations. Dasgupta does recognise that risk is an issue, and
criticises economists who do not take account of the downside of risk in
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their calculations - but his own approach is not very risk-averse. He
suggests increasing the well-being discount rate for technological
developments by the probability of the extinction of the human race as a
consequence!
The moderately weak sustainability advocated by Steer elsewhere9 still
assumes that human-made and natural capital are to a large extent
substitutable, although also complementary. The full functioning of the
economy is seen to require at least a mixture of the different kinds of
capital. Since the boundaries of the critical limits for these kinds of capital
are unknown, they say it is sensible to err on the side of caution in
depleting resources, especially of natural capital.
Sustainability and survivability
Rules of sustainability based on notions of natural capital are generally
justified in terms of keeping options open for future generations. Here, it
is helpful to take up John Pezzey's distinction between sustainability and
survivability.10 He defined sustainability as a path of development that
would not lead to declines in average levels of well-being in the future.
Survivability was a path of development that would not lead to declines
in well-being below a certain minimum necessary for human life. Both
sustainability and survivability, according to Pezzey's definitions, are
examples of what are called maximin rules - rules which seek the best
worst option, or to maximise the minimum. They are much more
cautious and risk-averse than the utilitarian approach economists have
traditionally used since the invention of welfare economics in the late
nineteenth century. Pezzey's approach to survivability would avoid paths
of development that risk disaster. Dasgupta's approach to optimal
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development would discount the value of such paths in proportion to
the probability of such a disaster. What underlies notions of sustainability
is not a failure to understand economics, but a more risk-averse approach
to life than Dasgupta's. Sustainability is derived from the precautionary
principle, which states that in situations of uncertainty about the
environmental impact of an activity, there should be a presumption
against doing anything which may have irreversible consequences.
Taking this argument further, it becomes evident that the degree of
substitutability of different kinds of capital is crucial. The most cautious
approach would be that of very strong sustainability, but it would make
human life as we know it impossible. Strong sustainability assumes that
natural capital can be substituted for by human-made capital, as when it
allows increases in solar energy technology to compensate for the
consumption of oil reserves. Its point is that running down any kind of
natural capital must be specifically compensated for by an equivalent
increase in another kind of capital. For example, loss of forest in one area
should be replaced by new forest of a similar type elsewhere, and receipts
from depleting oil reserves should be invested in renewable energy
technology.
Instead, someone like Andrew Steer, who calls weak sustainability
'sensible sustainability',11 would maintain total levels of capital intact, but
allow depletion of natural capital as long as 'critical' levels of natural
capital were kept. An example would be investing receipts from oil
depletion in education.
Herman Daly would argue that substitutability is much more limited:
Labor and capital funds are "worn out" and replaced over long
periods of time. Resource flows are "used up" or transformed into
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products over short periods of time. While there may be significant
substitutability between the two funds, labor and capital, or among
various resource flows, for example aluminium for copper or coal
for natural gas, there is very little substitutability between funds
and flows. You can build the same house with fewer carpenters
and more power saws, but no amount of carpenters and power
saws will allow you to reduce very much the amount of lumber
and nails. Of course one can use brick rather than wood, but that is
the substitution of one resource flow for another rather than the
substitution of a fund for a flow. Funds and flows, efficient and
material causes, are complements, not substitutes, in the process of
production...
Let us suppose, now, that capital can be accumulated faster as
renewable natural resources are exploited unsustainably. Will the
extra accumulation of humanly created capital be sufficient to
offset the extra loss of natural capital? We believe it will be far
easier to accumulate enough capital with sustainable use of
resources to enable such use to continue than to accumulate
enough capital with unsustainable use of resources to meet human
needs in the resulting wasteland.12
Andrew Steer sees the problem of natural capital in more specific terms:
SD: You say here "Since we do not know exactly where the
boundaries of these critical limits for each type of capital lie, it
behooves the sensible person to err on the side of caution in
depleting resources (especially natural capital) at too fast a rate." Of
course that's where the whole crux of the argument lies. I haven't
actually come across anyone who argued for truly weak
sustainability or what you call absurdly strong sustainability. The
argument really lies between what you call sensible sustainability
and strong sustainability pretty much. It's really about where the -
about what's critical. How broadly you define the criticality. Where
would you put the criticality?
Steer: I think you've said something which is extremely important,
which is, I'm not sure if you meant this. In my judgement, we
environmentally aware people like to broaden things. We like to
say "that's related to that, and that's related to that." We have a sort
of general equilibrium view of life. So we tend when we address
environmental problems to think in the large. When you come to
sustainability, what one wants to do is focus on critical limits
which can be fairly specific. So people for example say "We can't
keep on using as much energy as we're using." It's just not true.
We could use ten times as much energy. But we can't use this kind
of energy. What's the issue? Where are the real critical ones?
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Ozone. We crossed the limit. It's a long painful healing process and
we're lucky we didn't go another twenty years. Global warming is
clearly another very clear limit. We need to start getting serious
about it. Ten years from now we need to have tradeable permits...
Forests I think are an issue. One of the things that frustrates me
about our biologists and ecologists is that they're not willing to
make statements about thresholds at all. At one level our
ecologists, not ours [at the World Bank], general ecologists like to
talk all the time about thresholds, but when you actually say "OK,
are we close to the threshold in tropical moist forests? We've been
losing them at 0.8% a year. We can't keep on doing that forever.
How close are we? What's the real situation?" I would think that
twenty years from now, if tropical forests in particular are declining
by more than, oh, a fifth of a percent a year, we may be in very deep
waters. The plain fact of the matter, though, is it's a specific issue
which should be taken on specifically. I don't think the issues I'm
most concerned about, such as particulate emissions in the air or
dirty drinking water, which I think are the most important
environmental problems in many regards in the world, I don't
think they are actually really so much to do with sustainability, as
you would define it. Because I don't think there are thresholds in
an ecological sense that are quite as binding, and one of the things
that worries me is that an emphasis on sustainability and
thresholds can tend to minimise attention to the chronic problems
which are less threshold-crossing if you like. It seems to me that's a
very important point. Clearly there are some environmental
problems where there are real thresholds, and that's what this is all
about.
SD: I'm interested you say that, because the argument that would
be put forward is that the thing about the thresholds is that you get
into an irreversible situation. Whereas, sure, there may be terribly
bad levels of air pollution in some cities, but it's a reversible thing.
Whereas destroying the ozone layer is pretty irreversible.
Steer: Right. Now academically, that's interesting. But we had this
funny thing when we were discussing the World Development
Report with the American government and of course the
American government has many different constituencies within
it. We were making the point that drinking water was a major
environmental problem. And the person from the EPA said "Yeah,
but you don't need to exaggerate that as an environmental
problem, because it doesn't have irreversibilities." So I said "Well,
three million children dying every year is pretty irreversible." And
this person said "Ah, but it's not like losing species." By saying that,
I think suddenly he realised and the whole room realised how
ridiculous and outrageous and obscene that is. Yes. Because we've
got plenty of human beings, we can afford to lose three million
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children a year. No. So I think from a conceptual framework you're
right, it's stimulating and useful to think about irreversibility
because we're worried about the future of the planet. But I, and our
institution, we're interested in the future of individuals too,
especially poor people. So I make no apology for the fact that we
think the fact that 700 million women and children suffer from
indoor air pollution each year, equivalent to smoking three packs
of cigarettes a day, because they use dung or fuelwood. That to me
is an environmental problem that's very serious and if somebody
says "Well, you know they're able to grow enough fuelwood to
keep themselves going" I'd say "No, that's not the only
environmental issue." (Andrew Steer, World Bank/IMF AGM,
Madrid, 5.10.94)
Andrew Steer's remarks bring out an aspect of the difference between
sustainable development and mere survivability. Survivability only
requires that human life can continue. Sustainable development
demands that people's needs are met. Environmentalists are often
accused of being prepared to sacrifice the interests of the poor. This may
or may not be true, but an interesting situation arises when we have to
trade off the interests of present and future generations. Weak
sustainability allows more room for economic development in the
present, but takes more risks with the well-being of future generations. In
a sense, the whole idea of 'sustainable development' is based on a trade¬
off between the interests of the poor today and the whole world in the
future.
Steer raises another important point. The non-depletion of natural
capital is rather a vague requirement for sustainability. If you are losing
the ozone layer, it doesn't help very much if some other kind of natural
capital is growing. Different kinds of natural capital are not usually
substitutable for each other. This actually casts serious doubt on the
usefulness of attempting to achieve sustainability by concentrating on an
overall rule of non-declining natural capital. It involves aggregating a
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large number of very different things into a single indicator, presumably
based on money. A better approach might be to look more specifically at
what the actual limiting factors are.
Environmental space
The preservation of natural capital is one way of thinking about
sustainability. Another approach that has become popular among
environmentalists since about 1992 is to use the concept of
environmental utilisation space (usually shortened to 'environmental
space'). The idea first appeared in a 1982 paper on the economics of global
life-support systems by Horst Siebert, a German economist.13 His paper
considered environmental constraints on the economy. He took
ecological phenomena like resource regeneration functions and pollution
absorption functions as a constraint on economic activity, and called the
limits to environmental impact they set the 'environmental utilisation
space.' In 1987, the idea was taken up and popularised by Hans Opschoor,
an economist at the Free University of Amsterdam. He decided that
environmental space might be a practicably applicable tool, and started
research on the question of what the size of the environmental space
actually is. Opschoor told me why he had liked the idea:
I saw a couple of advantages in it. In the first place, it sort of reflects
this notion of scarcity or limitedness that I think the environment
entails. In the second place, and as an economist it made a lot of
sense to me, once you are doing that in the sense of space and so
forth, people start asking "How is this space distributed?" Which
you don't easily get with similar concepts such as carrying capacity
because that seems to be expressed in numbers of people or
animals, rather than the potential in the environment (Hans
Opschoor, Free University of Amsterdam, 19.12.94)
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Opschoor was chairman of the Dutch government's Advisory Council for
Research on Nature and the Environment from 1990 to 1995. In a report
published in 1994, he wrote:
This study starts from the general notion that sustainable
development implies that the environmental impacts of human
activities stay well within limits of how much environmental
space the biosphere can take. We shall refer to this notion as
'environmental space'.
Environmental utilisation space (or environmental space) is a
concept which reflects that at any given point in time, there are
limits to the amount of pressure that the earth's ecosystems can
handle without irreversible damage to these systems or to the life
support processes that they enable. This suggests to search for the
appropriate threshold levels beyond which actual environmental
systems might become damaged in the sense indicated above, and
to regard this set of deductively determined critical values as the
operational boundaries of the environmental space....
Although some authors tend to argue in favour of a single overall
indicator of the environmental space, we feel that at least three
different dimensions should be represented:
a. pollution of natural systems with xenobiotic substance or natural
substances in unnatural concentrations;
b. depletion of natural resources: renewable, non-renewable (and
semi-renewable);
c. loss of naturalness (integrity, diversity, absence of disturbance).14
The environmental space concept was taken up by the Dutch ministries
of Development Cooperation and of the Environment. Caring for
Tomorrow, a 1988 report from the National Institute for Public Health
and Environmental Protection concluded that the Netherlands would
have to reduce its resource and energy consumption and its production of
wastes to a fifth of the level at that time by 2010.15
Environmental space was also taken up by Milieudefensie, Friends of the
Earth Netherlands. In 1992, just before the Earth Summit, they published
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a report translated into English the following year as Action Plan
Sustainable Netherlands, which explicitly linked sustainable
development to environmental space.16 The Milieudefensie report
claimed that as soon as the present over-use of environmental space is
recognised, the question that immediately rises is about distribution. The
rich countries, with one quarter of the world's population, use three-
quarters of the raw materials and energy traded in the world, and are
responsible for most of the pollution in the world. Milieudefensie
argued:
In order to deal effectively with environmental problems such as
the greenhouse effect and the destruction of the ozone layer, the
participation of Third World countries is essential. It is no surprise
that the representatives of these countries have little interest in
introducing a severe environmental policy, since the rich
countries keep consuming the largest piece of the cake. A more
equitable distribution of the access to natural resources is therefore
a tough political condition for the realisation of sustainable
development. The West will have to severely limit its unrelenting
consumption of resources and simultaneously help the Third
World countries to increase their standard of living....
To decide whether a certain country's way of production and
consumption meshes with sustainable development, the use of
resources and the pollution of that country can be compared with
the environmental space belonging to that country. That particular
part of environmental space involves the 'world environmental
space' divided by the world population and multiplied by the
number of inhabitants the country has. Such an exercise shows in a
stark manner how far the rich countries live beyond their means.17
Action Plan Sustainable Netherlands went on to outline how far the
Netherlands was living beyond what Milieudefensie regarded as the
environmental means of the Earth. They started their calculations from
the assumption that the aim was to prevent further environmental
degradation, while enabling the entire world population to live at
roughly the same level. They calculated that resource consumption and
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pollution in the Netherlands would have to be reduced by 80-90% for
most activities. The good news was that although life would become
much more conservation-minded, involving extensive recycling and the
loss of many throw-away items, most of the material comforts of present-
day Dutch life would still be possible with the use of technologies already
available, or that could be expected by 2010. The exceptions were air
travel, use of cars and meat consumption. All these would have to be
reduced quite significantly from present Dutch levels. The Milieudefensie
calculations were rather 'back of the envelope', but are impressive
because they suggest that it is theoretically possible, even with present-day
technologies, for a population of several billion people to live in an
environmentally sustainable manner with a Western standard of living.
When I spoke to Maria Buitenkamp, the chief editor of the report, I asked
her about whether people in the West would be prepared to accept the
sort of lifestyle changes proposed. She told me that was a common
criticism. People had told her that aeroplanes, cars and high meat
consumption are important, not marginal, parts of modern Western life.
The report had said that what was being suggested was not a return to the
1930s, but she admitted that for those aspects of life, the changes would be
a return to the early 1960s for Dutch people.
Environmental space is a powerful idea because it expresses the idea of
sustainability in a more concrete way. Hans Opschoor explained why:
SD: How closely do you think environmental space and
sustainability are different ways of talking about exactly the same
thing, or do you think there are differences between the two ideas?
Opschoor: Well, they're not really different. In fact, if you look at it
mathematically, the way it has been defined the environmental
utilisation space is a set of steady-state conditions that are all by
definition sustainable: steady-state combinations of extraction from
140
the environment, pollution, and the capacities of the biosphere to
buffer against those things. Given the buffering capacity and
magnitude of natural systems, there is so much pollution and
extraction that you can see as a steady state, which itself is a
sustainable way of exploiting the biosphere. So every point on that
surface is a sustainable state. A steady state, thereby sustainable. In
fact, it's a kind of set of all possible sustainable ways of using the
environment at various levels. The next question becomes: what
level of sustainable exploitation does a society want? It normally
wants to be able to at least carry on the way it is at the moment. For
instance, our Dutch environmental policy plan says they want to
achieve sustainability in the year 2010 by having reduced emissions
to about 20-50% of what they are now. They think that if they have
achieved that by then, they will be in safe minimum standards of
ecological requirements to maintain the ecological infrastructure.
They will have reduced pollution levels safely within the margins
compatible with that level of ecological infrastructure to allow for
continued exploitation, as they are doing now in the Dutch
economy. And many other countries have similar ideas. Basically,
sustainable development says you want to continue with maybe
welfare per capita or something on an ecological basis among other
bases. And the welfare shouldn't go down, but go up or remain
constant. That is sustainable development. The environmental
utilisation space tries to make explicit what this means in
ecological terms. It tries to make explicit that if you want to have a
certain amount of environmental capital tomorrow, you are
constrained in using environmental capital today. It is related, but
it's not really the same. As a word, sustainable development is a
pattern of economic development and activities that can be
continued over time. What this means in terms of environmental
constraints is defined by the environmental utilisation space. So
they might be mirroring concepts in a way. Environmental space is
more explicit, isn't it? It suggests the need to operationalise, to
quantify how much space, and so on. Space where? Space for
whom? That sort of thing.
SD: What I notice is that whereas in the Brundtland report the
concept of what sustainable development means in the North is
very vague and talks about economic growth and a different kind
of growth, the idea of environmental space seems to involve the
amount of consumption in material terms in the North.
Opschoor: That's right. It suggests that. Once you start thinking
about what it means in practice, you still come up with all kinds of
requirements in terms of benchmarks. This or that is not
sustainable. If you visualise that, you are back basically at the same
sort of battle. You still have to say how much nature do you wish
to protect, and that defines how much acid you allow to fall on any
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hectare of land for instance. You're back at the question of making
estimates of things that are very imprecisely known. And then if
they are, how to relate to the uncertainty. Do we make safe
estimates, or do we make unsafe estimates? If you accept the
minimum bare structural approach to the environmental
utilisation space, you're not very far away from what weak
sustainability actually means in the eyes of people like Solow. So
it's a suggestion of precision and accuracy which is there, and
which I like to hang on to. And it's also the implicit notion that
antagonises a lot of people, that you have to dematerialise also, at
least in the North. It's much more provocative in debates than
sustainable development. I know plenty of people who hate the
notion of environmental utilisation space, and they all go for
sustainable development. But that's at a level of rhetorics rather
than analytics. (Hans Opschoor, Free University of Amsterdam,
19.12.94)
Hans Opschoor disclaims any credit for the use of environmental space in
the Third World's Earth Summit rhetoric. He told me that he presumed
there was no connection between the development of the concept in
Europe and the way it was used in Rio. Hans Opschoor told me that after
the Earth Summit:
it became clear that a lot of countries in South-east Asia,
particularly China, were going for rapid growth. And they were
actually achieving that as well. So I think the North was getting a
lot more concerned about another question. Not so much sharing
with the South, but being capable of defending its own position
vis-a-vis an emerging South that was claiming a large proportion
of, in their view, a much larger environmental utilisation space
than the North thought existed. (Hans Opschoor, Free University
of Amsterdam, 19.12.94)
The Dutch and Norwegian governments are the only ones in the
industrialised world that have shown any interest in environmental
space. In both countries, a Norwegian Friends of the Earth activist told
me, Friends of the Earth has a lot of influence on the Environment
Ministry. Norway's prime minister, Gro Harlem Brundtland, also has a
personal interest in both environmental and North-South issues.
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In 1994, the Norwegian government hosted a symposium on 'sustainable
consumption'. The keynote address was made by the prime minister
herself. She said:
An average person in North America consumes almost 20 times as
much as a person in India or China, and 60 to 70 times more than a
person in Bangladesh. It is simply impossible for the world as a
whole to sustain a Western level of consumption for all. In fact, if
7 billion people were to consume as much energy and resources as
we do in the West today we would need 10 worlds, not one, to
satisfy our needs.18
She went on to say that traditional economic growth has meant
producing more and more goods using more and more natural resources,
placing an increasing strain on the environment. She said that
perpetuating that kind of economic growth was neither necessary for
employment nor environmentally possible. She talked optimistically
about decoupling economic growth from the consumption of resources.
Criticisms of the environmental space concept
Only one of the speakers at the symposium was critical of the idea of
'sustainable consumption'. That speaker was David Pearce, Professor of
Environmental Economics at University College London and a former
adviser to the British government. He claimed that the references to
sustainable consumption in Agenda 21 are confused. In particular, he
wanted to make clear a distinction between consumption in the sense of
use of goods and services and the consumption of materials, energy and
the assimilative capacity of the environment. He was implicitly criticising
many of the other papers presented at the symposium, which dealt with
strategies to tackle consumerism in the West. Pearce said that reducing
consumption could only come about by either raising the fraction of
income that was saved for investment, or by reducing incomes generally.
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Governments can increase the rate of saving by changing the tax system
or interest rates. But "[c]ontrol of the overall rate of change of income in
the economy ('economic growth') is not by and large under the control of
governments, although there is undoubted scope for lowering economic
growth over the short term through sheer mismanagement"19
Pearce said that, if savings were increased, some of the increase could be
diverted to foreign aid, a transfer of income from North to South. But
reducing incomes in the North would do nothing for the South, and
would be very likely to make it worse off. That was because the lost
income in the North would not magically reappear in the South. Because
some of the consumption in the North spills over into demand for
products from the South, the South would be worse off, since it would
lose a market. Sacrificing economic growth in the North would make
both North and South worse off.
Reducing resource consumption would not automatically improve the
well-being of the South. If the North reduces its ratio of energy use to
consumption, this conserves energy reserves, but a ton of oil not
consumed in the North does not become a ton of oil consumed in the
South, Pearce said. The power to consume a resource only comes about
through the generation of income. He went on:
Of course, if the North's resource consumption falls significantly,
resource prices could fall. This would benefit the South if the
South imports the resources in question. But it will make the
South worse off if they export the resource. Ironically, those who
call for reductions in the North's consumption are invariably those
who complain about low commodity prices on world markets. The
two goals may well be inconsistent. The only exception is if we
believe that the future growth prospects of the South are going to
be constrained by lack of resources. This is possible, but not very
likely, at least as far as the supply of materials and energy is
concerned.20
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Pearce agreed that there is a legitimate sense in which conservation of
resources by the North could help the South. The really scarce resources
are not materials and energy, but the assimilative capacities of the
environment. They are damaged through the use of materials and
energy. Since they are shared globally, damage is shared by everyone, both
North and South. Pearce added that there was evidence the South
suffered disproportionately more from some types of global
environmental damage. Reducing resource consumption would also
reduce environmental impacts on the North itself, so it would also make
sense for the North to do it out of self-interest.
In Pearce's opinion, the thing to do was to move consumption patterns
away from resource intensive products towards less resource intensive
products. Pearce concluded that it was not desirable to reduce overall
consumption or the overall increase of consumption in the North. That
would only lead to unemployment and social unrest. The answer was to
drive a 'policy wedge' between the consumption of goods and services
and the consumption of materials and energy. Pearce would do that by
using economic instruments, particularly ecotaxes.
There was a gap in David Pearce's argument. He explained why a
reduction in Northern demand for material and energy resources from
the South would damage Southern economies. In this way, his argument
reveals a flaw in Milieudefensie's claim that Northern countries must
reduce their consumption of resources to enable Southern countries to
afford those resources. But he did not explain any way of avoiding similar
economic problems for the South if his own policy prescriptions were
followed.
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Friends of the Earth has also become aware of the potential economic
problems for the South if the North reduces its consumption of
resources. Bertram Zagema is a Dutch Friends of the Earth employee who
has worked on this problem. His solution is for the North to provide
massive economic aid to resource exporting Southern countries as
compensation.
These issues were raised at a public lecture by Ernst-Ulrich von
Weizsacker, the foremost German proponent of ecotaxes, which I
attended as part of a fringe meeting to the 1995 Climate Conference in
Berlin. Zagema was also present and presented von Weizsacker with the
problem during the question session. But von Weizsacker was
unperturbed. He rejected Zagema's idea that foreign aid was the answer.
Not only was it unrealistic to expect large financial transfers from North
to South, but it was also misconceived. Because an ecotax system would
be phased in gradually, increasing at only 5% a year, he argued that
resource exporting countries would be able to adapt. He said that
countries like Brazil and Nigeria are cursed with natural resources which
are appropriated by corrupt elites. Why should the North compensate
these elites? He went on to say that it is only when the mistaken view
that the way for such countries to get rich is through the unsustainable
exploitation of natural resources has been overcome that it will be
possible for them to develop in ways that benefit their people. His view is
that the entire international division of labour is wrong, being a division
between "winners and losers". In the modern world economy, wealth
accrues to the countries with skills, not the countries that supply raw
materials.
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An interesting consequence of von Weizsacker's argument is that it could
also be used to challenge the sort of 'trickle-down' approaches that David
Pearce advocates. I interviewed Pearce several weeks before I heard von
Weizsacker speak. At the time, though, I was already troubled by Pearce's
idea that economic advancement in the South required increasing
consumption in the North. I put to him the idea that the expanded
environmental space which can be got out of technological
improvements should be directed towards the poor in the South, rather
than the North:
Pearce: This is an argument that says you want to distribute the
future benefits of technology or for that matter of economic growth
in a particular way. I don't have any particular argument with that.
I think the idea that you would justify the trivial sums that we
spend on foreign aid, I find it difficult to believe that you can put
up a very strong justification. But I would urge those who do these
back-of-the-envelope calculations on economic growth rates to do
the same thing for redistributing the world's income. It really
doesn't make a lot of difference. First of all, it isn't clear what
redistribution means, or even what biasing the new benefits to the
Third World means.
SD: I calculated, using the IMF figures for real incomes in countries
balancing out the exchange rates, that it came out at $5000 adjusted,
which is rather higher than Hungary's.
Pearce: If you redistribute the existing world product? But what is
the value of this calculation? Politically there is no conceivable
way that anybody would ever redistribute the world income in that
way. Secondly, to redistribute it that way even if we imagine some
Joseph Stalin who orders that all of this should happen, it would
actually amount to phenomenal social misery in the North; and
you redistributed one lot of social misery in favour of some kind of
what you think might be a gain somewhere else. But it's naive to
be engaged in that kind of calculation.
If one's saying that of the incremental benefits for the future, that
0.3% of the UK's GNP is not a justifiable number for redistribution,
then I would wholly support that. But it isn't 10%. And again I
would say if anybody had any experience of seeing how monies can
be spent in the developing world, as someone who has seen most
of the world in 25 years, it is not possible to redistribute. It is not
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only not possible, it is not desirable. If you seriously thought that a
thousand dollars off my salary would reappear as a thousand
dollars somewhere else, it wouldn't.
SD: Of course it wouldn't. Again, some people do say that, but the
argument that I'm more interested in is the kind of argument that
the continued growth in the North is squeezing out the
environmental space-
Pearce: No it isn't! That's absolute garbage. I said that in Oslo. I'm
absolutely bewildered that anybody could argue that. If I reduce my
consumption of one ton of aluminium in the North, the ton
doesn't become available to the South. Where does this idea come
from? The ton doesn't magically get transported from England to
somewhere else. The only way the ton reappears is if the incomes
of the South grow in order to be able to buy that ton. Apart from
anything else, we're not short of aluminium. If I consume a ton of
coal, and if I stop consuming it for some policy reason, lack of
growth or something, it doesn't become available to anybody else.
In what sense does British coal become available to anybody else?
SD: The C02 absorptive capacity of the atmosphere.
Pearce: That's closer to that kind of argument, except that it
produces the nonsense of a permitted level of C02 growth. Again,
one wonders really whether anybody actually understands the
global warming problem. If global warming is true, and I've no
idea, but if it's true, it is too late. So you're not arguing about -
(laughs) We're already beyond a point where you can do anything
about global warming beyond shaving the rate at which it
increases. Absolute nonsense to think you're doing anything else.
I think it's politically correct to talk about "shares" and
"responsibilities". I don't have a great deal of problem with a lot of
it. But we're back to the Norwegian birch twigs, aren't we? It's
saying that I am where I am, and it's my fault because I shouldn't
be where I am. Now if what I have to do is reduce my C02
emissions, then of course we all agree with that. If the argument is
that I should resolve that problem by environmental taxes, I hope
we all agree with carbon taxes and all the rest of it. And look at the
problem you're having getting those in place, let alone talk about
redistributing the world's income.
But if the argument is that if Norway suddenly grows at 2% next
year instead of 4%, that it somehow benefits the Third World, then
I have to say I'm completely lost as to how. It's silly, frankly. The
whole overconsumption hypothesis is potentially very very
dangerous. People have not bothered to make the distinction that
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we just made earlier between materials consumption and income.
That was clear in Norway. It was perfectly clear, when I stood up
and said what I said, that it wasn't that anybody could think of
anything to say with respect to what intellectually was wrong with
this argument; it was that I'd said the wrong thing. In other words,
I was politically incorrect.
Now it's never been my (chuckles) concern to be politically correct.
And I'm not politically incorrect by looking for it. I just think you
have to pursue a very straightforward argument. And I don't see in
any sense in which making people poorer in the North does
anything. In fact, I can think of lots of ways in which it makes
things worse. (David Pearce, University College London, 9.2.95)
Pearce's position when I interviewed him was rather more 'politically
incorrect' than the view he had expressed in Oslo. But there also seems to
be a flaw in his logic. He cannot explain why Northern carbon dioxide
emissions do not reduce the environmental space for the South (a point
he had conceded in Oslo). Despite this, he goes on to say that he is unable
to see why reduced consumption growth in the North could benefit the
South. He sees the entire issue as being about altering the ratios of
resource consumption to GDP. It seems obvious, however, that both the
ratio of resource consumption to GDP and the absolute size of GDP
influence the amount of environmental impact a country has.
The missing billions for Agenda 21 show that Pearce is quite right about
the political naivety of calls for large-scale redistribution of wealth from
North to South. Nor does it seem at all likely that Western countries will
voluntarily forgo economic growth for the sake of the South.
Using Paul and Anne Ehrlich's formula I=PCT (Environmental Impact =
Population x Consumption per head x Technological efficiency),21 Paul
Ekins calculated that, if the overall environmental impact of the human
race was to halve over the next fifty years (optimistically assuming that
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would be a sustainable impact), while population doubles, and average
GNP per capita grows at 3% a year, the total required reduction in
environmental impact per dollar of GNP would be 93%.22 If the rich
Western countries did not grow, only a reduction of 79% would be
required. He commented:
Any of these figures of reduction of environmental intensity
represent an ambitious target. That of 93 per cent would be
considered feasible only by technological optimists verging on the
fanatic. The difference between these two figures (93 per cent and
79 per cent) is further evidence of the enormously skewed nature
of current consumption patterns. If the Third World alone, with
three-quarters of the world's population, doubles its population
and quadruples its consumption over the next fifty years (when its
per capita consumption would still be less than 20 per cent of that
currently in rich countries), then the necessary cut in
environmental intensity increases from the no-growth [in GNP
per capita] figure of 75 per cent to only 79 per cent. Quadrupling the
much larger consumption of First World countries as well raises
this figure to 93 per cent.23
When I interviewed Paul Ekins in 1994, he was now more optimistic
than in this passage about the technological potential for reductions in
environmental intensity by as much as ninety per cent. However, he was
pessimistic about the existence of the political will to bring about the
adoption of these technologies. What would be needed?
... a whole range of actions government will have to take place in
order to systematically reduce environmental impacts. And I don't
see them in practically any country in the world. There's a broad
list of those that one can come out with. There's the planning
elements, the accounting elements, the tax elements, various
levels of regulation, environmental charges, tradeable permits.
There's a lot more knowledge of the kind of portfolio of policy that
is required, but it's not being pursued with anything like real
commitment. Practically anywhere in the world. And it will need
to be pursued with real commitment to come anywhere near the
90% reductions in environmental impacts that technologists say
are possible. That's why I think there is still plenty of scope and




Further justification for pessimism can be drawn from the experience
with the Dutch government's National Environmental Policy Plan of
1988.24 The plan (NEPP) set itself ambitious environmental objectives to
achieve sustainability by 2010. The way in which 'sustainability' was so
narrowly defined in terms of pollution and environmental degradation
in Dutch territory inspired Milieudefensie's much more radical
Sustainable Netherlands plan, but in the real world the NEPP was in
trouble in the recession of the early nineties.
The NEPP had aimed to reduce most forms of pollution in the
Netherlands by 80% over twenty years, while GDP was to grow by 70% at
the same time. It had been claimed that the ambitious environmental
targets could be met at no net cost. The NEPP was controversial from the
beginning, when the right-wing liberal party WD had brought down the
governing coalition over the removal of tax breaks for car commuters.
The NEPP won that round, after the first European general election
where the central issue was the environment.
The implementation of the NEPP went rather less well than had been
hoped, though. The centrepiece of the strategy for reaching the targets set
in the NEPP was to have contracts between the government and various
industrial sectors. Backing up the government was the threat of direct
regulation if agreement was not reached. But after five years only a
handful of these contracts had been agreed. The whole process proved
much more difficult than had been expected.
NEPP2 was put forward in 1993.25 It accepted that the implementation of
the original NEPP's targets had not been a success. Although the original
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targets for 2010 were kept, the targets for earlier dates were scaled back to
reflect the unexpectedly poor implementation. New instruments and
implementation mechanisms were put forward. Behind the
Environment Ministry's brave face, the targets set even in NEPP2 were
under attack. The government's chief scientific advisory council
recommended abandoning them as not well founded. Industry claimed
they were hindering economic growth. The targets, ironically, were saved
at the end of 1994 because economic growth had picked up to 2% and the
recessionary crisis was no longer felt to be so severe.
When I interviewed civil servants in the Environment Ministry, they
were unsurprisingly defensive about the poor performance of NEPP
implementation. The official explanation for the failure to meet the
carbon dioxide emission targets was that there had been an unexpected
increase in trade because of the end of Eastern European communism.
But if the implementation of the NEPP failed at a time of general
recession, wouldn't it have been even worse if there had been the
expected amount of economic growth? A more likely explanation for the
failure is that the recession made it harder for the government to get
industry to invest in environmental improvements. Hans Opschoor
came to the ironic conclusion that "we will have to wait for some more
economic growth to see a re-emergence for political thinking seriously
about sustainable development. That is a rather diabolical statement, isn't
it?" (Hans Opschoor, Free University of Amsterdam, 19.12.94)
Another message that has been taken from the NEPP's failure is that its
regulation-based approach was misconceived. Reaching regulatory
agreements with individual industries proved extremely difficult. An
obvious alternative would have been the use of environmental taxes and
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permits. Actually, it is quite difficult to use those approaches when
dealing with pollution outputs, but civil servants squirmed when I asked
them why taxes on certain inputs (like fossil fuels or gravel) had not been
tried. Essentially, there were two answers. One was that it was contrary to
the Dutch tradition of environmental regulation. The other was that
there was a fear of raising costs and making Dutch industry
uncompetitive with the Germans.
The biggest problem the Dutch have with a carbon tax is that their
economy is based around being a transportation hub for Europe. To be
fair, the Dutch have been prepared to regulate their petrochemicals
industry more tightly than the Germans. The farmers have been
confronted over the notorious 'manure problem' which is caused by
keeping a very large number of pigs in a rather small country. Hans
Opschoor said:
NEPP, as you say, was rather cheerful about the fact that,
macroeconomically speaking, there were no costs to speak of. In
the documents surrounding it there was frankly prepared evidence
about the sectoral implications. For instance, tens of thousands of
smallholders would have to give up farming, particularly in
intensive pig-raising and the chicken industry. We would lose
quite a lot of exports not only in agriculture, but also in
petrochemicals. We're not losing a lot of employment there,
because there is no employment, but we're losing financially....
And at the moment, when it comes to the way, for instance, the
manure debate is developing, I would think that the population at
large, including the ministry of agriculture, now accept that they
can't solve the manure problem by technological alternatives. So
they have to go for fewer animals in the medium term. (Hans
Opschoor, Free University of Amsterdam, 19.12.94)
The problem with political will to implement environmental policies in
the Netherlands arises when you start talking about transport. An
economist in the Environment Ministry told me that the only big
competitive advantage the Netherlands has in Europe is its location. The
153
special place transport has in the Dutch psyche is clear when you look at
the issue of the expansion of Schipol airport. Increasing air travel is one
of the most environmentally damaging ways of achieving economic
growth. Environmentalists made that point, but they were over-ruled.
The people who supported the expansion argued that because of technical
improvements, even after a doubling in size the amount of pollution
caused by Schipol would be the same as at present. Hans Opschoor said:
The fact that the entire economy is supposed to step backwards
about 75% in terms of pollution, and that one should begin by
asking Schipol to also step back about 75% is not at all brought into
the public debate. Those environmentalists, including myself,
who've tried have failed to do so successfully... It's rationalised
away, more or less. And the arguments that would perhaps have
made a difference are not allowed. Or if they come in, even
ministers will say we will make sure other sectors of the economy
will compensate for that. If you ask how, they start looking at the
lamps and fall short of giving an answer. (Hans Opschoor, Free
University of Amsterdam, 19.12.94)
Of course, because the environmental impact per guilder generated by air
travel is so high, it would make much more sense environmentally to
invest in something else. The problem for Dutch environmental policy is
that not to invest in transport is politically unacceptable. When the
environmentalists challenged building a high speed train line through
nature reserves near Amsterdam, the transport minister said "That
would turn us into another Jutland!" and immediately isolated them.
The Dutch experience suggests that it can be politically possible to have an
environmental policy which involves cutting back some industries, so
long as they are not perceived as central to the national economy. Pig
farming and petrochemicals were so unpopular that, even in a recession,
those industries lacked the political weight to effectively defend
themselves. The Dutch felt differently about transport infrastructure,
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regarding it as vital for economic health and more important than
environmental considerations.
But increasing reliance on transport tends to increase the environmental
intensity per unit of GDP, moving the Netherlands in an increasingly
unsustainable direction. Dutch civil servants look uncomfortable when
this is put to them, and say there is no alternative. One told me that,
despite the Dutch image as environmental heroes trailblazing for
sustainability, in fact the environmental efforts being made are about the
same or slightly less than in Germany or Denmark. He said: "We are
good at writing things, but in doing we are a normal country." (The
Hague, 12.4.95)
Ecotaxation
Environmental economists always argue that regulation cannot be
expected to bring about the kind of shift in economic activity needed to
actually reduce total environmental impact. They claim that the best way
to do that is by using economic instruments such as taxes and tradeable
permits. The problem with attempting to reduce the environmental
impact of an entire economy by regulation is that it would require
something like full-scale central planning. Economic instruments
harness market mechanisms instead. There is a remarkable degree of
unanimity among people from Herman Daly to Wilfred Beckerman, who
disagree on almost everything else, that environmental taxes are a good
idea. Environmentalist opposition to ecotaxes has disappeared except
among ultra-leftists, who still say it allows the rich to pay to pollute. The
other remaining opposition comes from sectors of industry which see
155
ecotaxes as a threat to their future - particularly the oil, chemicals and car
industries.
A steady shift in the tax burden from labour to energy and raw materials
has come in recent years to be seen as the way to combine the political
and economic imperative of growth with the ecological imperative of
decreasing environmental impact. It is the 'big idea' in
environmentalism today. This is despite the fact that attempts by the
European Commission and the Clinton Administration to introduce
modest carbon taxes failed. Low carbon taxes introduced in Scandinavia
were reduced because of opposition from business.
Ecological tax reform
The green goal of 'ecological tax reform' is much more ambitious.
Professor Ernst-Ulrich von Weizsacker, the foremost proponent of
ecological tax reform, argues that the failure of these schemes was because
they were misconceived. They were formulated as means of raising
revenue with a green gloss, not part of a reform programme. People will
always resist extra taxes. Von Weizsacker's ecological tax reform would
instead reduce income taxes to compensate for the new energy taxes.
Secondly, because von Weizsacker is not interested in short-term
revenue raising, but in transforming society, he proposes introducing the
taxes at very low levels and ratcheting them up at 5% a year. This avoids
the economic shock of sudden price increases. Because of the power of
exponential growth, an increase in real terms of 5% a year would, over
forty years, make energy prices rise nearly eightfold. By that point,
renewable energy sources, which would be exempt from the tax, would
easily be cheaper for most uses. Long before that point, ecological tax
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reform would promote a dramatic shift in technological innovation.
Currently, as since the beginning of the industrial revolution, much
technological innovation in production processes is aimed primarily at
increasing labour productivity. What that means is that fewer worker-
hours are required per unit of output. This 'labour-saving bias' has always
existed because employers want to save on labour costs. In today's
Western societies, workers are both highly paid and highly taxed.
Meanwhile, a major problem in these societies is that mass
unemployment has become a structural feature. Yet most forms of energy
and raw materials are much more lightly taxed than labour. There is a
clear bias in the tax system, effectively promoting unemployment and
pollution. Put in those terms, the case for ecological tax reform sounds
unanswerable.
Almost all economists agree that energy is undertaxed nearly everywhere
in the world. But that is not to say that they would support von
Weizsacker's ecological tax reform. They worry that the kind of drastic
increases in energy prices that the ecological tax reformers talk about
would introduce economic distortions of their own. Increasing energy
prices eightfold would mean a tax on energy amounting to about 90% of
the total price, which is very high. The World Bank's Andrew Steer is a
fervent proponent of increasing energy prices. He argues that one of the
main things that destroyed the economy of the Soviet Union was low
energy prices, which prevented technological innovation. He thinks
energy prices in the Third World and most Western countries,
particularly America, are too low. But he told me: "I'm not sure,
incidentally, that energy prices in Italy need to be raised any more to take
account of global externalities. I think they're probably about right"
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(Andrew Steer, Madrid, 5.10.94). Energy prices in Italy and Japan are about
twice what they are in most Western European countries. Probably as a
direct consequence, the energy consumption per person in those two
countries is only about 60% what it is in most Western European
countries, and little more than a third what it is in the United States.26
As von Weizsacker often points out, Japan overtook the United States
and Italy overtook Britain in terms of GNP per capita with the highest
energy prices in the world. By contrast, the economy of the Soviet Union
collapsed under some of the lowest energy prices in the world. Low
energy prices discourage investment in new technology and modern
equipment. They also effectively subsidise pollution and wasteful use of
resources. But it is obvious that it must be possible to have energy prices
that are too high. Where is that point?
Evolving beyond the optimum
From the point of view of a neoclassical environmental economist, what
you should do is calculate the 'optimum' price of energy. The aim is to
internalise all the external costs to the rest of the economy in terms of
things like pollution. This approach was pioneered by Pigou back in the
1920s. Once all the external costs have been internalised, you have the
optimum price. David Pearce has done a lot of work along these lines in
recent years.
However, doing just that takes no account of technology. Once you have
internalised all the costs, you will, in terms of neoclassical theory, push
the economy to a new equilibrium some distance away from the state it is
in now. But technology will also adapt. New technologies will be
developed which save energy more cheaply than would have been the
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case without the policy intervention. That will create a new optimum
price which is even higher. So you can raise the price of energy again,
promoting the development of new technologies, raising the optimum
price further. There is a law of diminishing returns at work, but this effect
means that over time it is possible to raise prices of energy (or materials)
substantially higher than the neoclassical optimum figure. The economic
approach which deals with technology in this way is evolutionary
economics.27 The long-term effect of ecological tax reform would be to
restructure the entire economy. A different course of economic and
technological development would follow because of it. Such a thoroughly
different path does not lend itself to neoclassical optimum price
calculations. How can you calculate what the outcome of the future path
of technological development will be?
An interesting objection to ecological tax reform is that it might become a
victim of its own success. If governments end up dependent on revenues
from taxes on energy and materials, they may be tempted to encourage
their use in other ways. It is like the way that governments are often half¬
hearted about anti-smoking efforts because they make so much money
from taxing cigarettes. A related danger is that rapid technological
innovation could lead to sudden declines in income from ecological
taxes, forcing other taxes to rise rapidly. The answer von Weizsacker
gives to this objection is that ecological taxes should not become too
dominant a source of government income, so that they do not come to be
dependent on large revenues.
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The new realism
Ecological tax reform is an extremely important idea in the intellectual
and political development of the green movement. Dennis Pirages told
me: "You have to look at the social, economic and political sides of these
things. I think that's one of the major problems within the
environmental movement. It's often environmentally super-
sophisticated, but socially and politically inept" (Dennis Pirages, College
Park, Maryland, 22.6.94). Ecological tax reform, unlike 'no growth'
economic strategies or the redistribution of environmental space, is not a
message of enforced self-sacrifice to the populations of Western countries.
It actually offers quite an attractive carrot: reduced unemployment, as
well as less pollution. Wouldn't this be a good policy for Western
Europe's social democratic parties to put forward to their electorates?
In Germany, the Green Party has taken up ecological tax reform as its
central policy plank, meeting with success among voters who had shied
away from their earlier eco-fundamentalism. Even so, the Social
Democrats remain wary. They are closely tied to trade unions which are
heavily committed to some very environmentally-intensive industries.
In Britain, the Liberal Democrats in 1996 adopted a policy of limited
ecological tax reform, with the cost of energy increasing at 2% a year. At
that rate it would take 35 years for energy prices to double, taking them to
roughly their present price levels in Italy and Japan. Such a slow rate of
introduction would not lead to the radical effects of von Weizsacker's
proposal. The leadership of the British Labour Party has not shown any
interest at all in ecological tax reform.
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Aside from the usual unpopularity of new taxes, a particular difficulty is
that energy taxes proportionately fall most heavily on the poorest in
society and least on the richest. When Britain's Conservative
government put Value Added Tax on domestic fuel, the Labour Party and
the Liberal Democrats opposed it on the grounds that it would make it
harder for poor and elderly people to heat their homes adequately.
Ecological tax reform can take that problem into account, by increasing
taxes on the richest and redistributing them to the poorest in
compensation. Although the distributional effects of reform are neutral,
it is complicated in presentational terms. Opponents can talk about new
energy taxes hitting the poor and new wealth taxes hitting the rich.
The appeal of ecological tax reform is only partly in terms of green
credibility. A major appeal is that it should help to reduce
unemployment and make industry more internationally competitive.
That is because it stops taxing labour out of the market. It instead taxes
energy and raw materials inputs, which do not vote, and plays to the
strength of European economies - technological innovation, rather than
their weakness - high labour costs.
Effects of ecological tax reform on economic growth
There is a subtle way in which ecological tax reform might reduce
economic growth. Technological innovation increasing labour
productivity is what currently drives growth in Western economies. The
ever-increasing productivity of labour means that economies need to
grow by about 2.5% a year to avoid increasing unemployment, leading to
the problem of a recession. On the other hand, if the economy grows
more than 4 or 5%, wage demands increase, causing an inflationary
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overheating of the economy, followed by recession. Governments try to
manage growth so that the economy doesn't overheat, and so that
enough growth is allowed that unemployment doesn't spiral out of
control. They are not very good at it. Politicians are often tempted to let a
boom rip for short-term popularity, and worry about recession afterwards.
One effect of ecological tax reform could be to shift downwards both the
minimum and maximum levels of growth to avoid recession. The
minimum level of growth is lowered because the labour-saving bias of
technological innovation is reduced, so labour productivity increases
more slowly. The maximum level of growth without overheating is
lowered too. The rate of growth where demand for labour leads to wage
increases that cause inflation is lower because labour productivity is
increasing more slowly than it would without ecological tax reform.
On the other hand, in terms of the efficiency of factors of production,
because resources have been underpriced for so long, there are both large
amounts of existing but unexploited opportunities for conservation and a
lack of technological innovation in the field of resource efficiency, unlike
in labour productivity. What that means is that improvements in
resource efficiency could be large enough to compensate.
Community values
Greens traditionally have opposed economic growth. That is partly
because they have thought that it inevitably required physical growth.
Partly, it is also because of the idea that capitalist economic growth leads
to a breakdown of community. Ecological tax reform gets round the first
argument against growth, at least for a few decades. Does it get round the
second one? This argument is well encapsulated in a remark by the green
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thinker Hazel Henderson that much of present-day American economic
growth consisted of Mom no longer cooking breakfast at home, but
getting a job at McDonald's and charging her family $2.99 each for it
there.28 The arguments have been around since Mishan wrote The Costs
of Economic Growth. Before that, the claim that capitalism ruthlessly
atomises society into selfish individuals goes back to Marx. He wrote that,
as capitalism progresses, larger and larger areas of life are turned into
commodities. The economist's counter-argument is that Mom is better
off getting the minimum wage from McDonald's than being
economically dependent on her husband. If she didn't think so, she'd
have stayed cooking breakfast at home. And Mom is earning more than
her family is paying for breakfast at McDonald's. "Yes," Greens respond,
"there is more money circulating. But aren't the values of family and
community worth anything?"
How does ecological tax reform relate to this argument? It is claimed that
there is an indirect way in which ecological tax reform could reduce the
breakdown of community. That is because ecological tax reform would
increase the cost of transport. It would make local production more
competitive and tend to counter economic centralisation.
In his 1994 book Earth Politics, von Weizsacker puts ecological tax reform
in the context of other green reforms.29 He supports the Green idea of
encouraging 'ownwork', or self-employment. Herman Daly and John
Cobb went further in For the Common Good, and advocated a minimum
income scheme.30 This would pay all citizens a guaranteed minimum
income whether or not they worked. The idea is that it would encourage
people to work part-time, become self-employed, or take part in
alternative economic arrangements like Local Economic Trading Systems
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(LETS) to supplement their incomes. The minimum income scheme has
been strongly criticised because it would allow a lazy minority to do no
work if they wanted and live off the rest of society. Martin Ryle has
argued that such a scheme is politically unviable because the people in
the formal economy would object to subsidising other people's leisure.31
Looking at the current political pressure for cuts in the more generous
European social security systems, he is very likely right. Ryle also argued
that the minimum income scheme depends on the formal economy to
finance it, so it is not such a transformative idea as its advocates think. It
is a self-limiting reform.
In the final chapter of Earth Politics, von Weizsacker describes his future
vision. A trademark of von Weizsacker is that, as the German newspaper
Suddeutsche Zeitung has put it: "his solutions are free of fundamentalist
zeal and strictly guided by the criterion of Realpolitik." In the long term,
von Weizsacker looks to new models of wealth. In his future, car and air
travel, meat, plastics, metals and other energy-intensive goods will be
more expensive. On the other side of the balance sheet, information,
services, recreational and cultural activities would be cheaper. It is not a
world of fundamentalist green self-sacrifice that he advocates. Rather, he
talks of the danger of environmental considerations being used as the
justification for dictatorship. What he hopes to do is use the price
mechanism to nudge people's choices in a different, less environmentally
destructive direction.
The thinking about environmental space from Friends of the Earth and
von Weizsacker's thinking about ecological tax reform are not
inconsistent. In fact, the Wuppertal Institute, which von Weizsacker
directs, was given responsibility for research for Friends of the Earth's
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ongoing Sustainable Europe report. The justification for ecological tax
reform von Weizsacker gives is in terms of environmental space.
Ecological tax reform is a politically attractive device to free up
environmental space. The argument von Weizsacker gives in Earth
Politics for the imperative of ecological tax reform is based around the
argument that there is not enough environmental space in the world for
the Third World to ever be able to live as people currently do in the
West. He claims that if the entire world immediately adopted the present
Western way of life, the resource demands would cause environmental
collapse in five or ten years.
Arguments against economic growth
Von Weizsacker states that he supports the arguments Robert Goodland
and Herman Daly give for why Northern income growth is not a
solution to Southern poverty.32 Robert Goodland is an environmental
economist at the World Bank and, at the time the paper was written, Daly
was too. In many ways the paper reflects the influence that working for
the World Bank had on Daly's thinking and the softening to some extent
of his anti-growth views. The rest of this chapter is devoted to a
consideration of Daly's arguments against economic growth and the
counter-arguments in favour that David Pearce put forward when I
interviewed him.
Goodland and Daly gave ten reasons for their proposition that Northern
income growth is not a solution to Southern poverty. They started with
the point that GNP is a flawed measure of human well-being. Not only
does actual welfare bear little relation to GNP, as has been documented in
the annual UNDP Human Development Reports since 1992,33 but the
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economic sectors contributing most to GNP are those that are most
environmentally damaging. Although environmental damage is good
for GNP, they claim that in reality it is expensive and imprudent: much
better to invest in human welfare than GNP growth.
They went on to point out that relative incomes mean that a 3% growth
in per capita GNP means $633 more in the United States, but only $10 or
less in China and India. Global income growth worsens income disparity
between North and South. They move on to the difference in utility
between needs and wants. In the North, self-evaluated happiness is more
due to relative income than absolute income. So the marginal utility of
across-the-board income growth in Northern countries is low34 or even
negative as people do things like buy more cars (increasing congestion) or
eat more (damaging their health).
They claim that optimism about technology enabling poor countries to
catch up with the rich is misplaced. With world population doubling in
40 years, and average incomes in Western countries 23 times the average
for the rest of the world, the resource efficiency of technology must
improve 46-fold in that time to maintain a stable environmental impact
if Southern incomes were to rise to present Western levels (This
calculation, however, ignores the effect of technological improvements
in the North. If that is taken into account, the correct figure would be
more like a 10-fold improvement).
Goodland and Daly go on to stress the value of economic self-reliance.
Rather than what they characterise as the traditional model of Northern
income growth and "trickle down" of wealth to the South, they support
direct poverty alleviation in the South. This means increasing the value
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added to goods in the South, rather than export of unprocessed raw
materials to the North. They call for technology transfer to enable the
South to do that.
Next, they deal with growth of material throughput as a source of both
income growth and environmental damage. They quote statistics
showing that the environmentally-burdening activities like industry and
agriculture which provide about 25% of employment, generate about 65%
of the increase in national income.35 The increase in the income of
service professions like barbers in Northern countries over the past
century is due to the income from increases in these environmentally
burdening activities, rather than improvements in the productivity of
barbers.
They identify subsidised resource pricing as a major problem for
Southern countries. Severe under-pricing of raw material exports mean
the South is subsidising the North in terms of externalised
environmental costs and government incentives to exploit natural
resources. This relates to another problem - an inequitable trading system.
They claim that much Northern growth is based on depleting Southern
resources at a price far below the cost of sustainable exploitation.
Dysfunctions of trade mean that countries which attempt to internalise
environmental costs are at a competitive disadvantage against countries
which do not. There is a conflict between the World Bank's "free trade"
prescription and its "get the price right" prescription. They say that tariffs
to protect a cost internalisation policy should not be considered
protectionism. It is unpaid environmental costs which are subsidies.
Finally, they consider the insecurity of inequality. They claim that the
inequality in the North's use of global environmental commons and the
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environmental resources of the South is a source of international
instability.
David Pearce's arguments against a non-growing economy
How strong are these arguments? They are very powerful arguments
against the current pattern of economic development in the world. But it
is less clear that they show that Northern income growth is not the
solution to Southern poverty. The paper does not consider the possibility
of reducing the environmental impact of Northern consumption at the
same time as Northern incomes grow. When David Pearce delivered his
paper in Oslo, it was this kind of thinking he was attacking. Pearce
proposed a gradual restructuring of Northern economies to be less
environmentally intensive through the introduction of ecological
taxation. He argued that reducing growth of consumption in the North
would not only do nothing for the South, but by fostering
unemployment and social unrest in the North, it would be less
'sustainable'. David Pearce regards the idea of redirecting growth from
North to South as dangerously mistaken.
Pearce's 1989 Blueprint for a Green Economy36 was an important book as
it was the first significant attempt by a mainstream economist to bridge
some of the gap between the economists and their environmentalist
critics. Although the book has developed a reputation in Green circles as
"virtually a paean to economic growth", as Pratap Chatterjee described it
to me in conversation, the position taken was really rather more
measured than that. Pearce accepted that Gross National Product was not
really a credible measure of well-being, as it aggregates together both the
benefits and costs of increased economic activity as "growth" and does not
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take account of the consumption of natural capital. In that sense, Pearce
was not an unashamed enthusiast for economic growth. He favoured the
goal of 'development', broadly an increase in human well-being.
However, he wrote:
None the less, sustainable development and sustainable growth
are interlinked. A society which does not maintain or improve its
real income per capita is unlikely to be "developing". But if it
achieves growth at the expense of other components of
development it cannot be said to be developing either.37
When I interviewed David Pearce in 1995, he gave five reasons for
opposing an end to Northern economic growth, as Daly advocates.
Pearce's critique of Daly is worth repeating in some detail. Pearce argued
that ending economic growth is politically impractical, that lifestyle
changes are unnecessary, that Daly has confused growth in the use of
resources and economic growth, that economic growth is essential for a
healthy economy, and that there is a danger of authoritarianism in Green
ideas about growth.
Pearce's first allegation was that ending economic growth was politically
impractical:
....what interests me are pragmatic solutions. What interest
politicians are pragmatic solutions. It is not a pragmatic solution to
go to a politician and say that the solution to our environmental
problems is that everybody has to change their way of life. I would
guarantee you will not find a politician who will buy that
anywhere in the world.
.... I am totally at a loss to know who the people out there are
who'll vote against economic growth. It really amounts to saying "I
don't want a television. I don't want a car. I don't want an extra
fiver in my pay packet at the end of the week." And I don't know
who these people are. But I've never seen them in my lifetime.
What you describe is a fanciful world. It's a world that arises from
people who spend too long in armchairs talking in academic
circles. I repeat, the answers you may not like. But the answer is
that this is undesirable as an academic reflection. It doesn't have
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anything to do with the real world of ordinary people. The world
in which I was born and have never escaped from is a world in
which people desire to be richer. In a very conventional sense.
(David Pearce, University College London, 9.2.95)
Herman Daly had told me that his position is that:
....there are two kinds of impossibility. There's a political
impossibility and a biophysical impossibility, and right now it's like
the horns of a dilemma. I prefer to be impaled on the politically
impossible horn because that's not as fundamentally impossible.
Things which are presumably politically impossible frequently do
change. The Berlin Wall fell. That was politically impossible. A few
other things have happened that were politically impossible. But I
don't think we're going to change the dimensions of the earth or
reverse the laws of thermodynamics, those kind of things, which
are the fundamental limits. (Herman Daly, University of
Maryland, 22.6.94)
David Pearce's, second point, however, is that changes in lifestyle aren't
actually necessary:
....do we really have to change our way of life? Answer, no. You
can get there by a far less painful route. Again, on purely cost-
efficient grounds, why do people have to suffer? I think a lot of this
is puritanical. It's a bit like Norwegians beating themselves with
birch twigs. Something is wrong. It is your fault it's wrong, so you
must suffer. This has a long tradition, as you know. Both in
religion and in anthropological science. People want to hurt
themselves because they think that what they've done is wrong. "I
have to be punished. I've done something wrong. I've offended
God's will, I've offended Mother Nature, Gaia or whatever."
(David Pearce, University College London, 9.2.95)
That remark is a dig at Herman Daly, whom Pearce had earlier in the
interview accused of being a religious fundamentalist. He returned to his
attack on Daly in his third argument, that there is a confusion between
growth in the use of resources and economic growth:
I think it's also fundamentally irresponsible to do that [call for a
transformation of lifestyle]. It's counter-productive because you can
actually destroy the environment far faster by saying things like
that than you can by adopting pragmatic solutions. But it also boils
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down to a fundamental confusion. For example, if you look at
Daly's work, it changes its nature quite neatly between the early
seventies when he writes his anti-economic growth arguments.
What he is challenging is economic growth, the concept of
additional wealth. When he's challenged that to oppose economic
growth is to oppose the aspirations of ordinary people, the man on
the Clapham omnibus or the guy in the village in Nigeria, when
he realised that in a sense he had been attacking the wrong thing,
he changed it to say that what he was in favour of was economic
development, and what he was against was the consumption of
materials and energy. What he defines economic growth as is the
increased consumption of energy and materials. Nowhere in
economics literature can you find economic growth defined in that
way. Nowhere. And it's perfectly possible to have economic
growth, value added, without increasing the consumption of
materials and energy.
So I think there's an element of duplicity here. I don't blame
Herman for engaging in it. One might want to see that switch in
time as an admission on his part that the early attack on economic
growth was wrong. Unfortunately, because you get people who
aren't as intelligent as Herman Daly, then follow him, and
themselves can't distinguish between growth and growth of
throughput and confuse the issue further. Call for an end to
economic growth to my way of thinking is an offence really of the
most fundamental kind. I think somebody advocating that should
be made responsible for their decisions. And if you observe the
failure of the system of economic growth in this country and its
consequences for unemployment, I think those consequences need
to be brought home to people who advocate this as direct policy.
(David Pearce, University College London, 9.2.95)
How fair is David Pearce being to Herman Daly? Daly does in fact make a
distinction between economic growth (growth in the value of goods and
services) and what he calls throughput growth. But it is also true that his
famous book Steady-state Economics38 is an argument not just against
growth in the throughput of energy and materials, but also against
growth in the value of goods and services in the economy. Daly called,
back in 1977, for the need to maximise resource efficiency. He wrote:
no doubt it is true that at "some finite cost" we could live on
renewable resources, as mankind essentially did before the
industrial revolution. But the finite cost is going to include a
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reduction in population or per-capita consumption levels or, at the
very least, a cessation of further growth.39
He ridiculed the idea that improving materials and energy efficiency
could be combined with economic growth:
The idea of economic growth overcoming physical limits by
angelizing GNP is equivalent to overcoming physical limits to
population growth by reducing the throughput intensity or
metabolism of human beings. First pygmies, then Tom Thumbs,
then big molecules, then pure spirits. Indeed, it would be necessary
for us to become angels in order to subsist on angelized GNP.40
David Pearce's allegation of duplicity is somewhat unfair, however,
because Herman Daly allowed Steady-state Economics to be reprinted in a
new edition in 1992, writing in a new preface that he stood by everything
that he had said in the original 1977 edition. But it is true that Daly is
more circumspect about the possibilities for improving resource
efficiency in what he says and writes nowadays. When I interviewed Daly
in 1994 and asked him about his ideas for controlling Northern
consumption, he said:
I'm talking about a reduction in matter-energy throughput in the
North. To the extent we're able to increase productivity of that
matter-energy flow and satisfy our needs to a greater and greater
extent with the same, then it isn't going to cost us very much. And
to the people who are technological optimists, I would say "I hope
you're right. If you are right, it'll be easier to deal with." I tend to
think it'll not be quite so easy. We should certainly go as far in the
direction of technological improvement we can, but that remains
to be seen. (Herman Daly, University of Maryland, 22.6.94)
Both Daly's arguments against growth and Pearce's arguments for a
continuation of growth depend on the empirical question of the extent to
which it is possible to "angelize" the economy.
David Pearce's fourth argument is that economic growth is an intrinsic
part of a healthy economy:
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The final final comment I make is that they also are not very good
at economic history. And that is because governments don't have
control over long-term economic growth rates. Economies don't
grow because governments say they're going to grow and
economies don't slow down because governments say they're
going to slow down. That's certainly what happens in the short
run. Sure. If you look at the whole of economic history, the growth
of the British economy from around 1801 to the present day,
hovers around 2% in real terms per annum. What are we going to
say? That in 1801 the government was responsible for a 2% growth
rate? Gladstone? Asquith? It doesn't make sense. It's bad history as
well as bad economics.
.... But even the language, "The economy has to grow". Economies
just grow. Which economies do not grow? Where have we got any
evidence that there's an economy that has not grown over a
significant period of time? Over a period of ten years or so, you
certainly could cite African countries that have negative growth
rates over that time. That's very closely correlated with war, with
natural disasters and tremendous corruption. (David Pearce,
University College London, 9.2.95)
Daly wrote in Steady-state Economics that comparing a failed growth
economy to a steady-state economy was like comparing an aircraft falling
out of the sky to a helicopter: "The fact an airplane falls to the ground if it
tries to remain stationary in the air simply reflects the fact that airplanes
are designed for forward motion. It certainly does not imply that a
helicopter cannot remain stationary."41
Some Green authors, such as Martin Ryle42 and Robyn Eckersley43 have
argued that capitalism is based on a "grow or die" dynamic, because
profits depend on an expanding economy, implying that a non-growing
Green economy would have to be socialist. Daly is not a socialist, so I put
the argument to him that capitalism requires economic growth in order
to be able to maintain profits:
Daly: Well, I don't think so. If it does, then it's in trouble and will
have to change. Again, I'm using growth in my sense.
173
SD: I mean GNP growth, rather than necessarily growth in physical
throughput.
Daly: The way GNP is currently measured, you can have growth in
GNP without having growth in physical throughput. So to that
extent if you can limit the physical throughput and then GNP
grows because of greater quality or whatever, OK. Is that really
required by capitalism? Does capitalism have to grow? I don't really
think so.
SD: Where do profits come from in the long term if you don't
have-
Daly: In the standard - Profits come from innovation, temporary
monopolies. Profit really serves as an allocative mechanism, a
signal of misallocations. If you have profits over here, that means
more resources have to go over there. The market system at least -
SD: It's like the $20 bill lying on the ground and the girl reaches to
pick it up and her economist father says "Don't!"
Daly: Sure, you're never in a really equilibrium situation. There's
always some opportunities somewhere that have been overlooked.
If you end up with zero growth there's a sense in which that means
there would be no net investment. All investment would be gross
replacement investment replacing depreciation. So there would
still be renewal.
SD: But how could anyone get a return on their capital?
Daly: Well, if capital is productive -
SD: Surely if your GNP growth is zero, then there as many people
losing money as there are making money?
Daly: No. Let me ask "Why would anyone get a return on labor?"
You think labor would be zero, or land rent?
SD: No. But investment would be surely -
Daly: I don't see why. You have capital. If capital is productive, if it
allows you to produce more than you can produce without it, then
it seems to me you would still get a rate of return. You have, let's
say, a non-growing product which gets divided up among land,
labor and capital. I don't think that because the product is non-
growing, therefore capital would get a zero share. I think the
competition would give capital a share. Now if the economy's
growing, probably capital would get more.... If it's non-growing, by
definition goods and services would be constant year on year. That
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means you would not have a surplus for investment. All of your
investment would be replacement investment of things as they
wore out. But I don't see that would mean there would be no
return to capital. Capital would still by virtue of its scarcity and
productivity command a return....
SD: But where would profits come from? The argument is they
could be obtained, but it would require ever-increasing exploitation
of labour or land in order to get the profits for capital.
Daly: Maybe we're using profit in different senses here. There's a
rate of return to capital, which is sort of like the interest rate, which
is taken to be the normal rate of profit. Then there's excess profit,
or pure economic profit, which is over and above the opportunity
cost of capital, the interest rate. So you get excess profit usually as a
result of something which is novel and commands a temporary
monopoly. Those excess profits get competed away. Now, for there
to be excess profits in one part of the economy, I don't think there
has to be a growth of the whole system.
SD: No. The question is to do with the rate of return. Wouldn't the
rate of return on investment in capital, labor or land fall naturally
toward zero?
Daly: Let me just try. My hunch is it would fall towards equality
with the kind of rate of development. A rate of qualitative
improvement, which would be less than the current product of the
rate of qualitative improvement times the quantitative expansion.
You would have eliminated the quantitative expansion as one
source of this surplus. And so therefore that surplus would be less.
But I don't see that it would necessarily be zero. Or even if it were
zero, that doesn't seem to me to be a terrible thing.
SD: The economy would be differently organised.
Daly: No, I don't think so, because the whole idea is that profits are
supposed to be competed to zero anyway. That's pure economic
profits. It doesn't mean the entrepreneur is not making any
money. It just means he's not making any more than in his next
best occupation. That situation could obtain with zero economic
profit.
SD: That some people could make profits? Yes. But other people
would be having to make basically losses, whereas they'd currently
be making profits, even while they're making pure economic loss.
Daly: No. I think that's not the case.
SD: I don't know!
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Daly: You can talk to some other economists and maybe you'll get a
different view. (Herman Daly, University of Maryland, 22.6.94)
The exchange we had is worth repeating because something very
interesting emerges from it - that Daly himself is hardly confident that it
is possible to maintain profits in a non-growing economy. He did not
appear to have thought very much about the question before I raised it
with him, even though it is one of the most important objections that
has been raised to his ideas. What is more, he ended up arguing that
qualitative development in the economy (economic growth in its pure
form) would be what would maintain the general level of profit. This
does seem to support Pearce's contention that Daly has quietly shifted his
ground on the issue of economic growth, without openly renouncing his
previous opinions.
What, however, is remarkable is the pointlessness of the debate about
economic growth. Both David Pearce and Herman Daly now seem to
agree that GNP is not a measure of welfare or of environmental damage.
But both men continue to defend or attack the idea of GNP growth as
though it were a measure of one or other of those things. In some
mysterious way GNP has become a symbol that orthodox economists and
environmentalists can't stop fighting about, even though they have
forgotten why they were originally fighting.
David Pearce's fifth argument is about the authoritarianism of Green
ideas about growth. I had suggested that the building of the M25 orbital
motorway round London had been socially undesirable despite the fact it
had boosted GNP. Pearce responded by saying:
No. You see you're getting totally muddled up. What people
demand is not the M25 - what they demand is personal transport.
And you can provide personal transport in various ways. Now, so
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long as you signal to people what the true costs are of their choices,,
and if they still choose the M25, then you should provide the M25.
It is quite wrong for anybody to regard themselves as being
superior to the hoi polloi out there, as it was put to me at the
Foreign Office this morning, so that we sit back in the comfort of
the academic world, funded by some public body and we say "You
can't actually have what you want because what you want is
socially undesirable." That is not just appalling arrogance, it is
actually politically and morally indefensible. And it's very very
close to exactly what Adolf Hitler said in the 1930s. We need to be
very careful about this. Because what you have here is a
subterranean fascist culture in a lot of this environmentalism. It's
basically a bunch of people who think they know what the ideal
society is, and they're then going to impose it or try to impose it on
the rest of the world. At the end of the day, if you don't trust people
to provide you with the just society, then you fail....
That world can only come about either by a programme of mass
persuasion, the last occasion for which probably has to be the rise of
Christianity, and maybe these people are arguing for that. If they
are, then I don't have any great problem with it so long as the way
it's done respects people's freedoms and rights. The difficulty I
have with most of what I read that follows this kind of social
transformation school of thought is that it isn't social
transformation, it's actually social engineering. It's actually very
very reminiscent of fascism and of communism. It's actually an
attempt to say "I know better than you what is good for you,
because I am an expert. I've studied these ratios of economic
growth to material, and you can't have what you want. So I'm
going to tell you you want something else, and if you don't agree
with me (chuckles) I shall engineer the system so that in fact you
don't have what you want." I have to say I find that deeply morally
offensive, and politically, I think, totally unacceptable. And again, I
would argue that I don't think the people who argue that are
malicious. I think they haven't thought it through. I don't think
they see it. And I think if they did see it, and if they had this sense
of responsibility they would stop arguing that. So I have no
sympathy whatsoever with these viewpoints. (David Pearce,
University College London, 9.2.95)
The "fascism" Pearce saw in my remark was not truly a Hitlerian one,
which would be something like wanting to round up all the car
commuters in southern England and put them in concentration camps.
What he calls "fascism" is rather different: a moral framework that does
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not define liberty as consumer sovereignty and give primacy to economic
values, as will be explained in the next chapter.
Conclusion
Attempting to define sustainability in terms of capital opens up a debate
about the substitutability of technology for resources and environmental
services. Beyond that, it begs the question of whether a decline in one
aspect of the environment can be substituted for by an increase in another
aspect. The problem which bedevils the whole idea of sustainability in
terms of total capital or natural capital is deciding on the rules for
acceptable substitutions or compensation. This is a general problem with
any indicator which attempts to aggregate fundamentally dissimilar
things into a single number.44
The environmental space approach gets round that difficulty by dealing
with each aspect of the environment by itself, rather than attempting to
sum them into a global 'capital' figure. It instead raises the issue of the
distribution of access to the Earth's environmental space and suggests an
imperative for radical reductions in resource consumption by the
industrialised countries. However, redistribution of environmental space
would involve changes in lifestyles in these countries, and returns us to
the question of economic growth, at least for rich Western countries.
The debate about economic growth continues to rumble on. It is widely
recognised that GNP is not a measure either of welfare or of
environmental destruction. It could grow without meaning either was
increasing. However, it remains a symbol of the deeper dispute between
economists and environmentalists about the value of money and the
value of the Earth.
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The mainstream economist's approach to environmental decision¬
making is based on cost-benefit analysis. It involves attempting to
calculate what a set of environmental goods is worth to people in
monetary terms; crudely, finding out what people would pay to preserve
a feature of the environment as it is. The figure derived is compared with
the monetary value of economic exploitation. Whichever alternative of
preservation or exploitation that raises the greatest sum is held to have
won the cost-benefit analysis.
Since environmental goods are not normally traded in the marketplace,
traditional cost-benefit analyses tended to ignore the loss of the values
derived from aspects of the environment when economic development
takes place. In recent years, economists have put much more effort into
attempting to identify the economic values associated with preservation.
This has involved the construction of 'shadow prices' based on surveys
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of what people would be prepared to pay for the preservation of an
environmental good.
The economist's approach is controversial, though. Many
environmentalists assert that nature has an intrinsic value beyond the
value that people attach to it. The issue of whether nature has such
intrinsic value is dealt with further in the chapter following this one. The
present chapter instead concentrates on the social issues attached to the
use of monetary valuation in environmental decision-making,
particularly the example of estimates of the costs of climate change.
Cost-benefit analysis turns out to place value on the interests of different
people in proportion to the wealth that they command. It assigns greater
value to the interests of the rich than those of the poor. The use of money
as a common measuring-rod for expressing people's values through cost-
benefit analysis and the entire approach of 'welfare economics' does not
appear to be compatible with the concern for intragenerational equity that
is so important to the concept of sustainable development. The actual
practice of cost-benefit analysis is not even philosophically coherent in
itself.
Welfare economics is based on an individualist utilitarian framework
with no room for considerations of intragenerational or
intergenerational equity. Bringing these concerns into cost-benefit
analysis would involve not only a revision of its techniques, but of the
moral assumptions behind mainstream economic theory.
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Putting a price on the planet
David Pearce doesn't understand why he has been so reviled by
environmentalists. He was best known for saying in Blueprint for a
Green Economy that he wanted to "put a price on the planet", but told me
how annoyed he was when "people would say 'This man is out to put a
price on everything.' I've never said that. It's a bit too much." Pearce went
on to tell me that, however:
the idea that you cannot put a value on global warming damage is
self-evidently wrong because it's been done. People may want to
argue with the results, but it's been done in Bill Klein's work, by
my colleague Sam Fankhauser. If we go through it, why can't you
put a value on global warming? I don't understand why not. If I
look at it very simply, if I have global warming and I have sea-
level rise, then the relationship between warming and sea-level
rise is a scientific issue. It has nothing to do with economics. The
fact that the land has a number of economic sectors on it permits
me to go on and say what would happen if those economic sectors
were lost. So there's absolutely no reason why you shouldn't try to
value these things.
If somebody says that the estimate that you get is uncertain then I
would agree of course totally. But that's social science as you well
know. To my knowledge, that's also science. The idea that any of
this should be definite within 99% confidence limits is laughable. If
people are saying you can't value global warming, I think I would
have to say that the ball is in their court to say why not. (David
Pearce, University College London, 9.2.95)
In For the Common Good, Herman Daly and John Cobb did argue that
global warming was an example of the sort of pervasive externality that
cannot be costed.1 They wrote that, even if you assumed predictable
physical changes from global warming, the economic losses would be
subject to wide disagreement and uncertainty. Should costs be based on
how much people would be willing to pay to avoid the change? Or on
how much it would cost to put things back the way they were? They
pointed out that, since these kind of changes are not the kind of things
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that can be purchased piecemeal on markets, people would have to
express their valuations in terms of answers to hypothetical questions.
Are such answers meaningful? Even assuming that problem could be
solved, they outlined the difficulty of tracing through all the
consequences and costs of global warming, including all the relocation
costs, disruption of food supplies, loss of species, and so on.
We submit that, while perhaps barely conceivable to a Laplacian
demon, such a calculation involves so many guesstimates,
uncertainties, and arbitrary assumptions that it is a will o' the wisp,
an ignus fatuus, a red herring. The change is too nonmarginal, too
systemic and pervasive for prices to mean anything. Yet that is
what the logic of internalization demands. Is there not a more
operational and less arbitrary procedure for approximating the
Pigovian ideal of full-cost prices, and for recognizing at the same
time that a change like the greenhouse effect is not something to be
paid for, but something to be avoided?2
David Pearce can say that he has done these calculations, so it is not
impossible. The real question is not whether such a calculation can be
done at all, but whether the answer derived is in any way meaningful.
Pearce led a team of economists whose chapter on the social costs of
climate change for the second report of the Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change (IPCC) was rejected by governments at an IPCC meeting
held in Montreal in November 1995.
The equity question
The chapter on social costs was rejected because a number of Third World
countries, including India, supported a critique of the assumptions it was
based on that had been published by a small London-based lobby group,
the Global Commons Institute (GCI). Pearce's group had calculated that
following a "business as usual" scenario, global warming would cost 1.5-
2% of Gross World Product annually by the second half of the next
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century. They had calculated that action to limit global warming would
itself lead to losses of 2% of Gross World Product annually. GCI argued
that these calculations were based on flawed, indeed immoral,
assumptions.
GCI contested several assumptions, but the crucial charges were that the
economists had ignored scientific uncertainties in their calculations, and
that they had used an approach to calculating costs that generally
underestimated them and in particular discriminated against the Third
World.3
The economists had made their calculations based on the assumption of
2.5°C warming, in the middle of the IPCC range of 1.5-3.5°C. However,
this range is itself based on climate models which in fact contain much
larger uncertainties, and which ignore the possibility of positive feedback
effects that could aggravate global warming. Their assessments of damage
costs were also based on uncertain calculations. Most significantly, the
damage costs calculated were extremely sensitive to the surmised death
rate, which was predicted largely on the basis of a single study into the
effects of a 4°C rise on the inhabitants of fifteen US cities, and a series of
extrapolations. The economists had only considered deaths due to heat
stress and storms, not due to disease or malnutrition.
But GCI's most fundamental challenge to the economists was over the
calculations of differential value between rich and poor countries. They
valued the loss of land in Third World countries at one-tenth the rate of
land in Western countries. Based on an assessment of 'willingness-to-
pay', the IPCC economists had valued the cost of a lost life in Western
countries at $1.5 million for their calculations. They had valued a life at
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$100,000 for the rest of the world. Aubrey Meyer of GCI called this "the
economics of genocide". Meyer was born in South Africa, and he told me
in a telephone conversation that the kind of thinking behind such a
differential valuation of life reminded him of apartheid. GCI also pointed
out that "willingness to pay" is used normally in cost-benefit analysis to
assess benefits. To assess costs, it is normal to use "willingness to accept
compensation", which gives higher figures.
David Pearce said that his critics did not understand the methodology.
"The report simply says that people value risks differently. That
valuation is affected by the level of their incomes."4 The alternative
proposed - to value everyone's life equally - would increase the amount
spent on disaster aversion and foreign aid: "We would end up allocating
all our national income to life-saving."
What the IPCC economists were doing was making explicit the fact that
we live in a world where the rich count for much more than the poor. If
we valued the lives of people in the Third World equally to those in the
West, we would do something about facts like that ten million children a
year die of malnutrition. But when Pearce told New Scientist "This is a
matter of scientific correctness versus political correctness",5 he was
attempting to use the status of science to justify what actually is a political
judgement. Pearce does not believe it is sensible to attempt to redistribute
the world's wealth. Remember this statement of his:
If one's saying that of the incremental benefits for the future, that
0.3% of the UK's GNP is not a justifiable number for redistribution,
then I would wholly support that. But it isn't 10%. And again I
would say if anybody had any experience of seeing how monies can
be spent in the developing world, as someone who has seen most
of the world in 25 years, it is not possible to redistribute. It is not
only not possible, it is not desirable. If you seriously thought that a
thousand dollars off my salary would reappear as a thousand
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dollars somewhere else, it wouldn't. (David Pearce, University
College London, 9.2.95)
Two of the IPCC economists, Samuel Fankhauser and Richard Tol,6
responded to GCI, claiming that the issue of differential valuation was a
red herring. They said they had no problems with using a global average
value of life to assess world damages. But it would be an average value,
not the Western value. Using such an average value would not change
the overall results of their work. They also pointed out that the difference
between 'willingness to pay' and 'willingness to accept compensation' was
irrelevant to the question of regionally different value estimates.
'Willingness to accept compensation' estimates might be higher, but they
would still differ between regions. They added that the concept of
uniform values at Western levels, as GCI had proposed, was flawed
because the whole purpose of the regional damage analysis they had done
was to capture the regional diversity and assess the differences in
vulnerability.
The summary for policy-makers on social costs7 did not use the
economists' figures, because of GCI's lobbying, but it emphasised that,
while estimates for the damage to industrialised countries due to global
warming were only one to a few percent of GNP, estimates of damage to
agricultural Third World countries were several times higher. The irony
is that the responsibility for global warming lies with the industrialised
countries which have been responsible for the vast majority of
greenhouse gas emissions. Global warming is an excellent example of an
issue that involves questions of both intergenerational and international
equity.
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What really made the economists' work so controversial was that their
analysis did not take account of the inequity of the situation. It is in the
nature of economic analysis that it ignores questions of equity. Instead, it
values the luxuries of the rich more highly than the necessities of the
poor, because by definition the poor cannot pay as much for necessities as
the rich can pay for luxuries. This problem was explored a few years ago
by Kerry Turner in Blueprint 2, a book David Pearce edited.8 Cost-benefit
analysis assumes that the losers will be compensated by the gainers. In
this case, that would mean that the families of each Bangladeshi drowned
because of rising sea levels would be compensated to the tune of $100,000.
But in practice, as Turner noted, those who gain in a cost-benefit analysis
never have to compensate the losers.
David Pearce supports the "Polluter Pays Principle". That's why he said
that if people knew what the M25 really cost and were still prepared to
pay for it, they should have it. From a pragmatic viewpoint it is better
that the costs the M25 imposes on people who do not or will not benefit
from it are taken into account than that they are not. Is it "fascist" to
think that it would have been better if those costs had never been
imposed? Pearce's view depends on the belief that it is possible to
internalise all externalities by pricing, and that to attempt to handle
externalities through political process, rather than pricing, infringes
individual liberty. However, relying on pricing discounts the welfare of
people who are poor or not yet born. It is, as the old socialist jibe put it,
the same as the liberty for the rich to stay at the Ritz and the liberty for the
poor to sleep in the street.
An irony is that David Pearce was one of the people who in the late 1980s
showed that environmental degradation tends to hurt the poor, who
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cannot afford to protect themselves, more than the rich. Florida and the
Netherlands can afford to protect their inhabitants from rising sea levels
and storm damage in a way that Bangladesh cannot. Morally, it is
impossible to justify the idea that Americans are worth fifteen times
more than Bangladeshis. The reality of the world we live in is that the
lives of Americans do count for much more than the lives of
Bangladeshis. Should our assessment of the cost of climate change be
based on morality or economic reality?
If we are talking about Realpolitik, the lives of people in the Third World
count for almost nothing. Millions of children die each year from
malnutrition. The cost of saving their lives would be a few billion dollars
annually. Yet the rich choose to spend that money on countless luxuries
for themselves, rather than on ending hunger in the world. The money
raised by Britain's national lottery alone could make a significant impact,
but the revenues raised for 'good causes' are spent entirely in Britain on
things like opera houses and sport stadiums. British people in general
value subsidies for recreation at home more highly than the lives of
people in the Third World.
An assessment of global warming damage based on 'willingness to pay'
values is utterly pragmatic. But the decision was not a matter of
"scientific correctness versus political correctness". It was a political
decision itself. Aubrey Meyer said:
This is another way of saying that people do not have an equal
right to be here in the first place; your rights are proportional to
your income. In terms of achieving sustainable development
globally, this is nonsense. For practical as well as ethical purposes,
each human being is - and must be recognised as - the
fundamentally equal unit for measuring sustainability and this is
the irreducible level of decision-taking.
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At sub-global levels of 'economic' debate, this kind of wrangle is of
familiar vintage. It is the substance of the traditional left/right
arguments where those without money make "equity-for-equity's
sake" (principle) arguments, whilst those with the money make
"efficiency-for-efficiency's sake" (practicality) arguments. Whatever
the rights and wrongs of this approach, equity and efficiency are
seen as being traded off against each other between the left and the
right. Much of the history of our political economy is a story about
this false dichotomy.
At a global level this kind of economic discrimination is simply
suicidal. It is discriminatory on a greater scale than before. But it is
also dangerous and different in a manner which is without
precedent. First there is nowhere else to go. There isn't a global
carpet under which the waste, the pollution and the "poor" can be
swept and then ignored. The causes and the influence of these
things in the system needs to fundamentally inform that analysis
undertaken. This is true because large numbers of people are not
going to accept being made the discards of a system which values
itself 10:1 over everyone else, let alone which hasn't demonstrated
sustainable consumption patterns since industrialisation began.9
Meyer's argument is rather like the "greenmail" approach that the South
attempted at UNCED. The problem that "greenmail" has is that
essentially Third World countries have to threaten to destroy their own
environments. They obviously suffer much more from doing this than
people in the North will. In the case of the global commons, like carbon
dioxide emissions, the North itself is already acting in an unsustainable
fashion. And, again, the South is much more vulnerable to the negative
consequences than the North is. This makes the North feel that
"greenmail" is an implausible threat.
In a sense, it is irrelevant to Northern governments how much the
people of Southern countries will suffer from global warming. The power
to avert global warming lies with the North. All that the South can do is
threaten to aggravate it. In cynical Realpolitik, Northern countries will
only take action against global warming if they believe that their
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countries will lose more if they do nothing to prevent it than if they take
action. Actually, as Klaus Meyer-Abich has pointed out,10 because
political decisions are almost invariably taken on the basis of short-term
rather than long-term considerations, drastic action on climate change
will very likely only be taken if there is a short-term threat, such as from
migration.
This all sounds rather depressing for anyone who cares about the poor or
the future. The experience of sanctions against the apartheid regime in
South Africa is worth bearing in mind, though. It took decades, but
eventually the strength of the moral argument for solidarity with black
South Africans came to predominate over arguments of economic self-
interest and disingenuous arguments about protecting the welfare of the
black population. Similarly, the strength of moral arguments eventually
made the outside world intervene forcefully in Bosnia. What these
examples show is that morality doesn't really count for nothing in the
world of international politics; but it only counts in rather exceptional
circumstances.
Action to prevent global warming costs very little in the short run. Over
the long run, cuts in greenhouse gas emissions in line with IPCC
recommendations might cost a few percent of lost GNP over several
decades. At no time, though, would sacrifice actually be felt. The 'sacrifice'
is a purely notional one, because it amounts to an incremental loss of
around 0.05% of GNP. An alternative way of looking at it is that it means
that, at worst, people would only be as wealthy in 2050 as they otherwise
would have been in 2049. People normally do not notice the effect of one
year's economic growth in their lifestyle. On the other hand, the loss of
several small island states and a sixth of Bangladesh would be noticed. So
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would the millions of environmental refugees, the political disruption,
the disaster aid, the lawsuits in the International Court of Justice, and so
on. What prevents action against climate change is that moral pressure
has not yet built up to a point where the short-term political pressures for
action are greater than the short-term political pressures from fossil fuel
industries that would be threatened by such action.
The value of natural resources
The fundamental difference between economists and environmentalists
is about what they value. The way that the depletion of 'natural capital'
has been counted as income in national accounts symbolises the way
economists historically have treated the environment as valueless.
Natural resources have been regarded by economists as free gifts. Wilfred
Beckerman recently tried to defend this practice. He argued that, although
for some small developing countries dependent on a limited natural
resource base, it might be a worthwhile exercise to adjust GNP for
changes in natural capital, for large industrial countries or the whole
world, it is "a waste of time".11 For Beckerman, nature only has value so
long as it can be turned into something economically valuable.
Technology can make many things which were once economically
useless into valuable resources. He gives the example of unused land
which can be made valuable by clearing it, or of minerals like bauxite that
only became useful once techniques to turn it into aluminium were
developed. He writes that "if we were to adjust GNP estimates to allow
for new discoveries as well as for resources used up, the result might be
an upward adjustment, not a downward adjustment as is claimed by the
environmentalists who clamour for more money to be spent on making
estimates of 'sustainable' GNP."12
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The belief that underlies this view is that 'natural resources' are infinite
or infinitely substitutable. Labour and capital are scarce, so valuable.
Resources are not scarce, so they have no value beyond the cost of the
labour and capital needed to obtain them. Beckerman claims that if we
run out of anything, we will always be able to find a substitute because of
technical progress. To what extent can we rely on technical progress? It
depends on what it is for. Technical progress allows us to substitute for
copper wire rather well. When Paul and Anne Ehrlich say that
aluminium is an inferior substitute for copper as a conductor of
electricity,13 they sound rather desperate. Fibre optic cable is a superior
substitute for copper wire as a carrier of information. The trouble is that
there are many natural assets for which there are no feasible substitutes,
the things like the ozone layer, rainforests and wetlands which David
Pearce called 'critical natural capital'. Beckerman does not directly address
the idea of 'critical natural capital'. His discussion of the idea of natural
capital, as mentioned earlier, ignores such subtleties.
Money as a measuring rod
David Pearce argued in Blueprint for a Green Economy that the best way
to protect natural capital is by assigning it an economic value.
Environmental services, in particular, are often not bought and sold in
the marketplace. If the market is left alone, environmental services will
be treated as free goods and over-used. Pearce proposed that the answer is
to assign prices to these services based on what people would be willing to
pay for them:
Very simply, given limited resources, the rational thing to do is to
choose between our preferences in an effort to get the most
satisfaction - or "welfare", to use the economist's term - we can. If
we apply economics to environmental issues, then, we should
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expect to obtain some insights into the desirability of improving
the environment further, taking the social objective of increasing
people's overall satisfaction (or welfare) as given. This assumption
about the social objective used to derive measures of gains and
losses is important.
To be clear, what is being said is that an improvement in
environmental quality is also an economic improvement if it
increases social satisfaction or welfare.14
Pearce admitted that there are a number of questions and problems about
the approach. What if we can improve the welfare of the present
generation only at the expense of future generations? Should we look
generations, centuries or millennia into the future? Is it legitimate to
only consider human welfare, and not the welfare of other living beings?
He wrote that social objectives must be chosen so that short-term gains in
welfare do not lead to policies which are ultimately inconsistent with
human existence or some minimum quality of life.
Pearce went on to defend using money to measure the preferences that
people have. He wrote that money was a good measuring rod because it
expressed the strength of preferences well. What does it mean to put a
money value on the Californian condor or the African rhinoceros?
People could object that these animals were "beyond price". Pearce wrote
that nothing could really have infinite value. Even human life has a
finite value, because we are not prepared to spend infinite sums of
money to save lives.
Why was David Pearce so annoyed by my claim that the building of the
M25 had been "socially undesirable"? His view now seems to be that, as
long as people are prepared to pay the "true costs" of what they want, they
are morally entitled to have it, and it is "fascism" to deny them it. What
that means is that people have rights in proportion to their wealth. The
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interests that count are those that can be backed with money. So far from
money being only a "measuring rod", as in 1989, by 1995 wealth had
become the moral arbiter for Pearce. The combination of David Pearce's
fierce opposition to redistribution of wealth and his advocacy of basing
decision-making on people's ability to pay seems to lead to extremely
inegalitarian politics.
Pearce's work shows quite well the way in which the application of cost-
benefit analysis to global environmental issues works against the
principles of intergenerational equity and intragenerational equity that
lay at the core of the Brundtland Commission's definition of sustainable
development. Because decisions are based on ability to pay, less weight is
given to the interests of the poor and the future. Between people living at
the same time and with similar incomes, money is a good indicator of
strength of preferences. It is hard to see how it is a good measuring rod
when comparing the preferences of Americans and Bangladeshis, or M25
drivers and the people a hundred years from now.
My point is that there are two quite different ideas of what morality is.
One view of morality is David Hume's - mutual cooperation for common
benefit. The other view of morality is Immanuel Kant's - the equal
consideration of interests. The first view means that more weight is
given to the more powerful. It is a pragmatic morality. The second view
means that everybody's interests are regarded as equal. It is an idealistic
morality.
Welfare economics
Welfare economics ostensibly attempts to square this circle. The theory of
marginal utility states that an additional unit of consumption (say, a
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dollar) is worth less in terms of welfare to a rich person than to a poor
person. This means that, in determining which course of action leads to
the greatest total welfare, it is important to consider not just what leads to
the largest total wealth for society, but also the distribution of that wealth.
It would seem like an impossibly difficult task to work out what that
distribution would be.
According to orthodox economic theory, competitive markets will arrive
at a Pareto optimum distribution, the largest total amount of wealth.
Since it is the largest, it would be impossible to redistribute in such a way
as to make one person better off without making another worse off.
When economists refer to optimality, it is this situation they normally
mean. Since very few projects will produce only gainers and no losers, in
cost-benefit analysis, the potential Pareto optimum is instead used. The
potential Pareto is the distribution where the losers from the proposed
project are compensated for their losses by the gainers. Since a project is
only deemed worthy by cost-benefit analysis if the economic benefits
outweigh the economic costs, there will still be some money left over for
the gainers to keep. However, in practice losers are not compensated. The
entire logic behind cost-benefit analysis is lost.
Another problem is that even if a potential Pareto distribution was
achieved (by gainers compensating losers), if the original distribution did
not optimise welfare (rather than total wealth), the new distribution will
not either, except by fortuitous accident. That is because the redistribution
does not solve the problem of the sub-optimality of the earlier
distribution. It only compensates the losers from the new distribution for
the change.
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Cost-benefit analysis is central to neoclassical welfare economics. Welfare
economics, taking account of marginal utility theory, regards the best
distribution as the most egalitarian one that still maximises the total
income. Redistribution distorts the market and reduces total income, so
most economists oppose it. However, a certain amount of redistribution
would actually increase total welfare even when reducing total income,
because it is redirecting income to those for whom the marginal utility of
an additional dollar is greater. In principle, it is possible to try to adjust
the results of cost-benefit analysis by weighting the effects on poorer
groups more than on wealthier groups, but this is rarely done.
Cost-benefit analysis of nature preservation relies on contingent
valuation surveys. In these surveys, ordinary people are asked how much
they personally would be prepared to pay for some environmental benefit
or to prevent some piece of environmental destruction. Based on the
average amount of money people say they would be prepared to pay,
economists calculate the total monetary value members of society place
on that aspect of the environment. If the economic benefits of a
development would exceed that sum, it is deemed to be of net benefit.
Many people have been doubtful about the validity of the conclusions of
contingent valuation surveys as they make assumptions that can be
challenged. Contingent valuation assumes that people perceive their
environment as a set of discrete objects that could be bought and sold. It
also assumes that value is essentially derived just from individual self-
interest. Certainly, these are assumptions that are taken as correct by
nearly all economists. But do ordinary citizens think that way? And do
they feel the questions they are asked are meaningful?
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It has been known for a long time that many people surveyed for
contingent valuation refuse to answer the questions. But what do the
people who do participate think? For the first time ever, people who had
taken part in a contingent valuation exercise were recently asked what
they thought about it by a separate team of researchers. It turned out that
the people valued nature as a common good, not in terms of money.
Many told the researchers that they felt they had been misled by the
economists, who had not told them how their answers would be used.
They thought that decisions about conservation should be based on open
democratic debate, rather than the results of secret questionnaires.15
These findings cast very serious doubt on the validity of contingent
valuation surveys.
Contingent valuation surveys were originally introduced as a way of
attempting to reform cost-benefit analysis so as to account for
environmental values. Traditional cost-benefit analysis ignores
environmental values entirely, and effectively gives them zero weight.
Even when separate environmental impact assessments are made as
well, such as for road-building schemes in Britain, planners tend to pay
them very little attention.16
Cost-benefit analysis attempts to use money as a common measuring rod
to express people's values. When resources are scarce, we have to make
decisions about how much to prioritise different choices. It is commonly
said that human life is "priceless", but in reality we are not prepared to
spend all our income on life-saving. Michael Jacobs asserts that no one
actually thinks a life is "worth" a certain amount of money.17 Human
lives are not saleable commodities. The use of money values for human
lives reflect that decisions must be taken between alternative states of
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affairs, and one must be regarded as more valuable than another. His
point is that 'value' in this context is simply a relative term expressing a
ranking between alternative states of affairs. It does not require any
connection with money or any other external scale of measurement.
Jacobs argues that irreversible environmental losses (like the extinction
of a species) are regarded by people in a similar way. He does not think it
is meaningful to say that the preservation of a particular species, say, is
'worth' less than a million dollars a year. It must be compared with the
alternatives. People might think that it was less valuable than spending a
million dollars to prevent a famine, but more valuable than spending a
million dollars on nuclear weapons.
Cost-benefit analysis and sustainability
The fundamental weakness with cost-benefit analysis from the viewpoint
of sustainability is that it is not really able to deal with the concept. In
Blueprint for a Green Economy, David Pearce proposed that in addition
to cost-benefit analysis, a sustainability constraint should exist as an
additional criterion for decision making. To simply forbid any project
which depleted natural capital would be stultifying, but part of the
proceeds from any proposed project that depleted natural capital should
be put into compensatory projects to maintain natural capital, such as
reforestation schemes.
Kerry Turner identified four levels of environmentalism in terms of
their attitude to cost-benefit analysis18 (probably inspired by Tim
O'Riordan's four-fold division19). Conventional cost-benefit analysis has
an 'exploitationist' world-view. It is based on a particular kind of
Humean individualist utilitarian framework which has no interest in
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considerations of equity. It views nature solely as a collection of goods
and services of instrumental value to human beings. The future value of
the environment is discounted and justified by the assumption that
economic growth will allow human-made capital to substitute for natural
capital.
The modified cost-benefit analysis proposed by environmental
economists has a 'conservationist' world-view. It requires maintaining a
constant stock of natural assets out of concern for future generations.
Turner claims that this is incompatible with utilitarianism, as it involves
conferring "rights" on members of future generations who do not yet
exist. It implies a contractarian moral philosophy, perhaps based on the
theories of John Rawls.
A 'conservationist' world-view protects nature only on the grounds that
human beings can benefit from its existence. The interests of non-
humans are not directly considered, although the conservation of natural
capital would tend to conserve the habitats of non-human life forms.
The radically modified cost-benefit analysis proposed by many
environmentalists puts environmental considerations before economic
ones. Economic analysis would be used only to indicate the most cost-
effective ways of achieving environmental goals. This 'moderate
preservationist' world-view would allow for some exploitation of
ecosystems as long as they remained 'healthy' and biologically diverse.
Turner links it to Aldo Leopold's 'land ethic'.20 Essentially, it gives value
to biological diversity, but not to individuals.
According to Turner, deep ecologists abandon cost-benefit analysis in
favour of granting intrinsic value to nature. Intrinsic value is
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independent of any usefulness to human beings. The aim becomes to
maximise the sum of intrinsic and instrumental values, or some variant
of this rule. One possibility would be to place intrinsic value above
instrumental value so that human society has to use the minimum of
resources in order not to deplete intrinsic value more than absolutely
necessary. Turner claims that such an approach might involve sacrificing
basic human values, including "fundamental rights to exist at an
acceptable standard of living."21
Turner argues that the incidental effect of maintaining constant natural
capital is to protect the values that are of concern to believers in the
intrinsic value of nature. Turner also claims (incorrectly, as I will explain
in the next chapter) that deep ecologists would find this unacceptable
because they believe that the moral ground lies with those who intend to
behave morally, not with those who obtain moral outcomes by pursuing
other rules of behaviour.
Conclusion
Conventional cost-benefit analysis appears unable to deal with the
implications of thinking about sustainable development. A concern for
intergenerational equity would at the very least require an additional
sustainability constraint to safeguard the interests of future generations,
as David Pearce proposed in 1989. In addition, the current practice of cost-
benefit analysis takes an approach to questions of intragenerational
distribution which is internally inconsistent.
The problems with cost-benefit analysis go beyond that, though. Basing
ethical decisions on economic value seems by its nature to skew decisions
so as to favour the interests of wealthy people in the present day. The
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interests of the poor, future generations and other species are all
discounted by the approach. The problem lies not simply in the practice of
cost-benefit analysis, but is really a result of the utilitarian ethical
framework of mainstream economics. The next chapter will argue that a
reform of mainstream economic theory to incorporate the concerns of
sustainability and sustainable development would involve replacing its
version of utilitarianism with a different ethical framework.
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The ethical framework of economic utilitarianism may be unable to cope
with the concerns of sustainability, but what should be put in its place?
The issue is about what we regard as ethically acceptable in terms of the
distribution of well-being, sacrifice and risks between rich and poor, the
present and the future, and humans and non-humans. That is an
enormous field of moral philosophy to consider. Fortunately for our
purposes, much of the recent debate has centred around the influence of
one work, John Rawls' A Theory of Justice.1 Rawls concentrated on the
issue of equity within generations in his work, putting forward a strong
critique of the utilitarian approach. It is not always appreciated how well
his approach can be extended to consider the issue of equity between
generations. The first part of this chapter outlines Rawls' ethical
framework for relations within and between generations, and goes on to
suggest implications for a Rawlsian approach to the ethics of
sustainability.
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Discussions of the rights of other species have concentrated on
consideration of Leopold's land ethic and more recently on deep ecology.
Michael Jacobs argues that strong sustainability would be as effective as an
ecocentric ethic in guaranteeing the preservation of species and their
habitats.2 The second part of this chapter examines such collectivist
ecocentric ethics and compares them with approaches based on
consideration of the interests of individuals. Collectivist ethical
approaches to the rights of other species are shown to involve attempts to
justify granting such rights in terms of human self-interest. I turn to Peter
Singer's3 arguments for equal consideration of the interests of all sentient
beings as a basis for an attempt to construct an ecocentric system of ethics
which is truly non-anthropocentric.
Ethics has been explained in evolutionary terms arising out of reciprocal
altruism of the kind also seen in other animals. From that perspective,
our ethics is ultimately based on genetic self-interest. An ethic of
sustainability can be justified in terms of evolutionarily-motivated
concern for the interests of descendants. However, although genetic self-
interest can explain much of human behaviour, it cannot explain
everything. Both Leopold and Singer have argued that there has been a
historical process of an 'expanding circle' of ethical concern from the tribe
to the ethnic group to the entire human race. Can it be expanded to
include the rest of the biosphere?
Utility or fairness?
There are basically two approaches to moral philosophy which have been
popular in the West since the nineteenth century. One has been
utilitarianism, the other has been contractarianism. The whole idea of
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equity as a fundamental principle is alien to utilitarianism, which seeks
primarily to maximise the total amount of happiness (utility). The very
idea of intergenerational equity is therefore contrary to utilitarianism,
which largely explains why mainstream economists, who are classical
utilitarians through and through, have had such difficulty in coming to
terms with it.
Contractarian moral philosophies, like Rousseau's and Kant's, had an
enormous influence in the eighteenth century Enlightenment and
continued to be highly influential in continental Europe. But in English-
speaking countries, the utilitarian philosophies developed by Bentham,
Mill and Sidgwick for a time became extremely influential among the
intellectual elites. What is more, because of the interest the utilitarian
philosophers had in economics, their moral assumptions were adopted
by economists throughout the capitalist world as the only rational
approach.
The aim of classical utilitarianism is to maximise total utility. Jeremy
Bentham put it as "the greatest good for the greatest number." The idea
utilitarians had was that it was possible to create a 'calculus of utility',
working out what would be the gains and losses in happiness over time
resulting from any particular action. The morally correct action would be
the one that would lead to the greatest increase in total happiness.
One well known objection to classical utilitarianism was that it seemed to
call for an increase in population until the point where the increase in
total happiness (marginal utility) of each additional person was only
slightly greater than zero. What that would mean was a world with an
enormous, but overcrowded and impoverished, population. Surely,
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critics said, there was something wrong here? One utilitarian who agreed
was John Stuart Mill. He put forward an alternative conception of
utilitarianism, where the aim was the greatest average, not total, utility.
Most philosophers, and many other people, continued to find
utilitarianism morally obnoxious. Acts which, on balance, lead to an
increase in average utility are regarded as moral, regardless of the
suffering they may cause to innocent individuals. The dignity of the
individual counts for nothing in utilitarianism. This was brilliantly
satirised by Aldous Huxley in Brave New WorldA
The weakness of the utilitarians' opponents was that, although they had
good arguments against utilitarian morality, they could not put forward a
similarly broad social theory, or one that did not seem to rely on highly
subjective judgements. John Rawls countered utilitarianism by reviving
Kant's tradition of contractarian moral theory in a modern form. He
started by considering what kind of social arrangements free and rational
people would agree to in an original position of equality. This
hypothetical situation would take place behind a 'veil of ignorance'. They
would not know their place in society, their class, their natural abilities,
the society's level of economic development or what generation they
lived in. They would not even know what their personal conception of
the good life would be. The veil of ignorance would prevent individuals
or groups from being able to engineer the structure of society on the basis
of particular interests. A society based on principles that would be agreed
in this original position could be seen as 'fair' for all.
Rawls argued that people in his original position would choose a society
based on two principles. The first would be of the most extensive basic
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liberties for each person consistent with a similar liberty for others. The
second would be that social and economic inequalities of outcome, such
as inequalities of wealth and authority, are just only if they result in
compensating benefits for everyone, and in particular for the worst off.
The principles rule out justifying institutions on the grounds that
hardships for some are offset by greater good for others. Rawls claimed
that it is unjust for some people to have less so that other people can be
better off, but it is not unjust for some people to be better off than others
provided that the situation of the less fortunate is improved by the
inequality. The idea was that since everybody's well-being depends on
cooperation, without which nobody could have a satisfactory life, the
division of advantages should be of a kind that everyone, including the
worst off, could accept. Greater natural ability or being born into a better
social position are not deserved, he said, and inequality of outcome can
only be justified to the worse off if they benefit in absolute terms from it.
Rawls' second principle is a maximin rule. He drew from game theory to
support his claim that his original position is one where the rational
strategy is maximin. A maximin strategy is best in situations of
uncertainty where probabilities are difficult to predict, when it is not
worthwhile to take a risk of a poor outcome for a particularly good one,
and when some potential outcomes are particularly poor. All three
conditions apply to the original position.
Rawls pointed to a paradox in utilitarianism: "when society is conceived
as a system of cooperation designed to advance the good of its members, it
seems quite incredible that some citizens should be expected, on the basis
of political principles, to accept lower prospects of life for the sake of
others."5 Rawls argued that utilitarianism requires self-sacrifice by the
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most disadvantaged members of society for the benefit of the more
fortunate. Would anyone who might actually find themself in this
situation be prepared to agree to it?
Rawls claimed that the fundamental problem with utilitarianism is that
it does not take seriously the distinction between individuals. The
principle of rational choice for one person - to maximise happiness - is
taken as the principle of social choice as well. Utilitarianism sums all
individuals into an infinitely sympathetic and impartial spectator. The
spectator is one self who includes all desires and satisfactions within one
experience while imaginatively identifying with all the members of
society. Only a perfect altruist would be capable of doing this. To choose to
live in a utilitarian society, you would have to be a perfect altruist.
Utilitarianism may be the choice of an outside observer, but actual
human beings would be incapable of living that way.
However, Rawls' claim that the difference principle is the most rational
choice from behind the veil of ignorance has been widely criticised by
other philosophers. The difference principle is the most inequality-averse
choice of a range of distribution schemes that could be chosen. A
utilitarian distribution would be the least inequality-averse choice. In
between lie an infinite number of distributions offering different trade¬
offs between average welfare and equality.
Equity between generations
So much for Rawls' discussion of equity between individuals, but what
about equity between generations? He saw this as being a particularly
difficult problem for any ethical system. His discussion of
intergenerational equity preceded currents concerns about the global
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environment, and was mostly concerned with the rate of savings. Even
so, Rawls' ideas about intergenerational equity are still quite interesting.
Rawls' aim was to maximise the long-term prospects of the least favoured
over future generations. Each generation should not only preserve the
benefits of culture and civilization it inherited, but also set something
aside for capital accumulation. Rawls argued that, although it might seem
that the least-favoured first generation would have no obligation to save
for later generations, actually justice between generations should not
follow his difference principle in the same way as for justice within a
generation. That was because there is no way for later generations to help
or harm earlier generations: "We can do something for posterity, but it
can do nothing for us. This situation is unalterable, and so the question of
justice does not arise."6
He looked at the problem of the savings rate between generations from
the standpoint of the original position: "The parties do not know to
which generation they belong, or what comes to the same thing, the stage
of civilization of their society."7 People in the original position would ask
themselves what they would think would be a fair savings rate at each
stage of civilization, without knowing what stage they would live in.
Rawls thought that at times when people were poor and savings difficult,
a low rate would be required. In a wealthier society, the real burden of a
higher rate of saving would be lower. Once the society had become
wealthy and developed enough to have acquired all the institutions of
Rawlsian justice, the savings rate would fall to zero. He did not see the
goal of society as great wealth, but liberty and justice for all. He felt that
beyond a certain level wealth would become a distraction or even a
temptation to indulgence.
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Each generation would save in order to enable the next generation to
enjoy a better life. Each generation, except the first, would benefit from
previous capital accumulation. So the people in the original position,
who might find themselves at any stage of civilization, would consider
what would be a fair savings rate at any point in history. They could then
apply the appropriate rate for their generation.
It seems to me that the biggest problem with Rawls' approach to
intergenerational equity is the conceptual difficulty people have with it.
John Pezzey said to me:
I've heard endless arguments about the philosophy of
intergenerational equity and they all come back to some sense of,
well, if you were forced to choose between where you are now and
some sort of future generation then might you think differently,
and might that not be cause to consider what would be a fair thing
to do. And the answer that I always come out with is that is such a
hypothetical consideration that it would be meaningless to most
people. I don't know whether you've studied Rawlsian philosophy
at all. I have this fairly naive reaction that at least it is in some
sense physically possible to conceive of taking you from your
current economic and social position and swapping you with some
bum on the streets or queen in her palace... We could. It would
violate all sort of human rights or whatever, but we could
physically conceive of it happening... Time travel doesn't exist. You
cannot switch yourself with someone a hundred years ago or a
hundred years in the future. That's a different hypothesis. You're
being asked to hypothesise something that's completely infeasible.
There is not going to be any kind of intergenerational contract.
This notion of getting different generations to meet behind a veil
of ignorance, it's so bizarre that I can't attach any great significance
to it. (John Pezzey, University College London, 23.3.94)
Pezzey is surely right that trying to apply contract theory to
intergenerational equity seems bizarre. The Kantian imperative to do to
others as you would be done by makes some practical sense when others
are in a position to retaliate. But there is no way to enforce any kind of
intergenerational contract. Even so, Pezzey has written that it is very hard
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to give a reason for caring about potential people in future centuries
other than by appealing to basic intuitive notions of fairness.
In fact, there is a difference between Rawls' treatment of justice within
generations and justice between generations. For justice within a
generation Rawls' theory of 'justice as fairness' is to imagine a
procedurally fair way for a group of people who did not care for each
other's welfare to agree on a structure for society that defended everyone's
interests. But Rawls' thought experiment could never be conducted in
real life because the participants would know what their actual personal
attributes were and would be influenced by that knowledge.
The difference in the case of justice between generations is not so much
the impossibility of a meeting between generations, but the impossibility
of enforcement of any intergenerational contract. Without a time
machine, later generations are absolutely powerless to retaliate against a
non-cooperative earlier generation. Rawls himself saw this fact
preventing the inclusion of members of different generations in the
original position. However, one of his students, David Richard, did not
accept this view.8 He argued that a person's generational position is a
morally arbitrary fact in the same way as their sex or race. It is a question
of whether justice is a matter of mutual advantage or a matter of equal
consideration.
There are difficulties in extending the original position to a meeting
between generations, but it is interesting to consider the idea. As Brian
Barry has pointed out,9 Rawls' treatment of justice between generations
assumes that if each generation cares for its children, all will be well. He
does not consider the possibility of doing things that might not have
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negative effects for several generations. But Barry does not think through
the implications of this comment. Rawls rejected the idea of applying the
difference principle to justice between generations on the grounds that
the poorest first generation would not save to allow later generations to
become more prosperous.
We now know that the issue of justice between generations is much
more complicated. There is no reason to suppose that the first generation
is necessarily going to be the worst-off one. Wilfred Beckerman claims
that the strict application of Rawlsian principles to justice between
generations would either lead to all generations sharing the poverty of
the first, or "if we can rely on technical progress without savings and
capital accumulation, earlier generations would be justified in running
down their initial endowment of natural capital."10 But Beckerman is
assuming that "technical progress" can occur without any investment,
and that natural capital can be expended without negative effects on
future generations. The first assumption is impossible, the second merely
extremely improbable, depending on an extremely high rate of technical
progress capable of solving all problems indefinitely.
When you think about what Rawlsian principles would mean
intergenerationally, it becomes clear that the choices of each generation
influence which future generations, if any, exist. It is perfectly reasonable
to stick to Rawls' idea that the people in the original position do not
know which generation they belong to. Not knowing which generation
they belong to, it is their job to draw up the principles they would be
prepared to live by if all other generations lived by them too. However,
we have to consider not only the generations which will actually exist,
but all the potential generations which might exist. Beckerman objects
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that temporally different generations cannot be represented because the
choice in the original position will determine how many generations
exist. This is an example of a literal-minded misunderstanding that many
philosophers have also fallen into when discussing Rawls. The whole
point of the original position is as a device to force the reader to consider
what kind of structures they would agree to live under if they did not
know where in those structures they would actually end up.
When you consider justice between generations, it turns out that just as
the difference principle would imply no savings, utilitarianism would
imply a very high savings rate of about fifty percent.11 Rawls' idea was
that the savings rate should start out very low in a poor society, rise as
incomes rose, and then fall away to zero when a prosperous society had
emerged. Rawls saw no value in an extremely affluent society, as it
implied an emphasis on materialist and consumerist values. If you
imagine yourself in the original position, not knowing which generation
you would belong to, this slight deviation from the difference principle is
not so unreasonable, because very large economic benefits accrue to later
generations for the sake of a small sacrifice from the earliest generations,
thanks to the power of exponential increase.
When you consider environmental risks, which Rawls ignored, the
difference principle re-emerges as a sensible strategy under situations of
uncertainty where the actual risks are unknown. In this case, it is the
difference principle not between members of the same generation or
between different generations. It is the difference principle between
potential worlds. In other words, it seems to me that you would want
your predecessors to have chosen the path of development with the best
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worst-case outcome for your generation. The first rule to fall out of this
would be the precautionary principle.
Genes for the future?
An alternative approach to sustainability, pioneered by John Pezzey,12 is
by appealing to genetically-based motivations. Human beings generally
show a great deal of concern for their children's futures. But Dennis
Meadows told me: "They do care about their children. They don't care
about anybody else's children." This is a common sceptical response to
the claim that people care about the future. The general point was dealt
with by Herman Daly and John Cobb:
Your great-great grandchild will also be the great-great grandchild
of fifteen other people in the current generation, many of their
identities now unknown. Presumably your great-great grandchild's
well being will be as much an inheritance from each of these
fifteen others as from yourself. Therefore it does not make sense
for you to worry too much about your particular descendant, or to
take any particular action on his or her behalf. The farther in the
future is the hypothetical descendant, the greater the number of co-
progenitors in the present generation, and consequently more in
the nature of a public good is any provision made for the distant
future. To the extent that you are concerned about the welfare of
your descendant, you should also be concerned about the welfare of
all those in the present generation from whom, for good or ill,
your descendant will inherit. Thus a concern for future
generations should reinforce rather than weaken the concern for
present justice - contrary to what is often supposed.13
Daly and Cobb argue that the consequence of sexual reproduction is
towards community concern and away from individualism. John Pezzey
makes the rather different point that it is sexual reproduction which
makes concern for the future a public good, rather than something to be
left to individuals.14 He speculated that we discount the future to reflect
the dilution of our genes over the generations. Pezzey developed a
mathematical model which shows that the 'mating externalities' of
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sexual reproduction would tend to lead individuals to reduce their
bequests to their children below the 'socially optimal' rate that would be
calculated in traditional economic models which assume asexual
reproduction. Pezzey showed that even when considering the welfare of
the next generation or two, sexual reproduction introduces externalities
that can lead to the future being treated in a sub-optimal (let alone
unsustainable) way. Sexual reproduction makes sustainability and the
welfare of your descendants a public good. The nature of the situation
means that individuals' concern for their children is not enough;
sustainability is a public good which requires public policies to influence
behaviour.
It seems that the genetic dilution caused by sexual reproduction may
make it a rational strategy for individuals to discount the welfare of
future generations in personal decisions, but also makes it rational for
individuals who care about the long-term success of their genes to
support the collective welfare of the group their descendants will breed
within. Such arguments have been used by evolutionary psychologists to
explain the evolution of morality.
The distinction between private and public choices, between situations
where free-riding is easy and where it is hard, is the difference between
being a consumer and being a citizen. Michael Jacobs has argued that
while it is rational to discount the future as a consumer, it is not rational
to do so as a citizen.15
The idea of genetic dilution makes things more complicated, though.
When people think about the situation of their descendants, they tend to
think of people in a similar relative social position to themselves. But in
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industrialised societies, class structures are not so rigid between
generations. New Right thinkers like Hayek have used this point to
support the idea that large inequalities of wealth reflect differences in
individual effort and ability, rather than social oppression. So they call for
us to leave the distribution of wealth to the invisible hand of the market,
as classical utilitarianism does. However, the New Right elevates the
freedom of bequest to the status of a basic human right, which
undermines economic efficiency (and social justice) by creating a class
system. The choice of rich people who want genetic success would be a
rigid class system. People at the bottom of the social scale would want a
socialist revolution tomorrow to increase their immediate genetic
success. The bulk of people between the two extremes would want a social
minimum to protect their less fortunate descendants. But they would not
want such an inequality-averse society as the Rawlsian one, as that would
not serve the interests of their more fortunate descendants.
In a society with reasonably open breeding patterns, the long-term genetic
interests of the individual converge over several generations with the
interests of the entire future society. It would be highly irrational to
favour any policy which might conceivably threaten the long-term
survival of the genetic group, still less the species. In fact, the rational
strategy to support would be a maximin one which chose the approach to
the economy and the environment where the best of the worst
conceivable outcomes was chosen. Mainstream economists, such as
Partha Dasgupta, would consider this strategy highly 'risk-averse', but that
is only because, just as economic utilitarianism fails to take seriously the
difference between the individual and society, it fails to take seriously the
difference between the individual and the species.
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No matter how seriously you take arguments from genetic self-interest, it
should be clear that there is something very irrational about risking the
extinction of our species for potential economic advantage. When Partha
Dasgupta suggested discounting the benefit of economic developments by
the percentage of the risk of their making the human race extinct, he
unwittingly showed how unreal mainstream economics is. Such a view
comes from the economic approach of summing all possible futures from
any set of policies and then looking to see which set of policies gives the
highest average income across different futures. The extinction of the
human race counts as an outcome leading to zero income.
It might be objected that taking such extreme risks is not unknown. We
took the risk of extinction in the Cold War nuclear arms race. It was a
strategy satirised as saying "better dead than red." It wasn't a situation that
was freely chosen, though. It arose by historical accident. The approach
mainstream economics takes to environmental issues is to choose the
risk of extinction rather than give up the possibility of a higher income. It
seems to miss the point that the extinction of the human race is quite a
serious thing to risk for the possibility of greater economic gain: "better
dead than green" could be the motto.
Survivability is the approach which sets as its first priority the avoidance
of human extinction. It will not accept a 'zeromin' strategy, to risk
evolutionary suicide. A maximin strategy leads not to sustainability
directly, though. It leads to the precautionary principle. The precautionary
principle avoids taking any environmental risks which may be
irreversible. It is tied to the idea of at least the absolute preservation of
critical natural capital or the general preservation of natural capital. The
precautionary principle is a radical departure from conventional practice.
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Remarkably, it was adopted by the environment ministers of the North
Sea countries at the Bergen Conference in 1988. The story of the decision
to build the Oresund bridge between Denmark and Sweden is a clear
example of how it has not been implemented. The loss of bird life and the
risk to the long-term water flow in the Baltic were over-ridden for the
perceived economic benefits of a road link.
Economists like Beckerman ridicule the precautionary principle. They ask
why we should forgo certain economic benefits (for example, more trade
between Central Europe and Scandinavia) because of a small risk of
major environmental damage. Such a "risk-averse" approach is stupid,
they say. And, although the Swedish environment minister resigned in
protest at the Oresund bridge decision, that seems to have also been the
view of the mainstream of even the Swedish government.
A supporter of the precautionary principle could draw an analogy with
nuclear power. Risking environmental disasters on the scale of
something like the Chernobyl accident is a stupid gamble,
environmentalists say. The claimed benefits are outweighed by the risks
involved. In situations of large but indeterminate risks, the prudent
approach is to keep risk under control. If you take a large number of such
risks, you can be sure some will rebound very badly - risks accumulate, so
that taking a large number of small risks is equivalent to taking a big risk.
Are the risks worth taking? The precautionary principle puts preventing
irreversible environmental damage above potential economic benefits. It
gives priority to the environment rather than the economy.
Many environmentalists go beyond the ethics of sustainability and the
precautionary principle as an argument for environmental preservation.
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They take up an ecocentric position, arguing that other species and the
natural world as a whole have value in themselves well beyond the
benefits that human beings derive from their existence. These arguments
are often used in support of a moral framework like Leopold's land ethic
or the philosophy of deep ecology.
Anthropocentrism and ecocentrism
Michael Jacobs argues that the anthropocentric goal of sustainability, to
maintain the environment for the sake of future generations of human
beings, would conserve the species, and to a large extent the ecosystems,
that an ecocentric ethic would wish to see preserved.16 He emphasises
that sustainability would in practice lead to a view of environmental
protection that would have much more in common with an ecocentric
standpoint than with an approach based on valuation. That is because
sustainability (or at least 'strong' sustainability, which preserves natural
capital) does not see the benefit of the environment in solely economic
terms. Similarly, Kerry Turner argues that strong sustainability is similar
to the Land Ethic.17
Jacobs is sympathetic to an ecocentric approach. He writes that the attitude
of 'reverence for nature' which is the foundation for an ecocentric view is
almost certainly essential psychologically and culturally for
environmental protection. The problem he identifies is that so far no
coherent ecocentric philosophy has been worked out. Jacobs points out
that an environmental ethic based solely on protecting individuals (like
animal rights philosophy or, Jacobs seems to think, deep ecology ) would
fail to preserve an endangered species whose members were in
competition with members of another species. An environmental ethic
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concerned only with ecosystems (like the Land Ethic) might be prepared
to sacrifice human lives for the health of the ecology.
Jacobs is right that no satisfactory ecocentric ethic has yet been developed,
but I will argue that it is not for the reasons he supposes. Deep ecology,
although it is derived from the Land Ethic, does give value to both the
individual and the collective. Its weakness is that its principle of
'biocentric egalitarianism in principle' seems to make moral choices
impossible.
The Land Ethic
In his book A Sand County Almanac,18 Aldo Leopold argued that "we
abuse land because we regard it as a commodity belonging to us. When
we see land as a community to which we belong, we may begin to use it
with love and respect." The land ethic stated that "a thing is right when it
tends to preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic
community. It is wrong when it tends otherwise."19 The Land Ethic
restricts its concern to the healthy functioning of entire ecosystems. Its
ethical concern is in a sense an extension of enlightened self-interest. It
has no concern for the well-being of individual beings or species that do
not play an important role in its functioning.
Leopold's position was somewhat ambiguous on this question. At times
he appears to be arguing that belief in such an ethic on the part of land
owners and users is necessary to maintain the land in the long term for
human benefit. At other times Leopold appears to be arguing for the land
ethic as a matter of species' rights as members of the "biotic community".
A careful reading of Leopold's equivocations tends to support the view
that Leopold valued the existence of species for their own sake rather
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than for long-term human interests. At one point Leopold says: "When
one of these non-economic categories is threatened, and if we happen to
love it, we invent subterfuges to give it economic importance."20 He
gives the example that at the beginning of the century songbirds were
supposed to be disappearing. Ornithologists put forward "distinctly
shaky" evidence that the birds were necessary to control insects. He
concludes: "It is painful to read these circumlocutions today. We have no
land ethic yet, but we have at least drawn nearer the point of admitting
that birds should continue as a matter of biotic right, regardless of the
presence or absence of economic advantage to us."21
On almost the last page of A Sand County Almanac, Leopold reveals that
he places what is now called 'existence value' on remote wilderness he
will never see: "Is my share in Alaska worthless to me because I shall
never go there?"22 The distinction Leopold has drawn between economic
and non-economic interests is revealed as a cover for his biocentric ethic.
Leopold uses it in an attempt to blur the more radical distinction between
the interests of the human community and the interests of the rest of the
biotic community.
It seems that Leopold was trying to smuggle out a biocentric ethic within
anthropocentric justifications. J. Baird Callicott defended a prudential
interpretation of the land ethic,23 quoting Leopold's remark that "the
path to social expediency is not discernible to the average individual."24
Andrew McLaughlin puzzles over the reason why both Leopold and
Callicott, "who both clearly have a deep love and respect for the land"25
should assume that others are incapable of their sense of self-
identification with the natural world and need prudential arguments.
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A thought experiment
It seems to me that the key problem for attempts to promote a non-
anthropocentric ethic is economic, rather than philosophical. I will
attempt to explain why by use of a thought experiment. Imagine that it
turns out that there really is life on Mars. What arguments exist to
support an ethical relationship with such alien life forms? Certainly the
kind of prudential arguments and appeals to membership of the "biotic
team" put forward by Leopold would not work. It might be possible to
argue that these life-forms were so scientifically valuable that they must
be protected for that reason. But it seems very likely that most people
would support the protection of Martians from development for the
same reason that they have supported the protection of Antarctica,
despite its remoteness and inaccessibility for them. Most people in
contemporary Western societies value parts of nature for their own sake,
regardless of utility to themselves personally.26 It is only when its
protection is strongly contrary to their own perceived interests that they
do not. It is unlikely we would suffer any noticeable ecological effects
globally if pandas or elephants disappeared. Chinese peasants and African
poachers would notice their loss more directly. But they have short-term
economic interests contrary to preservation.
The Martians would be entirely alien life forms that we could claim no
evolutionary kinship with, and which we could exterminate with
impunity. The arguments generally put forward for an ecocentric ethic
would not apply to them. We would value the Martians enormously
because they were so different from us. It is not simply the value to
science, but a spiritual value, that would be felt. The discovery of life on
Mars, ironically, would make us conscious of how valuable to people
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biological diversity is for its own sake. What masks that fact presently is
the strength of economic and other anthropocentric arguments put
forward for interference with other life forms.
Leopold's arguments are subterfuges to give anthropocentric, if not
economic, importance to the biological diversity he valued. It is hard to
believe that he would have considered Martians outside the ethical circle,
even though they clearly could not be part of our biotic community. It
should be clear that the 'community' argument is also subtly
anthropocentric. It still argues that it is because of their being part of
something we ultimately need for our survival that we should value
other species. The anthropocentric/ecocentric split in environmental
ethics has strong parallels with the division between frameworks for
inter-human morality based on mutual benefit and on equal
consideration. What Leopold was trying to do was political: provide an
anthropocentric justification for his biocentric ethic.
Deep ecology
Deep ecology holds that the well-being and flourishing of non-human
life on Earth have value in themselves, independent of the usefulness of
the non-human world for human purposes.27 Much of the confusion
about deep ecology comes from misinterpretations made by critics because
of the tendency of its founder, Arne Naess28 (and others since) to use the
liberal individualist language of "rights" metaphorically in describing
what is an extremely holistic philosophy. Warwick Fox explains the basis
of deep ecology (or transpersonal ecology, as he prefers to call it) in terms
of the unity of all phenomena.29 Deep ecology has at its heart Gandhi's
idea of "self-realisation". According to Gandhi, true self-realisation comes
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in selfless action, in identification with others and the finding that your
own individual self-realisation cannot be separated from the self-
realisation of those around you. Gandhi was once asked if his aim in
settling in a village and serving the villagers was purely humanitarian.
Gandhi replied: "I am here to serve no one else but myself, to find my
own self-realisation through the service of these village folk."30 Gandhi
drew on the tradition of Mahayana Buddhism, rather than traditional
Hinduism, teaching that the further along the path to liberation a human
being proceeds, the greater the identification and compassion for others
and therefore the greater the effort to help others along the same path.
Gandhi identified with all living beings and the Earth itself, and sought
to minimise his exploitation of other beings as far as possible. Naess's
deep ecology is inspired by Gandhi's practice of life.
The land ethic and deep ecology share the attribution of ethical value to
non-human life. Both share the view that we cannot draw the sharp
boundaries between human interests and the interests of non-humans
that anthropocentric ethics do. Where deep ecology differs from the land
ethic is that it takes the non-anthropocentric principle much further. The
concern of the land ethic stops at the level of the whole ecosystem. It is
concerned for the maintenance of healthy climax ecosystems. It is
prepared to accept management for human ends, provided the ecosystem
as a whole remains healthy. Deep ecology is concerned for all levels of the
system.
One distinctive feature of deep ecology compared to other forms of
ecocentrism is its emphasis on an approach to life, rather than an ethical
system. Deep ecology has attracted a good deal of criticism, in particular
for 'biocentric egalitarianism'. Many critics (for example, Redclift,31 Porritt
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and Winner,32 Bookchin,33 Daly and Cobb,34 Jacobs35) have argued that
we cannot give, say, an earthworm or a dandelion or an AIDS virus equal
rights to a human being. They claim that human beings are much more
important and valuable than these entities. However, this argument
against deep ecology is based on a misunderstanding. Deep ecology does
not really grant equal "rights" to all beings, but rather gives equal
consideration to the interests of all entities. One way to understand the
distinction is by drawing on the writings of the animal liberationist Peter
Singer. Deep ecologists and animal liberationists are well known for their
mutual dislike. But the bitterness of their dispute is reminiscent in some
ways of the struggles between small leftist groups. The bitterness is
because they share so many beliefs that the disagreements that remain are
all the more deeply felt.
Speciesism
Singer36 puts forward the idea that it is "speciesist", by analogy with
sexism and racism, to deny certain rights to members of other species
solely on the grounds that they are not human beings. Species, like sex
and race, is not a morally relevant criterion alone. The criteria commonly
proposed by defenders of our treatment of animals like rationality, self-
awareness, language, the capacity to enter into contracts, the capacity to
understand one's own mortality, are too restrictive for the purpose of
justifying the exclusion of animals from moral considerability. We grant
rights to many human beings - infants, the severely mentally
handicapped and the senile - who are no more capable of these
supposedly unique human attributes. We do not perform painful
experiments on them, or hunt them for sport, or eat them. Singer goes on
to argue that the morally relevant criterion for the treatment of other
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animals is awareness and hence the capacity to suffer. To be logically
consistent, we must grant equal consideration to the suffering of other
animals. Not to do so is speciesist. Equal consideration is not the same as
equal rights. It would be absurd to grant a dog the right to vote or to
freedom of speech. That is no different from the way that it would be
absurd to grant men the right to have an abortion.
The individual versus the collective
Deep ecologists accept much of the animal liberationist argument in
principle. They challenge two aspects - the insistence that sentience is the
sole basis for moral consideration, and the limitations of what they see as
merely an attempt to extend liberal principles to individual animals.
Why should sentience be the basis of moral considerability? Singer argues
that an entity must be aware of its interests to have them. Deep ecologists
counter that plants and animals like jellyfish may not be aware that they
have interests, but they behave as though they have them. They
internally regulate their homeostasis, actively avoid noxious stimuli and
seek positive stimuli. Sentience is merely the capacity to mentally express
interests. The crucial characteristic seen as the basis of moral
considerability in this approach is the capacity for autopoiesis (self-
production). Living entities are primarily and continuously concerned
with the regeneration of their own organisational activity and structure.
They act as Kantian 'ends in themselves'. What better basis is there for
thinking that something matters for itself?37
Deep ecologists also object to animal liberationists' emphasis on the
individual. They consider the possibility of animal liberationist logic of
minimising suffering leading to human beings attempting to make
227
carnivores herbivorous, or at least killing their prey in a humane fashion
before feeding it to them. Singer actually does not take his argument that
far. He does not believe that it is viable for human beings to attempt to
control nature like that.
Deep ecologists consider that response to be an evasion on Singer's part.
Their argument is that predators and prey have co-evolved. Lions and
antelopes would not be lions and antelopes if they were not engaged in
their ecological relationships. The relationship has evolved over
millions of years and been "flattened" into their genes. It determines the
kind of beings they are physically and behaviourally. Although
individual antelopes might not feel about it this way, the relationship of
the two species is essential to their existence. Deep ecologists give priority
to ecological relationships (above the interests of individuals) and the
view that what an entity is cannot be divorced from those ecological
relationships.
Warwick Fox38 responded to criticisms from the animal rights
philosopher Tom Regan39 that a land or biospheric ethic amounts to
"environmental fascism", sacrificing individual organisms for the good
of the whole. Warwick Fox counters that a biospheric ethic logically
necessitates concern for individual organisms as well.
Leopold's land ethic is based on an intuitive grasp of the organismic
nature of ecosystems and the Earth as a whole. He saw ethics as self-
imposed limitations on freedom of action deriving from the recognition
that the individual is a member of a community of interdependent parts.
Leopold stated in an early essay that the Earth was alive, "vastly less alive
than ourselves in degree, but vastly greater than ourselves in time and
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space" and "a moral being respects a living thing."40 Leopold
concentrated at the level of individual ecosystems, while James Lovelock
more recently has concentrated at the level of the biosphere, or Gaia.41
Gaia is a vast autopoietic system, or a superorganism. Fox argues:
If "wholes" such as ecosystems and the ecosphere are considered to
be worthy of moral consideration by virtue of the fact that they
have interests of an intrinsic kind (namely, autopoietic interests or
interests in their own self-regeneration) then the moral
considerability of individual biological organisms is guaranteed
since the fact that these kinds of entities have interests of this kind
is even easier to establish. Thus, whatever their emphasis may
appear to be, proponents of ecosystem ethics and ecosphere ethics
are essentially engaged in making the point that it is not only
individual biological organisms that have interests and so are
worthy of moral consideration.42
The trouble that Fox places himself in here is that by giving logical
priority to the interests of individual organisms as 'autopoietic systems',
he would seem to be required to put the interests of individuals before
the rather abstract 'autopoietic system' that is an ecosystem. In other
words, he is not showing why we should leave predator-prey
relationships alone.
The confusion in deep ecology
What deep ecologists claim to value is 'Self-realization' - the well-being
and flourishing of all life (in its broadest sense) on Earth, and the richness
and diversity of that life. Therefore, value is placed on maintaining the
maximum degree of biological diversity, but also on the well-being and
flourishing of individual organisms. That includes the well-being and
flourishing of human beings. In his original 1973 essay, Arne Naess wrote
that human beings are as entitled to live and blossom as other species,
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and this inevitably necessitates some killing of, suffering by, and
interference with, the lives and habitats of other species.43
Deep ecologists have generally shied away from the fact that this requires
taking ethical decisions about which organisms are to be killed, suffer, or
be interfered with. Robyn Eckersley is a former student of Warwick Fox
who saw that this was a real problem for deep ecology as a practical
philosophy. She wrote:
In this respect, the degree of sentience of an organism and its
degree of self-consciousness and capacity for richness of experience
are relevant factors (as distinct from exclusive criteria) in any
ethical choice situation alongside other factors, such as whether a
particular species is endangered or whether a particular population
is crucial to the maintenance of a particular ecosystem.44
Eckersley is in a sense bringing back hierarchy to replace 'biocentric
egalitarianism'. But it seems undeniable that sentient beings have
interests that non-sentient beings do not. Their 'well-being and
flourishing' requires that these are taken into account. In taking
decisions, some entities will have interests that must be given priority
over the interests of others. Deep ecologists can object to that, but to
ignore it makes a nonsense of the idea that entities have interests. A
sensible ecocentrism would only require that equal consideration is given
to the interests of different entities, and that entities are not discriminated
against on irrelevant criteria.
Eckersley rejects criticisms that deep ecology is insensitive to the needs of
poor and oppressed human beings by collectively blaming the human
species as a whole for the ecological crisis, rather than specific nations,
groups or classes. She argues that since deep ecologists want human
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beings to achieve self-realisation (within ecological bounds), they
necessarily support social justice in the human community.
However, the sort of arguments deep ecologists give for why we should
not interfere with natural predation also suggest that human beings
should go back to live in our original ecological niche, as hunter-
gatherers. Attempts to 'better' our lives by growing crops, eliminating
diseases and generally using technology place us outside the natural
ecological relationships and boundaries we genetically evolved within. In
reality, of course, it would be completely impossible for several billion
human beings to live in that way. It is this kind of thinking that
underlies deep ecologists' calls for dramatic reductions in human
population. Most deep ecologists are not really 'neo-primitivists'45 and
want to hang on to many of the benefits technology has brought the
human race. Doing so, however, puts deep ecologists in an inconsistent
position because they are effectively renouncing biocentric egalitarianism
by allowing human beings to escape from the brutality of nature.
A further problem for deep ecology is that the claim that self-realisation
becomes 'Self-realization' through total identification with the rest of the
biosphere is implausible. A human being seeking self-realisation only
needs to pursue a policy of enlightened self-interest. It is very difficult to
imagine what it would mean psychologically to identify one's own
interests as identical with those of the entire biosphere. The idea that
identification avoids the need to develop an ethical system is surely false.
It would still be necessary to have some set of rules to decide which
interests in the biosphere to prioritise. How could an individual be able to
identify all the interests in the biosphere and then simply intuit the
'right' course of action? The claim itself seems an attempt to blur the
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difference between morality as enlightened self-interest and morality as
equal consideration of all interests.
Ecocentric ethics and the status of animals
Is it possible to construct an ecocentric ethic of equal consideration? More
importantly, must a morality based on equal consideration of interests be
non-anthropocentric? Peter Singer's arguments for equal consideration of
the interests of animals have made an enormous impact. Before he
wrote, philosophers had not critically considered conventional views on
the status of animals. They had tended to repeat traditional justifications
for the treatment animals receive from humans. Since Singer's
contribution, a great deal of discussion has gone on about the question of
whether or not animals have 'rights'. It is important to understand,
though, that Singer is a utilitarian, so he does not believe that either
animals or humans have 'rights', merely interests. Singer's ideas flow
from a famous statement by Jeremy Bentham, the founder of utilitarian
philosophy, on the moral status of animals: "The question is not, Can
they reason? nor Can they talk? but, Can they suffer?"46
Unlike Singer, Bentham did not object to humans killing animals to eat,
on the grounds that animals did not dread death in the way that humans
do, and that death at human hands was speedier and less painful than a
natural one. Singer, as is well known, advocates vegetarianism because of
the suffering to animals in farming and slaughter. He rejects Bentham's
argument here as not based on reality. Singer had originally argued
further that, even if animals could be reared for food in a way that gave
them good lives and slaughtered without fear or pain, the practice would
still be morally wrong, because it required the belief that bringing a being
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into existence confers a benefit on that being - and to think that, we have
to believe that it is possible to benefit a non-existent being. Singer
believed that was nonsense. Fifteen years later, in a new second edition,
he had changed his mind. He now thought that the killing of a sentient
being that lacked a sense of its own existence in the future might not be
inherently wrong if it was replaced by another being which would lead an
equally pleasant life, although he thought the idea had an "air of
peculiarity".47
Singer's ideas about the status of animals have been challenged by more
radical 'animal rights' philosophers, such as Tom Regan,48 who think
that he does not go far enough. But even as they stand, Singer's
arguments suggest a quite revolutionary change in our treatment of both
captive and wild animals. That is because the way humans treat animals
at present takes virtually no account of their interests. Few people today
accept Descartes' idea that animals are incapable of suffering because they
are merely unconscious automata (only humans having souls). The
Cartesians thought that the screams of a dog being cut open were merely
"the ghost in the machine". The notion goes against both logic and all
that we know about physiology.
Michael Leahy is one of the three or four philosophers who has
attempted to refute Singer and Regan, defending our present treatment of
animals.49 He has argued that animals may be conscious, but they cannot
think - they lack beliefs or desires. The evidence for this is taken to be that
animals lack language, and it is claimed that Ludwig Wittgenstein had
showed that language is necessary for thought. A little reflection should
make it clear that although human thoughts are normally expressed in a
language and there are certain kinds of thoughts that require language or
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symbols, there is no reason why language is necessary in order to have
beliefs or desires. Observation of animals shows that although they lack
language, many species act in ways that can only be explained if they have
beliefs.50 Leahy accuses the psychologists and ethologists who have drawn
such conclusions of anthropomorphism. They are wrong to think that
animals have beliefs, apparently, because they have not realised that
Wittgenstein showed it was impossible. Leahy's position is that the only
kind of suffering animals can experience is physical pain - although they
suffer that less than we usually think, he asserts. Animals cannot
experience fear, for instance, because that would imply a degree of self-
consciousness he claims they cannot have.
In terms of environmental ethics, it is really quite easy to show a very
strong case for believing that animals have interests in their own welfare
and that their existence is a good thing in itself (in other words, that the
lives of animals have intrinsic value). It is clear that consideration for the
interests of animals flows directly from the philosophy of utilitarianism.
An anthropocentric utilitarianism that ignores the interests of animals,
the kind normally practised by economists, simply contradicts its own
philosophical basis.
Contractual theories of ethics have more difficulty incorporating animals
because animals are incapable of negotiating moral contracts, or acting as
moral agents. Tom Regan51 takes up Singer's arguments about the
similarity between the moral status of animals and of human beings who
are incapable of acting as moral agents, such as the mentally handicapped
or young children. Regan uses the idea of moral patients, beings who are
not moral agents, but still are capable of desires and suffering. He attacks
Immanuel Kant's idea that we can regard animals as means not ends, and
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cannot wrong them directly. Maltreating animals is only wrong because it
may lead people to maltreat other people. Kant's argument for why
human beings are ends in themselves depends on the status of human
beings as moral agents. The result is that Kant either (a) thought that
young children and mentally handicapped people could be sadistically
tortured without doing them wrong directly, or (b) that their status as
human beings meant they could not be tortured without doing them
wrong. Kant seems to have thought (b), but was clearly being logically
inconsistent, because his theory of justice included only moral agents. If
he thought (a), he would have not been inconsistent, but morally
arbitrary. The arbitrariness is because there seems no good reason for
supposing that the reason it is wrong to torture small children is since it
may lead to torturing older people.
Kant's argument has been recycled by Michael Leahy52 in his attempt to
refute animals rights philosophy. Leahy argues that only moral agents
can have rights, so animals cannot have rights. He gets round the
problem of the status of human beings who lack moral agency by arguing
that human beings as moral agents are free to include other human
beings who are not moral agents in their circle of ethical concern. Leahy's
position grants rights to human moral patients by arbitrary fiat. Leahy
simply ignores Regan's refutation of Kant (although he disputes other
points Regan made in the same book) and in this way manages to avoid
tackling the central argument of animal rights philosophy. Leahy
conveniently concludes that we can use animals for any purpose we
want, as long as human society accepts it.
John Rawls excluded animals from his theory of justice. He considered
the question of whether it is necessary to be a moral agent in order to be
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entitled to justice. He concluded at one point that it was not necessary for
a being to have a sense of justice in order to be entitled to justice. At
another point on the same page he wrote that because creatures without a
sense of justice would be unable to take part in the original position "we
are not required to give strict justice to creatures lacking this capacity."53 If
we are not required to give them strict justice, what is required? Rawls
thinks that we have a duty not to be cruel to animals. But since animals
have been excluded from the original position, it is not clear why rational
self-interested people would agree to this. However, Rawls includes
within the scope of justice human beings who lack a sense of justice
because they have not yet developed it, or have temporarily lost it. Rawls
thinks that this "seems necessary to match our considered judgements"
about the rights of children, and also that "regarding the potentiality as
sufficient accords with the hypothetical nature of the original position,
and with the idea that as far as possible the choice of principles should
not be influenced by arbitrary contingencies. Therefore it is reasonable to
say that those who could take part in the initial agreement, were it not for
fortuitous circumstances, are assured equal justice."54 This is a move
away from a strict commitment to the idea that only beings with a sense
of justice are entitled to justice. Brian Barry comments "if a day-old infant
can be represented in the original position, why not a monkey or a
dog?"55 Barry points out that, even so, Rawls' belief in direct duties to
animals puts them in a better position than future generations of human
beings, to which duties are "parasitic" on justice among contemporaries.
This may seem strange, but it is not really so surprising. It is much easier
philosophically to support the idea that we have moral duties towards
animals alive at present than the idea that we have moral duties towards
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potential human beings who may never even exist. Since it seems a
morality which is neither incoherent nor arbitrary must attribute
intrinsic value to the lives of animals as well as humans, this provides a
powerful argument for the protection of the natural world. It is very
interesting to ask why the strong philosophical case for consideration of
the interests of animals is generally ignored. The reason, of course, is the
prevalence of prejudice in favour of human beings (even ones who don't
exist!) and against non-humans.
This turns on its head Michael Jacobs' argument that we can protect the
natural world indirectly by protecting the interests of future generations
through a sustainability ethic.56 We can instead protect future
generations of humans by protecting animals from damage or destruction
of their habitats. What is most intriguing about this way of looking at
things is what it shows about ideas of morality. Morality can be seen
either in terms of enlightened self-interest or in terms of equal
consideration. John Rawls tried to walk a tightrope between these two
conceptions in his theory of justice. It is in his discussion of the treatment
of animals that the tension becomes most apparent.
Sustainability is usually justified in terms of an ethic of equal
consideration of interests. The interests that are considered under the
slogan of sustainability are only those of human beings (existing or
potential). A non-arbitrary ethic of equal consideration would spread its
concern wider to include the interests of other sentient beings.
Selfish genes
But sustainability can instead be justified, as John Pezzey has argued, in
terms of genetic self-interest - "selfish genes". Human behaviour actually
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appears much more strongly motivated by this self-interest than by ideas
of equal consideration. Much concern about the environment and the
future is self-interested. It is quite "natural" for human beings to be
concerned about what happens to their descendants, even though it is not
as high-minded a concern as sustainability is often presented.
Peter Singer has considered the implications of "selfish gene" ideas for
the development of morality.57 Sociobiology58 explains altruistic
behaviour in terms of genetic advantage. Individuals (of whatever
species) may be prepared to sacrifice their immediately apparent self-
interest to help close relations. They may also be prepared to help non-
relatives if there is a reasonable expectation that the help will later be
reciprocated (this is called 'reciprocal altruism'). They also tend to favour
members of their own group over others. All these behaviours can be
explained as ways of trying to improve the transmission of shared genes
into the future. The sacrifice of individual self-interest in that way can be
seen as the expression of "selfish genes" - they are not genes for
selfishness, but genes that 'selfishly' try to propagate themselves.
Many of the ideas about ethics observed across human cultures seem to
bear a strong resemblance to the reciprocal altruism that is observed in
other species of animals. It is easy to show that the cooperative behaviour
of reciprocal altruists is likely to be much more evolutionarily successful
than pure self-interest. Acting purely self-interestedly only works in
situations where 'defection' can be kept secret and avoid later sanctions.
Singer argued that the claims by sociobiologists to be able to explain all
human behaviour in terms of genetic self-interest were overstated.
Indeed, Edward Wilson, the founder of sociobiology, later drew back from
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his more determinist conclusions about human nature. One example
that Singer points to is the difference between the extent of people's desire
for sex and their desire to have children. Thanks to the use of birth
control, people in modern industrialised societies mostly have
significantly fewer children than they would be able to support. If people
really put maximum reproductive success at the top of their priorities
then they would give up cars and foreign holidays to afford more
children. Yet even very rich people who could easily afford to raise ten
children usually choose to only have one or two. The transition from a
norm of large families to small families only took a few generations.
Modern birth control has allowed people to give much fuller reign to
their basic sexual desires without fear of unwanted children. It seems that
evolution has given people a strong biological desire for lots of sex, but
not one for lots of children.
Singer argues that our reason has trumped our evolutionary heritage
with the invention of birth control technologies. Evolution gave us a
desire for lots of sex as a means to its end of making us have lots of
children. Although people continue to strongly desire to have children,
they rarely have much desire for several (or at least to give birth to or
raise several) and have used their powers of reason to frustrate the
natural consequences of their sexual desires. Reason is a product of
evolution, but it is an autonomous force.
An 'expanding circle'?
Ethical obligations were originally restricted to members of the tribe.
Then they were broadened to members of the same ethnic group. Only in
the past couple of hundred years has the idea that ethical obligations
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should extend to all human beings become widespread. Singer claims
that this 'expanding circle' of moral concern is due to the exercise of
reason leading to the doctrine of impartiality. Singer thinks that the same
process of moral reasoning will eventually lead to the inclusion of non-
human animals in the ethical circle. Aldo Leopold had made a similar
point about the widening circle of concern in A Sand County Almanac.
Leopold recounted the example that when Odysseus returned home he
hanged a dozen slave-girls from his household whom he suspected of
misbehaviour during his absence:
This hanging involved no question of propriety. The girls were
property. The disposal of property was then, as now, a matter of
expediency, not of right or wrong.
Concepts of right and wrong were not lacking from Odysseus'
Greece; witness the fidelity of his wife through the long years
before at last his black-prowed galleys clove the wine-dark seas for
home. The ethical structure of the day covered wives, but had not
yet been extended to human chattels. During the three thousand
years which have since elapsed, ethical criteria have been extended
to many fields of conduct, with corresponding shrinkages in those
judged by expediency only...
There is as yet no ethic dealing with man's relation to land and to
the animals and plants which grow upon it. Land, like Odysseus'
slave girls, is still property. The land-relation is still strictly
economic, entailing privileges, but not obligations.59
The difference between Leopold and Singer is that Leopold was writing
about extending ethical consideration to ecosystems, while Singer is
writing about extending ethical consideration to individual non-human
animals. Singer holds that it is not meaningful to expand the circle of
ethical concern to plants or land itself. That is because these things are not
sentient and Singer cannot see how it means anything to imagine
yourself in the position of a tree or a mountain. What he thinks is wrong
about cutting down a tree or quarrying a mountain is that it deprives
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animals of their habitats, but not that it is wrong in itself. Singer believes
that the doctrine of equal consideration of interests does not mean
anything for our treatment of non-sentient entities because they have no
interests to consider.
Roderick Nash commented that Singer's version of the 'expanding circle'
is a typically liberal one, combining rationalism and concern for the
individual.60 By contrast, Leopold's arguments for expanding the circle of
ethical concern are pragmatic and holistic. Leopold wrote:
In human history, we have learned (I hope) that the conqueror
role is eventually self-defeating. Why? Because it is implicit in
such a role that the conqueror knows, ex cathedra, just what makes
the community tick, and just what and who is valuable, and what
and who is worthless, in community life. It always turns out that
he knows neither, and this is why his conquests eventually defeat
themselves.61
Leopold's argument is that "nature knows best" (as Barry Commoner62
would have put it). Singer's ethic is an almost manically interventionist
one. Brian Barry writes that it would seem to call for us to run flying
ambulance services for caribou.63 Singer's utilitarianism is indifferent
between acts of commission and acts of omission, requiring us not just to
refrain from causing suffering, but also to do everything we can to
prevent it. Singer himself admits that his ethics are too demanding for
human beings ever to live up to. He sees them as a goal, rather than a
minimum.64
Ecocentrists criticise animal interests philosophies for placing all intrinsic
value in the lives of individual sentient beings. They place the intrinsic
value in the diversity of species. Tom Regan argues that this is wrong
because it would lead to the view that, given the choice between killing a
rare wildflower or a plentiful human being, we should kill the human
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being as they contributed less to the "biotic team".65 Regan disagrees, not
with the idea of giving rights to non-sentient entities, but with the
propriety of deciding what should be done to individuals by aggregate
considerations. He writes that the beauty of an undisturbed forest might
have inherent value not reducible to any individual's pleasure or
satisfaction, or the sum of such good for a collection of individuals. What
he does not see is how moral rights could be attributed to the collection of
trees or the ecosystem. What is more, granting intrinsic rights to trees
would prevent human beings from being able to cut them down except
for survival. Regan sees this as a stronger protection for wilderness than
something like Leopold's land ethic.
At the present time, we are so far from a consensus on non-
anthropocentric values that this discussion may seem pointless. Here is
my exchange with Ismail Razali about the issue:
SD: Do you think that it makes any sense to talk of equity towards
other species, treating other species fairly, or do you think it doesn't
make sense? Do you think that all values emanate from human
beings, or that other things have value?
Razali: I don't accept that view at all. As I told you I'm a rural
person. I'm more aware of this. The countries that have the role
for this must do their utmost to ensure that they do not contribute
to the elimination of species. But in the course of doing that, it
doesn't mean that they become the world's laboratory for all kinds
of species to survive. In the course of doing that they mustn't put a
cap to the development of the human species. Because at the end
of the day, if we protect the spotted owl but not prevent people
dying of poverty I think we have got our bearings all screwed up.
SD: Now why do you think that? Why do you think that
individual people matter more than entire species of other species,
if you know what I mean?
Razali: In the first place, I'm a human being. I see terrible situations
of the human person, which I find, a few years before the next
millennium, completely unacceptable. In Europe for example you
plough back excess things that you do not want to go into the
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market because you guarantee prices for your farmers. While just
the other side of the Mediterranean people starve. I think that is a
horrible indictment of how screwed up we have become. I'm not
just passing judgement on the industrialised countries. Us too,
we've got all sorts of terrible things. Let us put right the human
equity first. If you are able to make the human person understand
that he's not living on an island, not responsible for what happens
somewhere else, he will do something about this. I think that with
that kind of understanding will also come a realisation that he has
to do something to protect the other species. It comes naturally. But
you cannot make the human person a sub-species while you
maintain the standards among the other species. I don't see that.
I'm not an environmentalist like that.
SD: Why do you think that's not right or not possible?
Razali: Because I'm a human being. I respond as a human being
and I look at the lot of the human person. If you're in Europe
perhaps it doesn't seem so bad. But if you see the serious
contradictions in certain parts of the world, if you look at poverty
in certain parts of Nepal, I promise you would be really worked up.
(Ismail Razali, New York, 5.7.94)
Razali's point about poverty was echoed from a different perspective
Donella Meadows:
SD: Do you think sustainability requires the idea of rights for other
species or not?
Meadows: Socially, do we have to get and respect that idea in order
to get ourselves sustainable? No, my first reaction would probably
be no, not at the deepest level. That if we just got the idea of not
taking renewable resources faster than they were replaced. Even to
view species just as resources, which is something the deep
ecologists hate, that would take us one hell of a way along the way.
And I'm willing to settle for that for the moment. Personally, I
have no question. I'm as deep a deep ecologist as they come. I'd
rather save the whales than homo sapiens.
... and it's not that I don't love people. It's just somehow I'm one of
those people who's for the underdog, and homo sapiens is not the
underdog at the moment. What I would love is a very beautiful
balance with human beings celebrating other species and regarding
them as jewels like stars in the sky, just blessings...
I would guess and hope that with a billion people there would be
sufficient abundance of things that people need that there wouldn't
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be the desperation. I think that is necessary to regard other species
as a jewel or a blessing rather than a meal. (Donella Meadows,
Dartmouth College, New Hampshire, 23.6.94)
The paradox is that the circle of ethical concern can only extend to other
species when people themselves are not in desperate situations. Yet the
creation of the abundance needed for that would seem to imply greater
exploitation of nature than at present.
Conclusion
Sustainability and sustainable development are concepts based on ethical
ideas about equity between and within generations of human beings. The
concern with equity sits uneasily with economic utilitarianism.
Sustainability seems to imply a Rawlsian intergenerational contract.
Criticism of the use of a Rawlsian framework for an ethic of sustainability
appears to be based on literalist interpretations of Rawls' original
position. The device of the veil of ignorance can be used to examine
considerations of equity between generations as well as within
generations. If we imagine people in the original position meeting
behind a veil of ignorance about which generation and potential future
they collectively belonged to, as well as their individual places in society,
then it becomes possible to construct a thought experiment about what
kind of principles should bind each generation in its policies towards
development and the environment. From such a perspective, strong
adherence to the precautionary principle appears as a particularly
important guiding rule.
Ethical principles about the treatment of other species are much more
difficult to derive from the Rawlsian framework. Here, Rawls'
philosophy suffers from the general weakness contractarian approaches
244
to ethics have in dealing with animals, infants and the mentally
handicapped. However, Rawls' use of a contractarian approach as a
literary device to provoke the reader's imagination means that the
inclusion of such interests in a circle of ethical concern is not in any way
ruled out.
The land ethic and deep ecology are the best-known attempts to create an
ecocentric ethic. Both have serious defects, though. The land ethic's
justification through subtly anthropocentric arguments is disingenuous,
if well-intended. Its extreme collectivism leaves it vulnerable to charges
of 'environmental fascism'. Deep ecology is less vulnerable to that
accusation, but the principle of biocentric egalitarianism and the concept
of Self-realization through total identification with the biosphere both
suffer from deep implausibility when examined critically.
By far the strongest arguments that have been put forward against
anthropocentrism come from Peter Singer's animal interests philosophy.
The ethical conclusions of these arguments are hard to deny unless one is
prepared to assert that non-human animals lack consciousness. Singer's
case for equal consideration of interests has generally been seen as a
critique of our present treatment of animals in captivity, but it also leads
to the conclusion that there is a strong moral case for the preservation of
habitats from development in order to protect the interests of the animals
that inhabit them. The simplicity of the argument for consideration of
the interests of animals contrasts with the philosophical complexity of
arguments about the rights of future generations.
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Sustainable development is a construct of political strategy and
compromise, rather than one based solely on environmental or
economic theories. Central to the Brundtland Commission's conception
of sustainable development is an attempt to claim that environmental
concern and economic growth are not incompatible, that in fact they can
complement each other. As Joke Waller-Hunter made clear to me, that
notion was crucial for the term sustainable development to have political
acceptance. Many environmentalists were not very happy with that
conclusion, but they had the compensation that the Brundtland report
legitimated many of their concerns in the sphere of international politics.
Sustainable development presented the economics profession with a
challenge. Although it allowed for economic growth, the concept was
implicitly critical of traditional approaches to economic development. At
a theoretical level, even the concept of natural capital as a separate
category of capital has been difficult for many economists to accept. The
attempt to make the environmental concept of sustainability fit into the
economic category of capital has proved problematical for
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environmentalists, leading them to the concept of environmental space
instead.
Mainstream economics draws heavily on utilitarianism for its
philosophical assumptions. The concept of sustainability is based on a
precautionary approach to risk which is incompatible with the
assumptions behind utilitarianism. Because utilitarianism is so central to
economic theory, economists would have to be prepared to rethink the
philosophical basis of their discipline to create 'sustainable economics'.
The fact that many green economists have been environmentalists who
retrained as economists emphasises the extent to which
environmentalists and economists have been in opposition to each
other. One of the things which environmentalists have found frustrating
in recent years is the degree of resistance the economics profession has
shown to environmentalism.
This contrasts with the extent to which scientists have come round over
the past thirty years to accepting claims of an environmental crisis.
Although the environmental writers of the sixties were mostly scientists,
the implication of the new environmentalism was initially seen as anti-
science. To be more exact, the environmentalists claimed that there were
serious limits to the use of science and technology to solve problems.
They argued that science and technology may solve some problems, but
create new ones instead. In the past few decades, scientific investigations
have confirmed that the use of technology has created many
environmental problems.
Although some radical environmentalists have argued that science and
technology are part of the problem, not part of the solution, most
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environmentalists have sought to reform the use of modern technology
so that it is not so environmentally damaging, rather than do away with
it entirely. To a very large extent, scientists and technologists have been
prepared to accept that the consequences of the use of scientific and
technical knowledge should be thought through more fully than it was in
the past before being practically applied.
Some environmentalists still criticise science for being mechanistic and
reductionist (for example, Jeremy Rifkin1) However, as Richard Norgaard
has pointed out, contemporary science has incorporated ideas such as
chaos theory which are quite different from that image.2 The problem lies
not so much with the contemporary practice of science as with an
ideology that emerged out of the Enlightenment, which he calls
modernism.
Norgaard identifies three key tenets of modernism. The first is that
Western science steadily advances, producing better technologies and
ways of organising, making sure that future generations will always be
better off than present generations. It would do this by extending human
control over nature. This belief in material progress excused people from
thinking about the consequences of their choices on the opportunities for
the next generation. He claims that the widespread acceptance in recent
years that the present path of development is not sustainable marks the
beginning of the rejection of modernism. The second tenet of modernism
that Norgaard identifies is the belief that all problems are amenable to a
technical solution and can be left to experts to solve. The third tenet is
that cultural differences will fade away as people discover the
effectiveness of Western rationality. Europeans came to accept the
modernist view of the world. They then expected other people to follow
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them in adopting it. Norgaard deliberately identifies those aspects of
modernism which were shared by liberalism and Marxism. An additional
feature of liberalism which he criticises is its commitment to
individualism.
To a much greater extent than the natural sciences, economics is an
ideological discipline. Modernism is not so deeply embedded in science as
in economics. Donella Meadows told me:
...I think only economists don't believe there are limits to growth.
And I think they've lost. They don't know it yet, but nobody in
physical science has any trouble with that argument. In fact many
people read Limits to Growth and said "ho hum, what else is
new?" Not because, as the economists said, "this is Malthusian,
this has been wrong for 200 years and it's still wrong." They're the
only people who think that. And we were all physical scientists. So
this was all obvious stuff to us. In our community it's obvious
stuff. (Donella Meadows, Dartmouth College, New Hampshire,
23.6.94)
Environmentalism and the idea of sustainability have emerged in the
last few decades as Western societies have lost their faith in modernism
and Progress based on ever-increasing domination of nature.
Sustainability is a rather different idea from Progress; rather than
assuming continual improvement, it aims for things not to get worse.
The idea of sustainable development retains Progress' desire for things to
get better, but implies the view that it is not assured.
1Jeremy Rifkin (1985) Declaration of a Heretic, London: Routledge &
Kegan Paul




THE END OF MODERNITY
Introduction
The environmental movement that has developed since the 1960s has
emerged as a critical political force in parallel to the decline of socialism.
In the 1990s, radical critiques of Western society are mostly expressed in
terms of Green, rather than Marxist, analysis. From the middle of the
nineteenth century until the late twentieth century, criticism of
industrial society was an extremely marginal force. After Marx, socialism
was even more ideologically committed to modernity than capitalism
was. The disillusionment with modernity in the last few decades has
origins both in the rise of environmental concern and the loss of faith in
socialism. These two phenomena have been largely separate, but they
have coincided historically.
Although the environmental movement has been extremely critical of
modernity, it has a more ambiguous relationship with the broader
Enlightenment tradition. In many ways, the Green movement has hoped
to revitalise leftism by disowning modernity and returning to the pre-
Marxist radical Enlightenment tradition.
The concept of sustainability has historically emerged out of a critique of
modernity and the trajectory environmentalists see it taking us on
towards disaster. Yet, at the same time, the concept of sustainability is
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rooted in faith in human perfectibility, the possibility of reform and,
perhaps most tellingly, the values of equality and solidarity.
The concept of sustainable development is even more split in its
loyalties, torn between environmentalist criticism of industrial society
and support for 'development', the more politically correct post-1945 term
for Progress.
Sustainability is an idea which combines postmodernist pessimism about
the domination of nature with almost Enlightenment optimism about
the possibility to reform human institutions. With worldwide
disillusionment in the last few years about attempts to engineer better
societies in the wake of the collapse of socialist ideology, the goal of
sustainability sounds increasingly ambitious in the pessimistic times we
live in.
The Modern Age
The modern world has been shaped by the advance of science and the
application of scientific techniques of reason. For over a hundred years,
from the middle of the nineteenth century to the middle of the
twentieth, people tended to see history as a march into a better future. It
was believed that science and reason were forces for Progress. Today,
people no longer assume that life is going to get better in the long run,
but increasingly fear that it is going to get worse. Concern about the
environment is an important embodiment of that fear, but the loss of
faith in Progress itself has deeper historical roots.
The success of the use of scientific reason from the seventeenth century
onwards led to the idea that reason could be applied in the social sphere
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as well to create a better world. The French Revolution of 1789 was the
first attempt to create a self-consciously rational political order. Feudalism
and absolute monarchy were abolished, replaced by the doctrines of the
rights of man and democratic government. The system of measurement
was metricated and the calendar was reformed to be more rational. But
the outcome of the French Revolution showed that even the best-
intentioned attempts to better humanity could backfire. In a foreshadow
of many twentieth century revolutions, fanatics took power and seized
the opportunity to persecute their rivals. The Jacobin Terror consumed
most of the original leaders of the revolution. They were despatched by a
scientifically designed means of execution, the guillotine.
Despite its terrible outcome, the French Revolution inspired the idea of a
progressive politics towards the goals of liberty, equality, fraternity. Its
horrors supported the argument of conservatives such as Edmund
Burke1 that attempts to make things better would tend to make things
worse. Revolutionaries believed in the perfectibility of mankind: that the
bad in people, as Rousseau had claimed, came from society rather than
human nature. Reason, they thought, was a force for good that would
drive out the irrational bad in people. The conservatives still accepted the
old Christian doctrine that man had been cursed with Original Sin after
the expulsion from the Garden of Eden and were therefore imperfectible.
The French Revolution was followed by another with even more
momentous consequences - the Industrial Revolution. More than the
French Revolution, this was the application of scientific instrumental
reason to change the world. The Industrial Revolution broke the
emergent political Left into two camps. Liberals supported the changes
because they were breaking the power of feudalism. Romantics and
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socialists worried that what was happening was that the oppression of
feudalism was being replaced by the oppression of capitalism and the
factory system. Early socialists hoped that people could be educated to see
that it was more rational to produce for the common good than for
private profit.
Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels ridiculed these 'utopian socialists', and
put forward their own doctrine of 'scientific socialism'. They saw
capitalism as part of the progress of human history. It would be brought
down, not by appeals to morality, but by its own internal contradictions.
In many ways, Marx became the leading prophet of modernity even for
non-socialists. He saw capitalism as a progressive force through its
subjugation of nature to the human race:
The bourgeoisie, during its rule of scarce one hundred years, has
created more massive and more colossal productive forces than
have all preceding generations together. Subjection of Nature's
forces to man, machinery, application of chemistry to industry and
agriculture, steam-navigation, railways, electric telegraphs, clearing
of whole continents for cultivation, canalization of rivers, whole
populations conjured out of the ground - what earlier century had
even a presentiment that such productive forces slumbered in the
lap of social labour?2
Marx also identified the central feature of modernity: the way that the
new continuously replaces the old:
Constant revolutionizing of production, uninterrupted
disturbance of all social conditions, everlasting uncertainty and
agitation distinguish the bourgeois epoch from all earlier ones. All
fixed, fast-frozen relations, with their train of ancient and
venerable prejudices and opinions are swept away, all new-formed
ones become antiquated before they can ossify. All that is solid
melts into air, all that is holy is profaned, and man is at last
compelled to face with sober senses, his real conditions of life, and
his relations with his kind.3
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According to Marx, though, there were some features of capitalism which
would not change and which would ensure its downfall. He thought that
capitalism's tendency towards periodic and successively worse slumps,
towards the immiseration of the working classes and towards monopoly
(bringing former capitalists into the proletariat) would lead to its
overthrow. It would be replaced with a socialist system of production
based on rational planning, rather than the anarchy of the market.
In the end, things didn't turn out the way Marx had predicted. Capitalism
proved capable of reforming itself when faced with the prospect of self-
destruction at the time of the Great Depression. Indeed, during the
twentieth century, Western capitalist countries introduced universal
education, progressive income tax and restricted inheritance. They
nationalised central banks, communications, railways and many other
industries; in short, they enacted most of what was called for in The
Communist Manifesto. What they failed to do was abolish capitalism
entirely. As J.K. Galbraith wrote, Marx's mistake was to believe that
capitalists were infinitely cunning except in the matter of ensuring their
own ultimate survival.4
The darker side of modernity was apparent from the beginning. The
guillotine was one example. The factory system was another. Adam
Smith extolled the division of labour in a pin factory as the model of
economic rationality. The horrors of life in the dark satanic mills of the
early nineteenth century inspired Marx to become a socialist. But it was
the confident belief of both liberals and socialists in their different ways
that the modern age would work through its defects and ultimately allow
people to achieve freedom.
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The modern age saw the new possibility for freedom as being a
consequence of the material power over nature that the use of scientific
rationality had given. Most people thought it was rather glorious to
'tame' nature by doing things like damming rivers, clearing jungles and
marshes, dynamiting roads and railways through mountain ranges.
Scientific and technological progress would continue to increase
mankind's power over nature. To be sure, not everyone thought this
way. There were groups like the Sierra Club which valued the existence
of wild nature for its own sake, but they were a fringe.
Another part of modernity's concept of Progress was the idea that
scientific and technological advance would not only make life better, but
that people in more advanced societies would become more rational and
civilised - better people. This theory was one of the main justifications for
colonialism. At the turn of the century, western Europeans were
confident that they had become enlightened and civilised. Examples of
this complacency are found in the 1911 edition of the Encyclopedia
Britannica. The article on TORTURE said that "the whole subject is of only
historical interest as far as Europe is concerned."5 The article on WAR,
discussing the immunities of civilians under the Hague Convention,
noted "This has all been done with the object of making the operations of
war systematic, and enabling the private citizen to estimate his risks and
take the necessary precautions to avoid capture, and of restricting acts of
war to the purpose of bringing it to a speedy conclusion."6 The historian
Eric Hobsbawm7 comments on how Russian pogroms of Jews at that time
shocked European opinion, although the casualties were by our standards
tiny - a few dozen. He also refers to the way that Friedrich Engels had
been horrified when Irish Republicans planted a bomb in Westminster
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Hall - he thought that the division between combatants and non-
combatants should be honoured.
The first blow to the comfortable belief in inevitable progress was the
First World War. After a century without large wars in Europe, it was the
war with by far the most casualties up to that time. The slaughter of the
Western Front largely destroyed belief in the inevitability of life
continually getting better. A belief in social progress was able to survive
because it was easy to blame much of the seemingly pointless slaughter
on the stupidity and callousness of the ruling classes of the nations that
had fought the war.8
The Second World War killed more people than all previous wars in
recorded history put together, and the Holocaust made people doubt that
any kind of moral progress had been made in the past few centuries.
People asked how a civilised nation like the Germans could have
committed such a terrible crime. What had happened could be blamed on
Hitler and the Nazis, but Nazism itself was a puzzling phenomenon.
Nazism as a political philosophy was based on irrational and paranoid
beliefs about German racial superiority and a Jewish conspiracy against
Germany. It rejected the values of the Enlightenment and hankered back
to pagan Germanic myths. Yet despite its own irrationality, it had been
very effective in the use of the rationality of twentieth century science
and bureaucratic organisation. It appeared that pre-modern prejudices
could go hand in hand with mastery of modern techniques.9
The invention of nuclear weapons gave human beings the capacity to
destroy the modern civilisation that had enabled their creation. The Cold
War's 'balance of terror' was based on mutual threats by the United States
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and the Soviet Union to exterminate the populations of each other's
countries. Stanley Kubrick's 1963 movie Dr Strangelove satirised the
insanity of the theory of Mutually Assured Destruction. Nuclear weapons
exercise a horrible fascination as pieces of technology. They represent the
outcome of one of the greatest intellectual efforts ever made by scientists,
but the incredible power they give is entirely destructive. To many
people, the fact that we were clever enough to devise the means for our
own destruction suggested that our technological progress had far outrun
our moral progress.
Post-modernity
Around 1968, the intellectual mood in Western countries finally began to
swing away from faith in the idea of Progress. Why did the loss of faith
occur after 1968, not 1945? After 1945, the countries of Western Europe
bounced back from the most devastating war in history, built prosperous
societies, created welfare states, and abandoned their colonialist empires.
In Western Europe and North America, the years after 1945 were the first
where the majority of people lived lives free of material deprivation.
Many of the social and economic goals that people had looked to
modernity and Progress for had arrived. Throughout history, the
majority of people had been poor and deprived. Now, in these societies,
the majority was comfortably off.
The older generation, who remembered the deprivation of the thirties
and the suffering of the war, were generally very satisfied with how
things had turned out. The generation that came of age in the late sixties
felt a sense of dissatisfaction. They wanted something else. Social
scientists called their spiritual malaise "post-materialist values". The
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social scientists explained it in terms of Abraham Maslow's theory of a
hierarchy of needs.10 Now that people's material needs were met,
spiritual needs were becoming more important.
Back at the beginning of the modern age, revolutionaries had been
convinced that Christianity, by soothing people with the thought of
something better in the afterlife, kept people from the struggle for a better
life in the here and now. The idea of Progress was a challenge to religion
because it claimed that people could make the world better themselves,
simply by the application of rationality. The Communist movement in
particular remade the Christian myth in its own image.11 The Christian
promise of the Kingdom of God was replaced with the prospect of the
Communist future. Communists commonly claimed not only that they
had seen the future, but that the actions of the Communist movement
were right because they were bringing about the future. Shorn of its
socialist overtones, the generally held idea that "you can't stand in the
way of Progress" took the idea of inevitability as a justification for a
particular course of action. By the 1960s, Christianity's influence was a
shadow of what it had once been. Even the Catholic Church was forced to
adapt a little to the modern world at the Second Vatican Council.
Critics of modernity since Rousseau and the Romantics had accused it of
enslaving the human spirit. The pioneering sociologist Max Weber
claimed that the instrumental reason of modernity would create an "iron
cage" of bureaucracy. In the 1940s, the experiences of Nazism and
Stalinism led two ex-Marxist German emigres in America, Max
Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno, to write the Dialectic of
Enlightenment,12 in which they asserted that the modernist project of
Progress through the domination of nature using instrumental reason
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inevitably rebounded on the human race in "the revenge of nature" -
bureaucracy and totalitarianism. One of their colleagues from their days
in Frankfurt before the war had been Herbert Marcuse, by the sixties a
professor of philosophy at Berkeley, who popularised this version of post-
Marxism called Critical Theory. The ideas of the Critical Theorists
inspired the New Left in the 1960s and later influenced the Green
movement.
An even more radical critique of modernity emerged from the end of the
1960s among disillusioned French intellectuals in Jacques Derrida's
deconstructionism13 and Michel Foucault's post-structuralism.14 Over
the next two decades postmodernist philosophy grew to become a major
influence in the humanities and social sciences in academies around the
world. The leading postmodernist philosopher Jean-Frangois Lyotard has
defined the condition of post-modernity in terms of a move away from
faith in attempts at human-engineered progress and "an incredulity
towards metanarratives,"15 overarching stories which claim to explain
the purpose of human existence and history.
The environmental movement crystallised doubt in Progress. When the
price of oil tripled in 1974 and the economic miracle the West had
experienced after 1945 came to an end, it seemed reasonable to wonder if
the warnings about 'Limits to Growth' might not be right. At about the
same time, it became clear that the high modernist approach to city
planning, where people were dominated by tower blocks and motorways,
was a social disaster.
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The death of socialism
The final blow to a certain kind of confident belief in Man's ability to
rationally plan society came with the disillusionment in socialism
worldwide after the economic disintegration of the Soviet system.16
Everybody knew for a long time that the system was unfree,
undemocratic and unpopular. But from the 1920s to the 1960s, the Soviet
Union was economically catching up with the United States. When
Kruschev told the Americans "We will bury you/' he meant that his
economy would one day surpass theirs. A planned economy certainly
seemed to work, even though the lack of human rights made the Soviet
system unpleasant to live under. In the 1970s, it became increasingly
apparent that the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe were falling
increasingly behind the West. But nobody expected it all to collapse. Why
did it?
It is important to understand that the reason why the Communist system
disappeared so quickly is because it had failed in its own terms - as an
economic system that would prove its superiority to capitalism. When
the economic failure became blindingly obvious even to the rulers, they
lost faith in it themselves and in most cases abandoned power with little
or no struggle.17
Eric Hobsbawm18 describes how after the 1960s, when the era of crash
industrialisation came to an end, the socialist economies found
themselves increasingly unable to keep up with Western technological
innovation. When inventions were made, there was little incentive to
exploit them (unless they were militarily useful). The consumer sector of
the economy never matured and the products were of depressingly low
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quality. There was no proper system of prices and no feedback about what
consumers wanted. Additionally, the use of energy and natural resources
was extremely inefficient. Apparently because of Marx's scepticism about
the idea of 'natural limits', environmental considerations were not
regarded as a priority, and so pollution was very severe. The use of
human resources was extremely inefficient as well. There was a social
contract based on the principle "we pretend to work and they pretend to
pay us."19 All in all, the collapse of an economic system so lacking in any
dynamism compared to capitalism seems in retrospect to have been over-
determined.
These facts were all well known for a long time, and apparent to almost
anyone who had the opportunity to compare Eastern and Western
Europe. Socialists in the West had for a long time had little but criticism
for the Soviet model, but its eventual collapse seemed to damage the
credibility of socialist ideas in general. Eric Hobsbawm argues that central
planning, which had been invented to industrialise a backward
agricultural country, was extremely crude and incapable of running a
sophisticated modern economy. He claims that it would be possible to
have a socialist economy with decentralised planning and market
pricing.20 However, the failure of the Yugoslav socialist economy
suggests that the economic problem was deeper than over-centralisation.
In Yugoslavia, cooperatives were supposed to compete in a socialist
market. In reality, though, cooperatives were not allowed to fail and the
state would bail out loss-makers. The result was that there was no
incentive to improve efficiency or innovate. Eventually, the cumulative
losses bankrupted the country.21
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If the experience of nationalisation and state planning in democratic
countries had been very successful, the failure of Eastern European
socialism would have been seen as due to the lack of democratic feedback
and personal freedom needed for a dynamic modern society. However,
the failure of the Soviet system was an extreme version of the problems
with nationalised industries and economic planning that had been
experienced in democratic countries. The response had been a shift in
policy towards privatisation and markets. By the end of the 1980s,
Western European social democracy had lost its reforming momentum.22
The end of the Soviet Union came as icing on the cake to Western right-
wingers.
The "End of History"
The American foreign policy analyst Francis Fukuyama put forward the
thesis that we had reached the "End of History" as Communism
collapsed.23 He argued that Marxism's ideological implosion saw off the
last rival ideology to 'liberal democracy' that had the potential to appeal to
people around the world. Hegel had written in 1806 that Napoleon's
defeat of the Prussians at the Battle of Jena marked the end of history
because the liberal political values of the French Revolution had
triumphed over those of reactionary conservatism. Hegel accepted that
there was still a long way before these liberal ideals were fully
implemented in the world, but he saw Jena as the decisive turning point
in ensuring that they were.
Fukuyama mischievously argued that the historical failure of Marxism's
pretensions to bring about a more advanced society than bourgeois
liberalism showed that Hegel had been right: the triumph of the liberal
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ideals of the French and American Revolutions over the Marxism of the
Russian Revolution meant that nothing better than liberalism had been
invented since 1806 and that liberalism is indeed the final form of
human society.
After the eclipse of the Soviet Union, Fukuyama extended his argument
to consider the possibilities for any new rival to liberal democratic
capitalism.24 Fukuyama explains the current dissatisfaction with
modernity in Western societies as the bored rage of 'the last man', the
being at the end of history who has nothing significant left to struggle for.
What Fukuyama calls the 'end of history' is the end of faith in progress
towards human perfectibility. People no longer envisage a rational,
planned, socialist future. We have seen the future and it didn't work.
Milan Kundera wrote in the early 1980s that since the French Revolution,
Europe had been divided between the left and the right. What was it that
unites the left? The dictatorship of the proletariat or democracy?
Rejection of the consumer society or increased productivity? The
guillotine or an end to the death penalty? Kundera identified what unites
leftists as the fantasy of a Grand March through history.25
The leftist fantasy of the Grand March was able to cope with setbacks and
betrayals. Leftists had been able to decide that the Soviet Union stood in
the way of the Grand March. When Communism collapsed, leftists
cheered along with the right. Yet the failure of the socialist economies
marked the end, not just of the Leninist tradition since 1917, but of the
socialist tradition since 1848. Fukuyama is correct that the events of 1989-
91 marked the ideological triumph of the liberalism of 1789. Eric
Hobsbawm reluctantly comes to much the same conclusion.26 He
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considers the possibility that future generations will look back on the
twentieth century dispute between capitalism and socialism as we now
look back on seventeenth century wars of religion.
The discrediting of the idea that a rationally planned economy will
function much better than one based on the market has been a blow to
socialism of such intensity that it has now become hard to sustain its
unconscious myth of the Grand March through history. Capitalism saw
off both its predecessor feudalism and its supposed successor socialism.
For Fukuyama, the future course of human history is the adoption by all
the world of the values of liberal democracy.
Fukuyama accepts that the horrors of the twentieth century have made
people doubt that history has any direction. Fie argues, however, that the
progress of natural science gives directionality to history. It is the only
important human activity that is generally agreed to be advancing, even
if its consequences are not necessarily good. Modern science made
possible not only the conquest of nature but, through technology, gave
enormous capability for technologically advanced nations to militarily
conquer other nations. Any state that wishes to remain independent
must possess the technology to defend itself. Secondly, modern natural
science gives enormous economic potential to countries that know how
to use it. In order to be able to utilise that potential they have to go down
the path called 'modernisation'. Countries that have modernised come
increasingly to resemble each other as economic logic dictates the forms
of society they must have, with features like a centralised state,
urbanisation and universal education. According to Fukuyama, the
lesson of the experience of Communism is that centrally-planned
economies can reach the level of industrialisation found in Europe in the
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1950s, but they are unable to succeed as technologically innovative 'post-
industrial' economies. This failure within Communism's own terms of
reference caused the leaders themselves to lose faith in the ideology.
Fukuyama admits that his economic interpretation of history resembles
Marx's, except that it concludes with capitalism rather than socialism as
the final outcome.
Fukuyama uses the same argument to explain why it is impossible to
abandon technology and go back to some imagined arcadian idyll. Those
who do that will be abandoning the means to defend themselves against
those who do not. Even if the infrastructure of science and technology
was destroyed in some global catastrophe, if any human beings survived,
the knowledge of the scientific approach would survive too. Eventually,
some group would start to develop science again.
Fukuyama explains the appeal of democracy for people all around the
world in terms of the "struggle for recognition". If people were purely
self-interested rational calculators, they would not be prepared to put
their lives on the line for abstract concepts like democracy. They would be
content to live under authoritarian regimes, at least ones that were
economically successful. Fukuyama here is borrowing from Hegel, who
believed that the establishment of regimes in America and France which
were based on the recognition of the individual was the beginning of the
"end of History". However, the source of recognition need not be the
rights and dignity of the individual, as it is in liberalism. It can be a
religion or a national identity.
Fukuyama admits that it is possible that extreme nationalism or religious
fanaticism will return as major forces in the world, but he regards it as
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unlikely. The only part of the world that he believed was vulnerable to
religious fundamentalism was the Middle East. In his opinion, however,
the most serious future threat to liberal democracy globally comes from
the success of paternalistic authoritarianism of the kind seen in
Singapore. Even so, he doubted that such an authoritarianism of
deference could be accepted by people outside East Asia. Liberal democracy
is the only political system left with appeal to people all around the
world.
Liberalism was invented in response to the devastating religious wars of
seventeenth century Europe. The conclusion drawn by Enlightenment
philosophers was that it was simply rational self-interest for people to be
tolerant and allow members of other groups in society to determine their
own lives. However, Fukuyama points out that a liberal society depends
in the long run on people coming to believe in tolerance for its own sake.
Like religion or nationalism, liberalism and democracy also depend on a
kind of faith.
Fukuyama believes that in Western Europe nationalism is now being
domesticated in the way that religion was a few centuries earlier. The
nationalist seeks to assert his nationality by domination of others. As
nationalism fades away, the irrational desire for domination is replaced
by a rational desire for equal recognition. A world of liberal democracy,
according to Fukuyama, would have much less incentive for war as all
nations would recognise each other's legitimacy. Liberal democracies
rarely have gone to war against each other. Fukuyama believes that a
world of them would be largely peaceful.
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Are there any new threats to liberal democracy? Fukuyama believes that
communism has been so discredited that any new threat from the left
would have to be quite different and wear the clothes of liberalism. He
considers the possibility of a "superuniversalization" of rights, where the
distinction between human and non-human is lost. In the days of Hegel
and Kant, and in the original Christian tradition of European culture,
human beings were superior to anything in nature because they free and
capable of moral choice. Modern science sees human behaviour in terms
of the influence of genes and environment, not a matter of free moral
choice. Since Darwin we have known that we are not separate from
nature. It was our superior dignity that entitled us to the conquest of
nature using the methods of natural science. Now natural science seems
to have demonstrated that there is no essential difference between us and
what Nietzsche called the "living slime".
Fukuyama is more seriously concerned by the appeal from the right of
Nietzschean nihilism to the bored "last man" at the end of history.
However, he believes that the terrible experiences of the two world wars
have taught Europeans that the boredom of the last man is preferable to
the excitement and horror of war. Fukuyama sees liberal democracy as a
good balance. On the one hand is the desire for equality that is required by
democracy, but that he admits cannot be achieved under capitalism. On
the other hand is the desire by some individuals to be outstanding, which
capitalism can tame and make compatible with civilisation. It helps
defend liberalism against its authoritarian opponents.
What is striking about Fukuyama's argument is how negative its defence
of modernity and capitalism is. He does not try to claim that capitalism
best embodies the principles of democracy. He admits that some kind of
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democratic socialism could do that better. Rather, he argues that socialism
lacks the capability for technological innovation necessary for its
survival. Fukuyama does not argue that technological modernity
necessarily makes us any happier. Instead, he accepts that it fills our lives
with useful but ugly things. Fukuyama's position could be put crudely, if
more negatively than he does: Modernity and capitalism are
unavoidable. At least there is the compensation that it seems democracy
suits them quite well as a system of government.
The 'greenlash' defends modernity
It is rare these days to find an unabashed enthusiast for modernity. One
remaining enthusiast is Richard North.27 His book Life on a Modern
Planet was published at the beginning of 1995, at almost exactly the same
time as Wilfred Beckerman's Small Is Stupid.28 The two books were
identified as part of the 'greenlash' - a right-wing backlash against the
environmentalism of the late eighties and early nineties. The most
important example of the greenlash was the election of a Republican
Congress in the United States at the end of 1994 which, among other
right-wing policies, set about dismantling the nation's environmental
legislation, which they regarded as a legacy of 1960s liberalism. In fact, the
greenlash proved to be quite a short-lived phenomenon. The
Republicans soon found that anti-environmentalism was deeply
unpopular.
North's book is a good example of greenlash thinking. He was formerly
The Independent's environment correspondent, but Life on a Modern
Planet was sponsored by the chemicals company ICI. Although they had
no editorial control, they must have been gratified to read North's
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defence of the chemical industry. His most memorable claim is that the
issues Rachel Carson raised in Silent Spring were already well in hand.
He accuses environmentalists and the media of hysteria in their criticism
of the chemicals industry. The nearest he comes to criticism of the
industry itself is when he writes that in the case of CFCs "During the early
part of the debate, ICI and most other chlorine producing firms (and ICI
much longer than the leading US firm Du Pont) argued their corner with
too little appreciation of the strengths of the case against the chemicals
they were selling."29 North is still less critical of the nuclear industry. He
claims that cancer fears about Chernobyl emanate from "a small group of
scientists from what was then the Soviet Union."30 He instead cites
approvingly two 1991 studies from "a small but authoritative British
team and a much larger international team of specialists" that there were
no deaths attributable to Chernobyl except the 31 admitted by the Soviet
authorities in 1986. He does not mention that both these groups
represented the nuclear industry. He covers himself by mentioning that it
is to be expected that there will be thousands of additional cancers over
the next decades in affected populations, but comfortingly adds that these
cancers will probably not be so numerous as to be noticeable in the
general rate of cancers. North is able to see positive sides to Chernobyl: it
showed us how not to run a nuclear reactor, it revealed the prejudiced
reporting of the media, and it has shown how advanced epidemiology
now is.
North's consistent theme is that environmentalists and the media
exaggerate environmental problems. As may be gathered, North is
supremely confident in industry and technology. In the introduction he
writes:
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It will surprise some readers perhaps that I am so keen on industry.
This is simply because I have come to accept that, while we need to
regulate the entrepreneurial and innovative human spirit, it has
benefitted [sic] society enormously. I am, I suppose, a post-socialist
and post-Luddite. I hope no one will think me a gung-ho
boomster, but I am tolerably relaxed that western industry does its
work within democratic controls, which we can tighten if we
want.31
The central message of North's book is that we should trust industry and
western governments to handle the environment properly. North also
claims that it is unfair to sue companies which cause health damage to
those who live near their plants as the fault lies with society for allowing
the activity in the first place. Rather peculiarly, North claims in the
introduction to his book that western governments are ahead of their
populations in terms of environmental concern, while in later chapters
he condemns the public for being so credulous of environmentalist scares
and disbelieving of government reassurances.
Like all anti-environmentalist authors, North claims that nature is in
pretty good shape. Half the world's rainforest has been lost this century,
but he points out that the half that remains is still rather a lot. North
quotes a single study which estimated that 80% of what remained could
be lost while only losing 10% of the species. North tells us:
Besides, I suspect that if we are clever we will be able to preserve 90
per cent of the biologically-useful diversity on a well chosen 10 per
cent of forest, and be kept very busy looking at that - still vast -
amount of territory and biological potential. Granted that a fig leaf
has 20,000 chemicals in it, we seem to have quite a job cut out for
us as we begin the assay of our biogenetic inheritance. This sort of
thinking, far from heretical, is the essence of modern realistic
conservation.32
Besides the fact that there is still a lot of it left, North also tells us that
"very few people have much of a use for it as it stands... large areas of it
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could be perfectly well used for other purposes... its rich biological
diversity does not make a very strong case for preserving much of it."33
North makes much of the way that reverence for nature in western
culture has emerged since the nineteenth century as a product of
urbanisation. Since it is a product of modernity, one might have thought
North would think it a good thing, but actually it is one aspect of
modernity he has little time for. North states that "modern people feel
alienated from nature",34 but he regards this feeling of alienation as
childish:
We want what industry brings us and we want the loveliness
which was there before industry came. When man faces
irreconcilable opposites, he has to accept compromises. Yet this
issue is hard to compromise on because it has elements of the
religious about it. And because we have become childish, we find it
easier to sulk and stamp our feet and pout and complain, than we
do to accept that adults take a balanced view, accept compromises
and above all do not expect perfection.35
North claims to want compromise, but the reality is that he always sides
with development rather than the environment. There is something
quite interesting going on. The defender of modernity ends up claiming
that the people of the West who live in modernity are childish to regret
what they have lost. He instead writes approvingly the people of the
Third World who want progress and modernity. The population of
Western countries have apparently developed irrational fears about
technology and a romanticism about nature that North seems to find
quite disturbing. Rather than extolling the West, as he claims in the
introduction, he ends up criticising its people for their loss of faith in




A superficially similar, but much more interesting and thoughtful
defence of aspects of modernity is the environmental scientist Martin
Lewis' Green Delusions.36 His polemical attack on Green ideology raises
some novel questions. Lewis subtitled his book "an environmentalist
critique of radical environmentalism." Although it has been seen in
some quarters as part of the anti-environmentalist greenlash, Lewis'
thinking accepts the ultimate objective of Green ideas, to protect nature
from human destruction, and he criticises the anti-environmentalists for
their anthropocentrism. He writes that the work of the anti-
environmentalists makes it clear that they do not care at all about nature,
only about human beings.
Lewis takes issue with the very idea that there must be a choice between
'technocentric' and 'ecocentric' approaches. He argues that the "back to
nature" views of eco-radicals are counter-productive and would
themselves be environmentally destructive if implemented.
Schumacherian neo-Luddite low technology would be much less efficient
in its use of resources than environmentally-conscious high technology.
Rather than living closer to nature, society should be "decoupled" from
nature, so that nature can continue in existence with the minimum of
human interference. Lewis accuses eco-radicals of romanticising the pre-
industrial past, which was much worse to live in and also had many
environmental problems. He argues that only the use of high technology
solutions can enable the present billions to live on the Earth without
destroying their environment.
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Lewis claims that while the widely held dichotomy between
technocentrism and ecocentrism in the environmental movement may
accurately depict approaches in the past, it is unhelpful for devising a
truly effective environmental movement:
It incorrectly assumes that those who adopt an anti-
anthropocentric view (that is one that accords intrinsic worth to
nonhuman beings) will also embrace the larger political programs
of radical environmentalism. Similarly, it portrays those who
favor reforms within the political and economic structures of
representative democracies as thereby excluding all nonhumans
from the realm of moral consideration. Yet no convincing reasons
are ever provided to show why these beliefs should necessarily be
aligned in such a manner.37
Lewis wants to separate human activities from nature in order both to
protect nature from humans and to allow humans to lead better lives.
This is the opposite of the radical green view that the separation between
humans and nature lies at the root of the environmental crisis.
Lewis tries to overturn a wide variety of Green shibboleths. Some of the
opinions he criticises are in fact held by few Greens. Herman Daly, in a
generally hostile review of Green Delusions, wrote that "eco-freaks really
should thank Lewis for taking them seriously enough to try to correct
their errors, especially since nobody else does, at least outside Santa
Cruz".38 Certainly, technophobia is no longer as fashionable among
environmentalists as it was in the 1970s. Lewis claims, however, that
"Ultimately, green extremism is rooted in a single, powerful conviction:
that continued economic growth is absolutely impossible, given the
limits of a finite planet. Only if this notion is discredited can the edifice of
eco-radical philosophy be shaken."39 Lewis argues that, although
unlimited physical growth is impossible, technological progress can
decouple economic growth from growth in the use of resources. Without
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economic growth, there will be technological stagnation of the kind that
occurred in Eastern Europe in the 1980s.
Lewis supports the industrialisation of the Third World. He argues that
industrialisation is necessary to raise living standards in those countries
to Western levels. He dismisses the alternative of lowering Western
living standards as impractical. Lewis wants to deal with the habitat
pressures of a rapidly growing Third World population by urbanisation,
physically separating people from nature. People living rurally use up
much more land than in urban environments, he argues. Lewis agrees
that environmental conditions in Third World cities are generally
terrible, but argues that conditions will improve with economic
development, as has happened in the West. He points out that
urbanisation also makes family sizes rapidly decrease, curbing population
growth.
Lewis points to the Asian tiger economies as models of successful
development, although he admits that it has been achieved at a heavy
environmental price. These countries have prospered by exporting goods
to the outside world. By contrast, countries like Burma that tried to
develop in isolation have remained poor. Anti-capitalists have
responded to the economic success of South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong
and Singapore by arguing that the first two were given enormous aid by
the United States and the second two are really trading cities, rather than
countries. Lewis replies to this objection with the observation that
Malaysia and Thailand are now doing well.
An objection to Lewis that could come from a Green perspective is that,
although he is disarmingly frank about the terrible pollution that has
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followed industrialisation in Taiwan and South Korea, he does not
provide any evidence that it would be possible for other countries to
industrialise without great damage to the environment. He seems to rest
his argument on the way that levels of pollution peak as a country
industrialises and then diminish as it becomes affluent. However,
although local pollution was much worse in cities like Manchester in the
nineteenth century than it is now, it is not the case that the overall
environmental impact of the inhabitants of Manchester was greater then
than it is now. Quite the opposite is the case. If the Third World is going
to industrialise without creating even more environmental degradation,
then it is going to have to be a quite different kind of industrialisation
from what we have seen so far. Lewis, aware of the environmental costs
of East Asian industrialisation so far, places his hopes in the idea that
industrialising Third World countries will be able to technologically
leapfrog the West. Some support that this is possible can be found from
Singapore. Japan and South Korea industrialised in the traditional way
with an early emphasis on steel, shipyards and car manufacture.
Singapore instead specialised in electronics, which is not an
environmentally benign industry, but is at least much less energy and
materials intensive than the traditional route to industrialisation.
Lewis criticises Green ideas about ecodevelopment because "no program
committed to small-scale technology and economic autarky can ever
foster genuine development."40 He supports sustainable development, as
it allows for quite rapid economic growth in Third World countries.
Lewis believes that from an environmental perspective it is self-defeating
to try to avoid urbanisation and industrialisation. Urbanisation removes
the growing population of peasants from the vicinity of sensitive
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habitats. By urbanising them it will promote a shift in values away from
purely utilitarian attitudes towards nature. Most importantly,
urbanisation is usually accompanied by falling fertility rates; this is not so
with even successful programmes of rural development.
Lewis draws on the failure of literally dozens of attempts at what could be
called 'development in one country' as an argument against the Green
idea of self-sufficient development. He believes that it is only through
capitalism and world trade that Third World countries can develop.
Lewis takes the failure of these isolationist approaches as evidence of how
wrong Marxism was, although Marx himself would not have been
surprised. Marx believed that socialism would come from the most
advanced countries, and that attempts to prevent capitalist development
elsewhere were futile:
The bourgeoisie, by the rapid improvement of all instruments of
production, by the immensely facilitated means of
communication, draws all, even the most barbarian, nations into
civilization. The cheap prices of its commodities are the heavy
artillery with which it batters down all Chinese walls, with which
it forces the barbarians' intensely obstinate hatred of foreigners to
capitulate. It compels all nations, on pain of extinction, to adopt the
bourgeois mode of production; it compels then to introduce what it
calls civilization into their midst, i.e., to become bourgeois
themselves. In one word, it creates a world after its own image.41
The "End of Progress"
Richard Norgaard, from the Green camp, has drawn quite a different
conclusion from Lewis about the lessons to be drawn from the demise of
Communism.42 Norgaard sees the failure of the Soviet Union as
significant because it was the first major power to collapse while
diligently pursuing modernity. Its version of progress ended up
destroying people's creativity and initiative in bureaucracy, wasted soil in
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an effort to modernise agriculture, and polluted water and air to
accelerate industrial development. In the end its efforts stretched
everything beyond breaking point. Norgaard claims that democratic
capitalist nations are wrong to interpret its failure as a victory for their
version of modernity, "not realizing that the differences in versions only
amount to how quickly the breaking point is reached."43 For Greens, as
Jonathon Porritt memorably put it in 1984, "the debate between the
protagonists of capitalism and communism is about as uplifting as the
dialogue between Tweedledum and Tweedledee".44 Capitalism and
communism both were forms of 'industrialism', differing only as how
best to divide the proceeds from exploiting the Earth.
Norgaard believes that the call for sustainability is a recognition that
something has gone wrong with progress, but that "sustainable
development", as commonly understood, requires more data, more
sophisticated use of science, more controls on technology, better
institutional design and appeals to existing values. The logic seems to be
that modernity has gone wrong because people have not been fully in
control:
In this schema, development might become unsustainable if
technology and social order do not advance sufficiently quickly to
uncover new resources and to make enough poor quality resources
available. The solution to unsustainability is to accelerate
technological change and adapt society to these changes. Ironically,
indeed irrationally, in this view of environmental history, if
development is unsustainable, the driving forces of development -
technology and social change - should be accelerated. The idea that
changing ever faster is the path to sustainability underlines the
contradiction in combining the terms "sustainable" and
"development" in the first place.45
Norgaard argues that the crisis of modernity lies in its false
understanding of science. Society accepts particular scientific ways of
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understanding and tries to act rationally on these understandings to the
exclusion of other ways of understanding: "The particular scientific ways
of knowing by themselves are neither bad nor good, but the beliefs which
makes these ways dominant create both an overdependence on particular
ways of understanding and blindspots through the exclusion of other
ways of knowing."46 Norgaard thinks that the problem lies in the belief
that all problems can be solved in a deterministic fashion. It has become
clear that instrumental reason can be highly effective, but its use has not
created the Utopia that was expected. Norgaard writes: "We have become
so effective at dividing and conquering that problems that can be treated
in this manner are no longer problems."47 Norgaard's solution is a
'coevolutionary' approach. Conventional approaches to development
seek to 'humanise' nature. Norgaard's approach takes as the starting point
that nature and society co-evolve. He gives the example of the co-
evolution of pests and pesticides. It is proof of the old maxim that "when
a man invents a better mousetrap, nature invents a better mouse."
Norgaard argues that both social and environmental determinism ignore
the two-way flow between nature and society. He criticises both the social
determinism of the economics profession (of which he is an estranged
member) and the environmental determinism of many in the
environmental movement (in which he is an activist). Norgaard sees the
period since the Industrial Revolution as an era where for a long time it
was possible for societies to develop with relatively few environmental
constraints thanks to the use of fossil fuels.
What would Norgaard's coevolutionary approach be like in practice? It
would involve smaller political units, a flattening of bureaucratic
hierarchies and more public participation - the standard Green ways to
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ensure that information about specific local circumstances is used in
decision-making. It would also involve moves towards greater regional
self-sufficiency and less global trade because Norgaard sees the global
market and cultural homogenisation as ultimately risk-increasing by
reducing the diversity of local strategies. When I interviewed him,
Norgaard told me that he was concerned by the way that free trade and
deregulation mean that increasingly decisions are taken not at a regional
or national level, but at an individual level or global levels, a
"juxtaposition of extremes that I think are very strange." (Richard
Norgaard, University of California, Berkeley, 21.7.94)
Norgaard would like to divide the world into a large number of self-
governing units. In my interview, he told me he was envisaging units of
a few million people. Rather ironically, Norgaard and other Greens
propose this kind of division essentially because they see sustainability as
easier to deal with if you divide the problem up. Norgaard explains the
problem of operationalising sustainability in terms of scale. We can start
at the local level and ask whether a region's agricultural and industrial
practices can continue indefinitely or whether they will destroy the local
resource base and environment. This first level ignores whether there
might be net material or energy inputs to the region being supplied from
outside. The second issue Norgaard identifies is how to weigh the
degradation of some aspects of the environment against investment in
environmental improvements and investment in capital. Thirdly, if a
region is dependent on external non-renewable resources, there are a
number of questions to answer. How long might they last before being
exhausted? Are there renewable substitutes? If the region is dependent on
external renewable resources, are these being managed sustainably?
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Norgaard states that, from an environmental science perspective, keeping
track of material and energy flows would be necessary to put sustainable
development into practice. He claims that keeping track of the flows,
particularly for a number of regions with complex economies, would be
nearly impossible. He writes that one of the challenges of sustainable
development, at least with the data requirements of Western scientific
environmental management, would be to keep track of the flows without
tying up the entire labour force.
Norgaard is raising the spectre of the notorious information problem.
Friedrich Hayek argued that the fundamental fallacy underlying attempts
at economic planning was the belief that all it was necessary to do was to
work out the best way to allocate the given resources.48 The problem he
identified was that the information about the preferences of individual
consumers was unknown, and that collecting enough information
centrally would be impossibly difficult. In a market economy, a vast
number of different products are available. Central planners are unable to
obtain enough information to devise a plan of that complexity, so the
result is a massively simplified economy. Attempting to devise a plan as
complicated as a market economy would require an enormous amount of
labour.
Norgaard's solution to the complexity of the present world is to
drastically decentralise decision-making. When I interviewed him, he
told me that he did not want to come up with a single global definition
for sustainability: "I'm looking for a lot of local definitions. And setting
up technologies and economies that don't have as much interaction. So
things we do in Berkeley don't impact what's going on in Edinburgh."
(Richard Norgaard, University of California, Berkeley, 21.7.94)
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However, the consequence of that kind of decoupling would be rather
like the effect of central planning: to drastically simplify the economy.
The complexity of modern economies depends on the complex flows of
resources around the world. Without such flows, it would be easier to
keep track of the sustainability of each region. But without trade, the
people of many regions would be unable to support themselves. Should
sustainability start at the local level or at the global level? The regions of
the world are so interdependent that it seems utterly impractical to
attempt to disentangle them now. The fact of this interdependence makes
the current practice of local authorities establishing "sustainability
indicators" as part of their commitment to Agenda 21 rather meaningless.
These indicators cannot really be measures of sustainability. They are just
local environmental indicators.
Norgaard himself recognises that regions are affected by the actions of
other regions. Issues like climate change and ozone depletion obviously
require global coordination. Norgaard argues that more emphasis on the
local should not mean less emphasis on the global. Frustratingly, he does
not describe how to bring about this trick of simultaneous
decentralisation and globalism.
In order to establish sustainability at the global level, it is not really
necessary to track resource flows in the way that Norgaard claims. It is
only necessary to know about all the resource inputs and all the waste
outputs. Even this task, however, would be huge. It would also be
necessary to assess how much of each kind of waste ecosystems could
assimilate without 'unacceptable' damage, for pollutants ranging from
the most short-term and short-range to the most long-term and long-
range. In addition, the sustainability of the supply of each resource input
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would have to be considered. For non-renewable resources and
unsustainably harvested renewable resources, it would be necessary to
consider the technical possibilities for substitution with resources that
could be obtained sustainably.
The difficulties of trying to predict the future development of technology
are well known. A less obvious problem, which Norgaard highlights, is
that our systems of knowledge co-evolve with the world. For example,
how we understand agricultural systems affects our decisions about
agriculture. The decisions taken affect the agroecosystem and also the
ideas about agriculture that we have. Because what we know is both
within the system we are trying to understand and affects what we are
trying to understand, our knowledge co-evolves with its environment.
Norgaard claims that this means that there is no absolute knowledge,
because knowledge only has meaning relative to how well it explains the
state, dynamics and evolution of a system; there is no meaning to the
idea that knowledge accumulates. Norgaard's argument does not really
sustain this view, because there are areas of knowledge like chemistry
where our ideas about how something works do not affect how it actually
works. But in areas like economics, it is apparent that there is a reflexive
loop between the understanding and the "object" of study. Norgaard
seems correct to say that "This view of the nature of knowledge and our
interactions with systems helps explain why there are always new
problems needing new solutions. It is not the case, as is often argued, that
we are constantly generating new problems [just] because we cannot
foresee all of the consequences of our actions."49
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Sustainability and the limits to control
When planners and regulators fail it is not just because they are unable to
foresee some of the consequences of their policies. Attempts to push the
path of society in a particular direction are faced with the more
fundamental problem that they are dealing with a target that is not
merely difficult to predict, like the weather, but which responds
intelligently to predictions in such a way as to be able to make them self-
fulfilling or self-confounding. Peter Medawar used this argument to
explain why economic prediction is so unsuccessful.50 It is widely
believed that Keynesianism eventually failed as an economic policy
because investors became able to predict the behaviour of governments
in such a way as to frustrate their intentions. Could policies to bring about
sustainability be successful in the long term? Sustainability policies
would have to be capable of making long-term predictions about the
behaviour of human society as well as of the physical environment.
Another fundamental problem with any kind of long-term historical
prediction which Karl Popper identified is the impossibility of predicting
the future course of science.51 If we could predict its course, we would
also know the contents of future science. Future scientific knowledge will
make possible new technologies, which we do not know of, and which
will have unpredictable social and environmental consequences.
(Incidentally, the same basic argument easily refutes Fukuyama's claim
that liberal democracy is the final form of human society.) Economists
have used Popper's argument to criticise environmentalists for failing to
allow for scientific progress in their view of the future.
Environmentalists have responded that scientific progress is
unpredictable: we cannot simply assume that scientific advances will
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come along to get us out of environmental problems. The difference
between weak and strong sustainability was about the extent to which
technology can substitute for natural capital. But future social evolution
is even more unpredictable than future technology. Attempting to
achieve sustainability sounds like a goal at least as difficult to achieve as
socialism.
Politics after socialism
One of the tremendous ironies of present times is the way that, since
Marxism went into decline, leftists have taken up arguments that once
belonged to conservatives. At the beginning of the modern age, Malthus'
claim of natural limits was conservative and Engels' argument that there
were no limits was progressive. Today, Greens attack economic growth
with an analysis derived from Malthus, and free market economists
defend it with an argument they have borrowed from Engels. Why have
the arguments changed sides? The doctrine of Progress once gave leftists
self-confidence. They were the party of progress, on the side of the future.
Conservatives were the party of reaction, seeking to defend the past. By
the late twentieth century, progress had been so successful that it had
swept away almost all vestiges of the feudal past from Europe. After the
First World War, socialists had firmly established themselves as the
leading progressive element. With time, many of their ideas about state
planning had become the orthodoxy. One of the major appeals of
socialism was that it seemed a more rational approach to economics than
the market. Socialism embodied the progressive values of the
Enlightenment.
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The outcome of both capitalist and socialist modernity was the increasing
destruction of nature. By the late 1980s, almost nobody was able to deny
that the scale of the destruction that had resulted was a cause for concern.
By the late 1980s, it was also apparent that attempts to rationally plan
society had not worked out as expected. The result of these experiences
has been that both the belief in large-scale planning and the belief that
progress lay through the domination of nature seem discredited.
Modernism is now an old-fashioned idea.
The role of the Left has traditionally been to criticise the present society
and suggest a better one. The role of the Right has been to defend present
social arrangements and argue against change. In recent years, the Left has
increasingly been defending its historical achievements, and the Right
has increasingly been seeking to do away with them. The Left has stopped
being progressive and the Right has stopped being conservative in the
earlier senses of those words. The future vision of the Left is increasingly
informed not so much by the socialist vision of the future, but by the
Green one. The Right finds itself, as the proponent of capitalism, cast as
the defender of what faith in Progress remains in western societies.
There is something very odd about all this. The Right has eventually
come to terms with the way that capitalism demands "All that is solid
melts into air", as Marx put it. The Right has ceased to be conservative.
Instead, it seeks to remake society in the interests of capitalism. The
Green position is odder still. It recycles the traditional conservative and
Romantic scepticism of progress. However, in some ways Green ideology
returns to the pre-Marxist roots of socialism. Green ideology retains
certain elements of progressive Enlightenment thinking - the support for
liberty, equality and fraternity. It lacks the faith in human rationality that
287
was the driving force of the Enlightenment. Instead, it considers the
rationalism that drove modernism to have been a disaster. Without faith
in the ability of science or the state to transform society for the better, it
instead puts its faith, like anarchism, in bringing about the
transformation of society from the bottom up. Like anarchism, it is
unable to propose a mechanism for bringing about the world it desires.
Green thought rejects the myth of Progress, but in other ways it is not so
different from other Western belief systems. Trevor Blackwell and
Jeremy Seabrook explored the structural parallels between the Christian,
Marxist and Green myths.52 In the beginning there was harmony on
Earth (the Garden of Eden, a classless society, human beings living in
harmony with nature). Then that harmony was lost (The Fall, the
invention of private property, the domination of nature). The story
involves suffering (Christ's death on the Cross, the sufferings of the
proletariat, the ruin of the planet), followed by redemption (the
Resurrection, the development of class consciousness, the renunciation
of the industrialist way of life), a moment of truth (the Day of Judgement,
the revolution, the avoidance of apocalypse) and finally a resolution
(Heavenly after-life, communism, survival). The green myth differs from
the others in that it is more modest, offering not the end of history after
the struggle, but the continuation of existence. It also offers no clear
redemptive agency. Nonetheless, its structure is largely that of the
standard Western myth.
Blackwell and Seabrook claim that originally capitalism borrowed from
the Christian myth, adding only the idea that the soul could be saved
through work that created wealth. They claim that in recent times it has
turned itself into a religion too. It has abandoned the Christian elements
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of its story and claims that paradise lies in the rich societies here and now.
Francis Fukuyama's claim that contemporary liberal democracy marks
"the End of History"53 seems to fit their interpretation of the new
capitalist myth.
Blackwell and Seabrook argue that the Green myth has a great deal of
potential as a new myth to appeal to the entire human race. It is surely
quite telling that Fukuyama did not directly respond to the Green
challenge. He was able to argue against the feasibility of abandoning
technology, but he had no answer to the challenge to anthropocentrism.
The change in attitudes towards Nature and Progress that has taken place
in Western societies in the last three decades is so great that it seems
likely that we really are witnessing a complete shift in attitudes similar in
scale to the changes that the Enlightenment brought to European
consciousness.
Sustainable development was ostensibly invented as a term that could
allow for the concerns of both environmentalists and developers.
Richard Norgaard described it to me as "a neat bridging trick" to get
environmental ideas into the mainstream. He has pointed out that it is
impossible to publicly advocate unsustainable development and
maintain rhetorical credibility.54 The rhetorical power of the word cannot
be the entire explanation for the success of the idea, though. E.F.
Schumacher recounted how someone once asked him if he really
believed in 'appropriate technology'. He replied that he certainly didn't
believe in inappropriate technology.55 Schumacher's ideas ran into the
problem that people could not agree what was 'appropriate' or
'inappropriate' technology. The concept of sustainability has perhaps been
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more successful because many activities taking place in the world today
are pretty undeniably unsustainable.
The road to sustainability
Environmentalists are increasingly using the measuring stick of
sustainability. It is very hard to defend an activity once it has been
condemned as 'unsustainable'. Attempts to bring about 'sustainability' are
faced with several serious problems, however. Most immediately, there
are powerful vested interests that favour unsustainability. Socialists had
to fight the vested interests of capitalists. For environmentalists, the
present generation has a vested interest in putting itself before the claims
of future generations. Those who live in particularly unsustainable ways
- the affluent consumers - have a particular vested interest in resisting
change immediately. What is more, the poor of the Third World want
wealth quickly and are tempted to ignore the long term consequences.
The second stage to face in attempting to achieve sustainability is defining
what we mean by sustainability. It has not been particularly difficult to
come up with definitions. The difficult bit is getting agreement on any
given definition. It is even harder to find a definition that can readily be
operationalised. Any operational definition of sustainability is ultimately
based on more or less arbitrary decisions about the extent to which new
knowledge and technology will be able to substitute for various natural
resources. Yet it is fundamentally impossible to predict with any accuracy
what future technologies will be available.
The decision about whether a particular activity is sustainable depends
further on knowledge about how many other similar examples of the
activity are taking place. A million cars in the world might have been
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sustainable, a billion cars are not. This means that it is also necessary to
agree on a distribution key for the use of the environmental space
available. Attempting to achieve sustainability in one country is almost
useless if other countries continue to act unsustainably. Sustainability
seems to demand global agreements about the use of the environmental
space.
The logic of competition and free trade will tend to oppose considerations
of sustainability, so there would be a need for global enforcement
mechanisms as well as national policies towards sustainability. The
radical Green idea of decentralisation of decision-making to almost a
village level is a fantasy. On the other hand, the pursuit of sustainability
could turn into a latter-day version of central planning if everything was
decided at a global level. Some kind of a division of labour between
different scales of decision making would have to be worked out.
Even so, it would never be possible to be sure that sustainability had been
achieved. Proving that something is sustainable is impossible. There is
always the possibility that there is something that has been overlooked.
The effects of DDT on bird life is a good example of something that only
became apparent after it had happened and would have been difficult to
predict with the available knowledge. Today, environmental science is
much further advanced, but there still remains the possibility that some
apparently harmless activity will turn out to be highly unsustainable. We °
can eliminate or bring under control all activities that are known to be
unsustainable. It is much more difficult to deal with activities that are
only suspected of being unsustainable. It is impossible to prevent all
potential sources of unsustainability.
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The central idea of Progress was that rationality could be used to master
nature and to build a better society. Sustainability is a rather similar idea
in that its implementation also requires the use of rationality and science.
The main difference is that it is less optimistic about our capacity to
'master' nature. But the belief that we will actually be able to achieve
something like sustainability seems to be based on optimism that it is
possible to predict the future with any accuracy and furthermore that it
will prove possible to persuade people to act not just rationally, but with
altruism towards future generations. It could be said that the search for
sustainability is the continuation of modernity by other means.
The need for metanarratives
A different approach may prove more fruitful. It would be to promote a
kind of religious love of nature rather like Leopold's land ethic. The
development of environmentalism as a religious faith would be likely to
indirectly lead to sustainability. It is easier to imagine a successful nature
religion than a successful religion of 'descendant worship'. This approach
short-circuits rational argument in favour of an appeal to spirituality or
superstition, depending on your way of looking at it. The obvious danger
with such an approach is that, like earlier religions, it could lead to
fanaticism and persecution.
The ecocentric green religion seeks to derive its legitimacy from science.
What is new about the green myth is that it uses Darwinism as the basis
for its cosmology. Humanism to a large extent derived its cosmology
from Christianity, but put Man in the place of God. The long-term
problem humanism is going to be faced with, as a religion for
intellectuals in competition with the green myth, is that the creation
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story humanism accepts as true does not fit with its morality as well as
with the green myth's morality.
Today many intellectuals are influenced by postmodernism and its
suspicion of 'metanarratives', myths to explain the world. Morality
requires such myths, however. Postmodernism takes up Nietzsche's
nihilist arguments, but draws back from his amoral conclusions,
preferring radical relativism to his exultation of the power of the strong
over the weak. But Nietzsche was right that we need myths to live, even
if his myth was distasteful to most of us.
The humanist myth that Man could be God is in serious trouble. It
appears that there are reasons in principle why modern people cannot
develop the God-like powers of control over their destiny that they
sought. The ideal of sustainability is the last attempt to keep that myth
going. Beyond sustainability lies the green myth which puts Nature in
the centre of the frame. Clearly there are dangers for human welfare in
such a myth. People have an unfortunate tendency to lurch from one
extreme of belief to another. The cultural shift is really quite slow,
though. It has been underway for a generation and if it continues will
probably take a few more generations to complete even in Western
countries.
The idea of sustainability was invented to make it difficult for even
hardline anthropocentrists to oppose the environmentalist agenda. It is a
kind of bridge to enable them to begin the shift. Currently, sustainable
development is the slogan of the centrists in the debate and sustainability
is more radical. The people who reject sustainability as anthropocentric
are the extreme radicals in the debate. What really motivates most
293
environmentalists, however, is not love of their great-grandchildren, but
love of the natural world. As environmental destruction proceeds and
the natural world is being lost, this love of nature increases among the
population. The gut instinct in favour of preservation is likely to become
increasingly powerful. The talk of sustainability is a way to put opposition
to environmentalism on the defensive. In the long run, though,
environmentalism is likely to become increasingly open about its
ecocentric basis in the love of nature. The World Council of Churches,
which helped to get the ball rolling in the seventies, has moved on from
talking about the environment in terms of sustainability, and now talks
in near-ecocentric terms about "the integrity of Creation".
Does that mean that talk about sustainability will eventually fade away?
Perhaps not, because the slogan of sustainability, although perhaps over-
ambitious, creates space for a way of talking about issues of social justice
as well as environmental concern. In particular, the concept of
"sustainable consumption" mentioned in Agenda 21 implies the equal
division of environmental space. Sustainability is increasingly being used
in the sense that something is only sustainable if it can be done by
everyone into the indefinite future. This version of sustainability is
much the same as Immanuel Kant's famous categorical imperative: "Act
only according to the maxim by which you can at the same time will that
it should become a universal law." It draws on the argument Kant used
that any moral rule that can be accepted by rational beings must be one
which all can follow. In the context of consumption patterns, the Kantian
categorical imperative is a powerful moral argument for the value of
equality. However, its adoption in practice would depend on a sense of
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solidarity between nations and generations. 'Solidarity' is the present-day
name for the French revolutionary value of 'fraternity'.
The idea of sustainability now provides an environmental argument for
social justice. It chooses a line of argument for equality that Marx and
Engels considered, but rejected for faith in material abundance. The
environmental space argument for equality is a kind of global ecological
version of the inevitable rise of the proletariat in Marxist theory. The
flaw in Marxism was that it underestimated the capacity of capitalism to
reform itself for survival against the threat of revolutionary socialism.
Will the threat from the limits to the Earth's environmental space lead to
reform?
Limits of scale and limits to control
Pressure for reform was visible at the Earth Summit. It is possible that the
current climate negotiations that came out of Rio will eventually lead to
a treaty which will try to address the issue of sharing access to the Earth's
environmental space in terms of greenhouse gas emissions. John Pezzey
pointed out to me that if such a treaty was to be enforced, it would be a
significant step towards a world super-state. For more than a century,
Utopians have hoped for a world state to solve the problem of war. There
were many hopes for the League of Nations after the First World War
and for the United Nations after the Second World War. After the end of
the Cold War, there were hopes among some people that the global
environmental crisis would lead to the creation of such a power.
The collective approach to social organisation in the Modern Age was at
the level of the nation-state. In recent years, international capital has been
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able to transcend the power of individual states and reveal their
weakness in the new world order.
Sustainability would require a kind of world super-state to enforce
standards and prevent cheating on agreements. The new world economy
that is finally emerging calls out for a world super-state to effectively
regulate it. Sustainability, a combination of concern for the integrity of
the global environment with concern for the distribution of the Earth's
environmental space, would be perhaps the most important issue for it to
address. We are a very long way politically, though, from a world super¬
state being established. Even in western Europe, nationalism is far from
dead.
It is not just that our present political structures are incapable of dealing
with the problems, and that new ones will take time to develop. We can
have no certainty that Hegel's 'universal state' would actually be able to
solve these problems either. The problems of modernity may have no
rational solution. Although we no longer have faith in modernity's
earlier promise, Fukuyama may be right that we are stuck in its logic for
the foreseeable future. Perhaps ours is a civilization heading towards an
ecological abyss with unstoppable momentum.
Conclusion
Sustainability has been a valuable slogan for environmentalists as it has
helped them to put their concerns about the global environment on the
international political agenda. The adoption of the phrase "sustainable
development" at the official level marks recognition of these concerns. Its
official acceptance has enabled environmentalists to take the concept into
the heart of the enemy - the economics profession. The language of
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sustainability now also provides space for discussion of matters of
international equity through the concept of environmental space.
However, there is not really much sign that the talk about sustainability
and sustainable development has yet led to much change in practice,
beyond the rhetoric. As Paul Ekins put it to me: "there is still plenty of
scope and justification for pessimism."
This brings us back to the paradox at the heart of the concept of
sustainability. It has come to prominence as the spirit of post-
Enlightenment optimism about human progress has faded, to be replaced
with concern about the environment and its consequences for future
human generations. Upon reflection, it turns out that achieving
sustainability is a goal that would require an enormous capacity to predict
the future and handle uncertainty. The idea of sustainability itself has
arisen out of increasing pessimism about the capacity of human
institutions to handle even much less challenging problems. The slogan
is rhetorically easy, but begs more questions than it answers.
1Edmund Burke (1790) Reflections on the Revolution in France, Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1993
2Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels (1848) The Communist Manifesto,
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992, pp. 7-8
3ibid, p. 6
4John Kenneth Galbraith (1958) The Affluent Society, New York: New
American Library
5Encyclopsedia Britannica (1911) eleventh edition, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, vol. 27, p. 72
6ibid, vol. 28, p. 314
7Eric Hobsbawm (1994) Age of Extremes: The Short Twentieth Century
1914-1991, London: Michael Joseph
8ibid
9ibid
10Abraham H. Maslow (1954) Motivation and Personality, New York:
Harper and Brothers
297
nTrevor Blackwell and Jeremy Seabrook (1988) The Politics of Hope,
London: Faber & Faber
12Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno (1947) Dialectic of
Enlightenment, New York: Herder, 1972
13Jacques Derrida (1976) Of Grammatology, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
University Press
14Michel Foucault (1979) Discipline and Punish, Harmandsworth:
Penguin
15Jean-Fran^ois Lyotard (1984) The Condition of Post-modernity,
Manchester: Manchester University Press, p. xxiv
16Hosbawm (1994) op cit
17Timothy Garton Ash (1990) We The People, London: Granta
18Hobsbawm (1994) op cit
19Timothy Garton Ash (1989) The Uses of Adversity, London: Granta
20Hobsbawm (1994) op cit
21New Economics Foundation (1992) Economic Alternatives in Eastern
Europe, London: New Economics Foundation
22Carl Boggs (1995) The Socialist Tradition, New York: Routledge
23Francis Fukuyama (1989) 'The End of History?' The National Interest,
Summer 1989, 3-18
24Francis Fukuyama (1992) The End of History and the East Man, New
York: Free Press
25Milan Kundera (1984) The Unbearable Tightness of Being, New York:
Harper & Row
26Hobsbawm (1994) op cit
27Richard D. North (1995) Eife on a modern planet: A manifesto for
progress, Manchester: Manchester University Press
28Wilfred Beckerman (1995) Small Is Stupid, Oxford: Duckworth







36Martin W. Lewis (1992) Green Delusions, Durham, North Carolina:
Duke University Press
37Lewis (1992) op cit, p. 18
38Herman Daly (1994) Review of Green Delusions, Ecological Economics
9,179
39Lewis (1992) op cit, pp. 9-10
40ibid, p. 201
41Marx and Engels (1848) op cit, p. 7
42Richard B. Norgaard (1994) Development Betrayed, London: Routledge
43ibid, p. 185
298
44Jonathon Porritt (1984) Seeing Green: The Politics of Ecology Explained,
Oxford: Basil Blackwell, p. 44
45Norgaard (1994) op cit, p. 34
46ibid, pp. 9-10
47ibid, p. 70
48F.A. Hayek (1945) 'The Use of Knowledge in Society' American
Economic Review 35, 519-530
49Norgaard (1994) op cit, p. 95
50Peter Medawar (1984) Pluto's Republic, Oxford: Oxford University Press
51Karl Popper (1957) The Poverty of Historicism, London: Routledge &
Kegan Paul
52Blackwell and Seabrook (1988) op cit
53Fukuyama (1992) op cit
54Norgaard (1994) op cit
55E.F. Schumacher (1979) Good Work, London: Cape
299
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Ash, Timothy Garton (1989) The Uses of Adversity, London: Granta
Ash, Timothy Garton (1990) We The People, London: Granta
Barney, Gerald, director (1981) Global 2000 Report to the President, New
York: Penguin
Barry, Brian (1989) Theories of Justice, London: Harvester-Wheatsheaf
Barry, Brian (1995) Justice as Impartiality, Oxford: Clarendon
Beckerman, Wilfred (1995) Small Is Stupid, Oxford: Duckworth
Bentham, Jeremy (1789) An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and
Legislation, London: Athlone, 1970
Benton, Ted (1989) 'Marx and Natural Limits: An Ecological Critique and
Reconstruction' New Left Review 163: 51-86
Blackwell, Trevor and Jeremy Seabrook (1988) The Politics of Hope,
London: Faber & Faber
Boggs, Carl (1995) The Socialist Tradition, New York: Routledge
Bookchin, Murray (1989) Remaking Society, Montreal: Black Rose
Boulding, Kenneth (1966) 'The Economics of the Coming Spaceship
Earth' in Environmental Quality in a Growing Economy, edited by H.
Jarrett, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press
Brundtland, Gro Harlem (1994) 'The challenge of sustainable
development and consumption patterns' in Symposium Report:
Sustainable consumption, edited by Sylvi Ofstad, Liv Westby and Tone
Bratelli, Oslo: Ministry of Environment
Buitenkamp, Maria, Henk Venner, Teo Warns, editors (1993) Action Plan
Sustainable Netherlands, Amsterdam: Vereniging Milieudefensie
Burke, Edmund (1790) Reflections on the Revolution in France, Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1993
Callicott, J. Baird (1989) In Defense ofA Land Ethic, Albany: SUNY Press
Callon, Michel (1991) 'Techno-economic networks and irreversibility',
International Conference on the Economics and Sociology of Technology,
University of Manchester Institute of Science and Technology
Carroll, Lewis (1872) 'Alice Through the Looking-Glass' in The Penguin
Complete Lewis Carroll, Harmandsworth: Penguin, 1982
300
Carson, Rachel (1962) Silent Spring, New York: Houghton Mifflin
Chatterjee, Pratap and Matthias Finger (1994) The Earth Brokers, London:
Routledge
Clayton, Anthony and Nicholas Radcliffe (1996) Sustainability: A Systems
Approach, London: Earthscan
Cole, H.S.D., Christopher Freeman, Marie Jahoda and K.L.R Pavitt (1973)
Thinking About The Future: A Criticjue of 'The Limits to Growth',
London: Chatto & Windus
Commoner, Barry (1972) The Closing Circle, New York: Knopf
Daly, Herman E. (1977) Steady-state economics, San Francisco: Freeman
Daly, Herman E. (1992) Steady-State Economics, Second Edition, London:
Earthscan
Daly, Herman (1994) Review of Green Delusions, Ecological Economics 9,
179
Daly, Herman E. and John B. Cobb (1989) For the Common Good, Boston:
Beacon
Dasgupta, Partha (1993a) 'Optimal versus Sustainable Development' in
Valuing the Environment, edited by Ismail Serageldin and Andrew Steer,
Washington DC: World Bank
Dasgupta, Partha (1993b) Floor Discussion in Valuing the Environment,
edited by Ismail Serageldin and Andrew Steer, Washington DC: World
Bank
Derrida, Jacques (1976) Of Grammatology, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
University Press
Descartes, Rene (1637) A Discourse on Method, London: Everyman, 1992
Devall, Bill and George Sessions (1985) Deep Ecology, Salt Lake City: Gibbs
Smith
Dowdeswell, Elizabeth (1994) 'A global view' in Partnerships in Practice,
London: Department of the Environment
Easlea, Brian (1983) Fathering the Unthinkable, London: Pluto
Eckersley, Robyn (1992) Environmentalism and Political Theory, London:
UCL Press
Ehrlich, Paul (1968) The Population Bomb, New York: Ballantine
Ehrlich, Paul R. and Anne H. Ehrlich (1991) The Population Explosion,
New York: Simon & Schuster
Ekins, Paul (1992) 'Sustainability first' in Real-life Economics, edited by
Paul Ekins and Manfred Max-Neef, London: Routledge
Encyclopaedia Britannica (1911) eleventh edition, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press
Engels, Friedrich (1844) 'Outlines of a Critique of Political Economy' in
Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, Collected Works, London: Lawrence &
Wishart, 1987
Fankhauser, Samuel and Richard Tol (1995) Appendix D to Aubrey Meyer
and Tony Cooper, 'A Recalculation of the Social Costs of Climate Change',
Global Commons Institute, London
Foucault, Michel (1979) Discipline and Punish, Harmandsworth: Penguin
Fox, Warwick (1990) Toward a Transpersonal Ecology, Boston: Shambhala
301
Fukuyama, Francis (1989) The End of History?' The National Interest,
Summer 1989, 3-18
Fukuyama, Francis (1992) The End of History and the Last Man, New
York: Free Press
Galbraith, John Kenneth (1958) The Affluent Society, New York: New
American Library
Georgescu-Roegen, Nicholas (1971) The Entropy Law and the Economic
Process, Cambridge, Massachussets: Harvard University Press
Global Commons Institute (1994) 'The Unequal Use of the Global
Commons', paper for IPCC workshop, Nairobi, 18-23 July
Goodland, Robert and Herman Daly (1993) 'Why Northern income
growth is not the solution to Southern poverty' Ecological Economics, 8:
85-101
Gore, A1 (1992) Earth in the Balance, New York: Houghton Mifflin
Gramsci, Antonio (1971) Prison Notebooks, London: Lawrence & Wishart
Griffin, Donald R. (1992) Animal Minds, Chicago: University of Chicago
Press
Grubb, Michael, Matthias Koch, Koy Thomson, Abby Munson, Francis
Sullivan (1993) The 'Earth Summit' Agreements: A Guide and
Assessment, London: Earthscan
Hayek, F.A. (1945) 'The Use of Knowledge in Society' American Economic
Review 35, 519-530
Heuting, Roefie, P. Bosch and B. de Boer (1992) Methodology for the
calculation of sustainable national income, The Hague: Central Bureau of
Statistics
Hildyard, Nicholas (1993) 'Foxes in charge of the chickens' in Global
Ecology, edited by Wolfgang Sachs, London: Zed
Hirsch, Fred (1976) The Social Limits to Growth, Cambridge,
Massachussets: Harvard University Press
Hobsbawm, Eric (1994) Age of Extremes: The Short Twentieth Century
1914-1991, London: Michael Joseph
Horkheimer, Max and Theodor Adorno (1947) Dialectic of
Enlightenment, New York: Herder, 1972
Huxley, Aldous (1932) Brave New World, London: Chatto & Windus
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (1990) Climate Change: The
IPCC Assessment , Geneva: World Meteorological Organisation
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (1995) Climate Change 1995,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (1995) 'Summary for Policy¬
makers of the Report of Working Group IIP, World Meteorological
Organisation: Geneva
International Union for the Conservation of Nature (1980) World
Conservation Strategy: Living Resources Conservation for Sustainable
Development, Gland, Switzerland: IUCN
Irwin, Aisling (1995) 'Green economist faces picket', Times Higher
Education Supplement, 24 November
Jacobs, Michael (1991) The Green Economy, London: Pluto
302
Khor, Martin (1992) Editorial, Third World Resurgence, 24-25
Kuhn, Thomas (1970) The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Chicago:
University of Chicago Press
Kundera, Milan (1984) The Unbearable Lightness of Being, New York:
Harper & Row
Latour, Bruno (1987) Science in Action, Milton Keynes: Open University
Press
Leahy, Michael P.T. (1991) Against Liberation, London: Faber & Faber
Leiss, William (1972) The Domination of Nature, New York: George
Braziller
Leopold, Aldo (1949) A Sand County Almanac, New York: Ballantine,
1970
Lewis, Martin W. (1992) Green Delusions, Durham, North Carolina:
Duke University Press
Locke, John (1689) Two Treatises of Government, London: Everyman,
1993
Lovelock, James (1979) Gaia: A new look at life on Earth, Oxford: Oxford
University Press
Lyotard, Jean-Francois (1984) The Condition of Post-modernity,
Manchester: Manchester University Press
Machiavelli, Niccolo (1532) The Prince, Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1988
Macluhan, Marshall (1962) The Gutenberg Galaxy, London: Routledge &
Kegan Paul
Maddox, John (1972) The Doomsday Syndrome, London: Macmillan
Malthus, Thomas (1798) An Essay on the Principle of Population, Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1993
Martinez-Alier, Juan (1987) Ecological Economics, Oxford: Basil Blackwell
Marx, Karl and Friedrich Engels (1848) The Communist Manifesto,
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992
Maslow, Abraham H. (1954) Motivation and Personality, New York:
Harper and Brothers
McLaughlin, Andrew (1993) Regarding Nature, Albany: SUNY Press
Meadows, Donella H., Dennis L. Meadows, Jorgen Randers and William
W. Behrens III (1972) The Limits To Growth, New York: Universe Books
Meadows, Donella H., Dennis L. Meadows and Jorgen Randers (1992)
Beyond the Limits: Global Collapse or a Sustainable Future, London:
Earthscan
Medawar, Peter (1984) Pluto's Republic, Oxford: Oxford University Press
Meyer, Aubrey and Tony Cooper (1995) 'A Recalculation of the Social
Costs of Climate Change', Global Commons Institute, London
Meyer-Abich, Klaus (1993) 'Winners and Losers in Climate Change' in
Global Ecology, edited by Wolfgang Sachs, London: Zed
Mill, John Stuart (1848) Principles of Political Economy, Harmandsworth:
Penguin, 1985
Mishan, E.J. (1967) The Costs of Economic Growth, London: Staples
303
Muir, John (1894) The Mountains of California, San Francisco: Sierra
Club,1988
Naess, Arne (1973) The shallow and the deep, long-range ecology
movement: a survey' Inquiry 16: 95-100
Nash, Roderick (1989) The Rights of Nature, Madison: University of
Wisconsin Press
National Institute for Public Health and Environmental Protection (1988)
Caring for Tomorrow: National Environmental Outlook 1985-2010, The
Hague: National Institute for Public Health and Environmental
Protection
Netherlands Ministry of Housing, Physical Planning and the
Environment (1988) National Environmental Policy Plan, The Hague:
Ministry of Housing, Physical Planning and the Environment
Netherlands Ministry of Housing, Physical Planning and the
Environment (1993) Second National Environmental Policy Plan, The
Hague: Ministry of Housing, Physical Planning and the Environment
New Economics Foundation (1992) Economic Alternatives in Eastern
Europe, London: New Economics Foundation
Norgaard, Richard B. (1994) Development Betrayed, London: Routledge
North, Richard D. (1995) Life on a modern planet: A manifesto for
progress, Manchester: Manchester University Press
O'Riordan, Tim (1983) OECD Discussion Paper, Paris: OECD
O'Riordan, Tim (1988) 'The Politics of Sustainability' in Sustainable
Environmental Management: Principles and Practice, edited by R. Kerry
Turner, London: Belhaven
O'Riordan, Tim (1993) 'The Politics of Sustainability' in Sustainable
Environmental Economics and Management: Principles and Practice,
edited by R. Kerry Turner, London: Belhaven
Pearce, David (1994) 'Sustainable consumption through economic
instruments' in Symposium Report: Sustainable consumption, edited by
Sylvi Ofstad, Liv Westby and Tone Bratelli, Oslo: Ministry of
Environment
Pearce, David, Anil Markandya and Edward B. Barbier (1989) Blueprint
for a Green Economy, London: Earthscan
Pearce, Fred (1995) 'Global row over value of human life', New Scientist,
19 August
Pearce, Fred (1996) 'Pounds and pence view of nature provokes uprising',
New Scientist, 3 February
Perrot, Michelle (1983) 'Malthusianism and Socialism' in Malthus Past
and Present, edited by J. Dupaquier, London: Academic
Pezzey, John (1989) Economic Analysis of Sustainable Growth and
Sustainable Development, Washington DC: World Bank
Pezzey, John (1994) 'Concern for Sustainability in a Sexual World', Centre
for Social and Economic Research on the Global Environment, London
Pirages, Dennis, editor (1977) The Sustainable Society, New York: Praeger
Popper, Karl (1957) The Poverty of Historicism, London: Routledge &
Kegan Paul
304
Porritt, Jonathon (1984) Seeing Green: The Politics of Ecology Explained,
Oxford: Basil Blackwell
Porritt, Jonathon and David Winner (1988) The Coming of the Greens,
London: Fontana
Rawls, John (1971) A Theory of Justice, Cambridge, Massachussets:
Harvard University Press
Redclift, Michael (1987) Sustainable Development: Exploring the
Contradictions, London: Methuen
Regan, Tom (1983) The Case for Animal Rights, London: Routledge &
Kegan Paul
Richard, David J. (1971) A Theory of Reasons for Action, Oxford:
Clarendon
Rifkin, Jeremy (1985) Declaration of a Heretic, London: Routledge &
Kegan Paul
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques (1755) Discourse on Inequality, Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1994
Ryle, Martin (1988) Ecology and Socialism, London: Century Hutchinson
Schmidheiny, Stephen (1992) Changing Course, Cambridge,
Massachussets: MIT Press
Schumacher, E.F. (1973) Small is Beautiful, London: Blond & Briggs
Schumacher, E.F. (1979) Good Work, London: Cape
Schumpeter, Joseph A. (1943) Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy,
London: Allen & Unwin
Serageldin, Ismail and Andrew Steer (1994) Making Development
Sustainable: From Concepts to Action, Washington DC: World Bank
Shelley, Mary (1818) Frankenstein, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994
Shelley, Mary (1826) The Last Man, London: Hogarth, 1985
Siebert, Horst (1982) 'Nature as a life-support system', Journal of
Economics, 42 (2): 133-42
Singer, Peter (1975) Animal Liberation, New York: Monthly Review Press
Singer, Peter (1981) The Expanding Circle, Oxford: Clarendon
Singer, Peter (1990) Animal Liberation, Second Edition, New York: New
York Review of Books
Smith, Adam (1776) The Wealth of Nations, Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1993
Smith, Kenneth (1951) The Malthusian Controversy, London: Routledge
& Kegan Paul
Steer, Andrew (1993) Discussant Remarks in Valuing the Environment,
edited by Ismail Serageldin and Andrew Steer, Washington DC: World
Bank
Turner, R. Kerry (1991) 'Environment, economics and ethics' in Blueprint
2: Greening the World Economy, edited by David Pearce, London:
Earthscan
United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (1992)
'The Rio Declaration on Environment and Development', Rio de Janiero:
UNCED Secretariat
305
United Nations Development Programme (1992) Human Development
Report 1992, Oxford: Oxford University Press
Ward, Barbara (1966) Spaceship Earth, New York: University of Columbia
Press
Weizsacker, Ernst-Ulrich von (1994) Earth Politics, London: Zed
Weterings, R. and J.B. Opschoor (1994), Towards Environmental
Performance Indicators Based on the Notion of Environmental Space,
Rijswijk, The Netherlands: Advisory Council for Research on Nature
and the Environment
Williams, Robin and Stuart Russell (1988) 'Opening the black box and
closing it behind you', Edinburgh PICT Working Paper No. 3
Wilson, Edward O. (1975) Sociobiology: The New Synthesis, Cambridge,
Massachussets: Harvard University Press
World Bank (1992) World Development Report 1992: Development and
the Environment, New York: Oxford University Press
World Commission on Environment and Development (1987) Our
Common Future, Oxford: Oxford University Press
World Council of Churches (1974) Report of Ecumenical Study
Conference on Science and Technology for Human Development,
Geneva: World Council of Churches
Worster, Donald (1985) Nature's Economy, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press
306
